Systemic pressures, party politics and foreign policy: Serbia between Russia and the West, 2008-2020 by Vuksanovic, Vuk
 
 









Systemic Pressures, Party Politics and Foreign Policy: 













A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of 







I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than 
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others. The copyright of this thesis 
rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement 
is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant 
that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third 
party.  
 







Since 2008 Serbia maintained its relations with the West, meaning the EU and the US 
while nurturing partnership with Russia, even though it has an interest in joining the EU. 
This thesis examines the causes of the Serbian balancing act between Russia and the West 
in the period between 2008 and 2020. The thesis determines the causal factors behind 
Serbian balancing act and factors that account for differences in the intensity of this policy 
during different historical stages. The analysis uses the causal mechanism of the 
neoclassical realism (NCR) where the individual behaviour of the state is determined by 
the international systemic processes (independent variable) that are translated through 
unit-level factors (intervening variable). The thesis methodologically relies on process 
tracing, case study and analytical narrative. The research was based on the analysis of 
secondary source materials, like empirical and theoretical literature, media material and 
think-tank reports. More importantly, the study is based on primary source material 
collected through fieldwork in Serbia, in which semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 31 stakeholders. There are four arguments offered within this study. The 
first is that the independence of Kosovo is the first systemic process shaping Serbian 
policy as Serbia became closer to Russia from that point. The second is the lack of 
permanent US interest in the region, and the inability of the EU to enlarge generated a 
power vacuum in the Balkans that acts as the second systemic process. In that vacuum, 
there was a permissive environment for Russia to act more assertively and in which Serbia 
gained an incentive to balance and play Russia and the West against each other. Third, 
the difference in the intensity of Serbian balancing act is determined by the state of 
relations between Russia and the West, where if the relationship becomes more 
confrontational Serbia is even more inclined to hedge its bets and continue its balancing. 
Fourth, the party politics in Serbia also shapes balancing act acting as the intervening 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Defining the Puzzle, Research Question and Hypothesis  
 
Since its inception, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has tried to uncover the 
forces behind sovereign states’ international behaviour. Why did state A launch a war 
with state B? Why did state C, unlike state A, decided to establish diplomatic relations 
with state B? What interests does state D pursue and with what means? At the time of 
writing, the UN has 193 Member States;1 which means there are 193 internationally 
recognised sovereign nation-states. Regardless of their differences in size, power 
capabilities, geography and culture, each one of these states has its interest in the 
international system. These states promote those interests through the specific policy 
instruments at their disposal. In short, every one of these states has its foreign policy. In 
a way determining causality behind the behaviour of an individual state appears as a 
commonsense task. 
 
However, some states engage in policy behaviour that constitutes an empirical puzzle that 
demands rigorous analysis of the forces causing that behaviour. The case of the Serbian 
balancing act between Russia and the West is just that type of puzzle. After the regime of 
Serbian strongman Slobodan Milošević was overthrown in 2000, widespread predictions 
were made that Serbia would along with the other countries of Eastern Europe join the 
institutions of the transatlantic community, like the EU and NATO. Goran Svilanović, 
the first post-Milosevic Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), 
in his 2001 speech in the Federal Assembly, stated openly: “The basic foreign policy 
orientation of the FRY is directed towards European and Euroatlantic integration 
processes.”2 However, the word Euroatlantic slowly disappeared from the official 
documents and policy narrative in subsequent years.3 
 
1 ‘United Nations – Member States’, United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-
states/index.html, accessed: 28-02-2021 
2 Nataša Dragojlović, Stanislav Sretenović, Dragan Đukanović, and Dragan Živojinović (eds), Spoljna 
Politika Srbije: Strategija i Dokumenti (Serbian Foreign Policy: Strategies and Documents), (Belgrade: 
2010), p.287 




As opposed to the initial ambition to pursue fully pro-Western foreign policy, starting in 
2008, Serbian foreign policy began to drift through different stages, summarised in 
various sloganeering political terms used by its political elites. The Euroatlantic 
integrations were replaced with European integrations to avoid a reference to NATO. 
New phrases also began to be used by Serbian elites, like: “both Europe and Kosovo” 
(opposing Kosovo’s independence while pursuing the policy of European integrations); 
Serbia that is “East to the West, and West to the East”; four pillars of Serbian foreign 
policy (Russia, EU, USA, and China). This policy lasts to this very day. However, for the 
sake of analytical precision, it was necessary not just to define the starting date of the 
empirical phenomenon but also the empirical conclusion. While the Serbian balancing act 
carries on in 2021, the year 2020 provides a closing timeframe on which a sound analysis 
based on a conceptual framework can be conducted. 
 
In her 2020 keynote address in the Serbian Parliament, Serbian PM Ana Brnabić outlined 
Serbian foreign policy goals: “Serbia’s main foreign policy goal is EU accession, the best 
framework for overall reforms, modernisation, and development of Serbia. ... At the 
international level, Serbia will continue to pursue a policy of respect, friendship and 
partnership with the People’s Republic of China, to maintain traditionally friendly 
relations and strategic cooperation with the Russian Federation, as well as to work 
diligently to improve and build better relations with the United States.”4 Serbian strategic 
documents are based on the same set of proclaimed goals, showing how deeply embedded 
this policy of balancing between Russia and the West really is. In 2019, the Serbian 
National Security Strategy emphasised the Serbian desire to join the EU while 
simultaneously stressing strong ties with the US and Russia as essential for Serbian 
national interest.5 The previous National Security Strategy from 2009 is based on the 
same set themes,6 showing that the policy of simultaneously pursuing close ties with the 
 
4 ‘Keynote address of Prime Minister Designate Ana Brnabic’, The Government of Republic of Serbia, 28 
October 2020, https://www.srbija.gov.rs/tekst/en/130345/keynote-address-.php, accessed 04-03-2021 
5 ‘National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia’, Ministry of Defence Republic of Serbia, 27 
December 2019, p.7, http://www.mod.gov.rs/eng/4350/strategije-4350, accessed 04-03-2021 






West and Russia survives irrespective of the passage of time or government changes in 
Belgrade. 
 
This language points to a certain lack of strategic thinking. These statements and 
doctrinary documents resemble a wishlist of goals Serbia pursues, rather than a 
strategically- and analytically-based policy with a clear set of priorities. So, this is a 
country that is an EU membership candidate, expected to become aligned with the EU, 
wants to pursue a partnership with Russia, irrespective of whether the EU and Russia are 
on the same page. The task may be even more demanding in the case of the US and 
Russia. How can one hope to have a good relationship between two powers that are 
frequently clashing? 
 
This dilemma is not just reduced to government officials’ statements and formulations in 
the policy documents. In practice, the Serbian policy appears even more contradictory. 
At the end of 2014, Serbia, based on its Partnership for Peace membership (PfP), adopted 
the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), the highest level of partnership that a 
country not aspiring to become a member can have with NATO.7 In 2015, Serbia was 
visited by NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg.8 However, that same year, Serbia 
started participating in the trilateral military exercise “Slavic Brotherhood”, alongside the 
Russian and Belarus military, amidst West-Russia tensions over the conflict in Ukraine.9 
Serbia balancing its EU aspirations and partnership with Russia equally burdens the 
country’s behaviour. A powerful case in point is Serbia’s persistent refusal to join the EU 
sanctions against Russia over its involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. As then Serbian 
Foreign Minister, Ivica Dačić, told the Russian press in 2018: “Yes, today we find 
ourselves on the European path, but the European path will not be an obstacle for kind 
relations with Russia, so Serbia will not introduce sanctions against Russia.”10 In 
 
7 ‘Serbia adopts new IPAP with NATO’, European Western Balkans, 8 November 2019, 
https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/11/08/serbia-adopts-new-ipap-with-nato/, accessed 25-06-2020 
8 Sasa Dragojlo, ‘NATO Visit Highlights Serbia’s Strategic Balancing Act’, Balkan Insight, 18 November 
2015, https://balkaninsight.com/2015/11/18/nato-visit-highlights-serbia-s-strategic-balancing-act-11-17-
2015/, accessed 13-06-2020 
9 ‘Slavic Brotherhood 2019 military exercise begins in Serbia’, TASS, 15 June 2019, 
https://tass.com/defense/1063934, accessed 23-06-2020 
10 ‘Serbia has no plans to introduce anti-Russian sanctions, says foreign minister’, TASS, 26 November 




December 2020, unlike the EU members, Serbia voted against the UN General Assembly 
resolution calling on Russia to end its seizure of Crimea.11 
 
Serbia may not necessarily be a unique case given that it is certainly not the first time that 
a smaller country tries to balance between two or more great powers. However, Serbia is 
still a puzzling case. Historically, it has been frequently perceived by the Western powers 
as a Russian ally or a proxy, leading to disputes and even conflicts. Therefore, it is a risky 
and potentially dangerous policy for Serbia to be close to Russia to the extent that it would 
encourage the perception in the West of Serbs being “the little Russians”, Russian allies 
and proxies in the Balkans.12 
 
Serbian foreign policy also sets it apart from other countries in the region. Most of the 
other Balkan nations are mainly taking a pro-Western course. One can test this assertion 
based on the level of Serbian alignment with the EU’s foreign policy, including joining 
the EU’s declarations and measures. Among the candidate countries, the Serbian 
percentage of alignment with the EU’s policies in 2020 (56 per cent) was lowest after 
Turkey (12 per cent).13 This puts the fellow candidate countries in the Western Balkans 
in front of Serbia: Bosnia and Herzegovina had 68 per cent of alignment in 2020; North 
Macedonia had 93 per cent of alignment; and Montenegro and Albania were fully aligned 
with the EU’s measures and declarations.14 Indeed, in its neighbourhood, Serbia sticks 
out. 
 
Ultimately, Serbia would not be expected to conduct such a foreign policy given its 
evident status as a small country unable to have structural autonomy in the light of its 
material capability deficiency. According to structural realist logic, Serbia, a small 
country encircled by NATO and the EU and economically dependent on the West, would 
 
11 ‘RFE: Serbia votes against UN resolution on Crimea’, N1, 8 December 2020, 
https://rs.n1info.com/english/news/a681312-rfe-serbia-votes-against-un-resolution-on-crimea/, accessed 
16-01-2021 
12 Vuk Vuksanovic, ‘Serbs Are Not “Little Russians”’, The American Interest, 26 July 2018, 
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/07/26/serbs-are-not-little-russians/, accessed 08-09-2018 
13 ‘An analysis of Serbia’s alignment with the European Union’s foreign policy declarations and measures 
in 2020’, The International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC), March 2021, p.6, https://www.isac-
fund.org/en/publication/an-analysis-of-serbias-alignment-with-the-european-unions-foreign-policy-
declarations-and-measures-in-2020, accessed 21-05-2021 




be advised to bandwagon with the West. As Kenneth Waltz said: “As soon as someone 
looks like the winner, nearly all jump on the bandwagon rather than continuing to build 
coalitions intended to prevent anyone from winning the prize of power. Bandwagoning, 
not balancing, becomes the characteristic behaviour.”15 Instead, Serbia is showing a 
tendency to balance among great powers, in this case, the West and Russia, without fully 
aligning with either side. Jelica Kurjak, the Serbian specialist on Russia and former 
Serbian ambassador in Russia, was also perplexed with the Serbian balancing act: “I have 
to admit it was always without foundation for me. What weight do we have in 
international relations?”16 Therefore, Serbia represents an anomaly compared to the 
dictates of structural realism. 
 
In that regard, the project at hand deals with two types of research puzzle, the first is the 
one “for which no answer is readily at hand”, and the second for which “the answers 
suggested by the previous study do not seem to apply.”17 On the former, no one has 
engaged systemically with the considerations guiding the Serbian balancing act. With the 
latter, it is worth adding that except for a couple of Balkan specialists, Serbia and the 
Balkans have not been a focus of International Relations studies. There are some 
exceptions, but these works of scholarship did not entirely deal with the Serbian balancing 
act. 
 
One example of that type of scholarship is the 2012 book by James Ker-Lindsay, “The 
Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States.”18 
In this book, Ker-Lindsay deals with cases of states engaged in counter-secession vis-à-
vis contested territories and policy instruments that states use on that front. Serbian policy 
on Kosovo, including reliance on Russia, was among the cases that Ker-Lindsay 
examined, but the Serbian balancing act is not the primary focus of this book. A 2017 
book by Dimitar Bechev, “Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe”, analyses Russian 
foreign policy towards Southeastern Europe in the post-Cold War era and the logic 
 
15 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: 1979), p.126 
16 Author’s interview with Jelica Kurjak, former Serbian Ambassador to Russia, Belgrade, March 2019 
17 Jillian Schwedler, ‘Puzzle’, Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, Vol. 11, No.2, Fall 2013, p.28 
18 James Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested 




guiding local nations to engage with Russia.19 However, the Serbian case is just one of 
several countries that Bechev examines in a politically diverse region. Therefore, while 
Bechev’s book is a capital work on the topic, it does not venture enough into the Serbian 
perspective during the period examined in this study. Also, worth mentioning is the book 
chapter on Serbian foreign policy written in 2014 by Mladen Mladenov, as part of the 
broader study on the foreign policies of post-Yugoslav states.20 While Mladenov does 
refer to the Serbian balancing act as one aspect of Serbian foreign policy, his chapter does 
not offer a detailed, empirical analysis of that particular aspect of Serbian policy, as his 
study is a macro bird’s-eye view of Serbian foreign policy since the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. It is also not a theoretically-founded analysis, which creates an opening for 
a conceptually sound, scholarly analysis of the subject. 
 
Given the research puzzle described above regarding the peculiar case of the Serbian 
balancing act, a research question was needed based on that puzzle. The logical choice 
for a research question would be: Why is Serbia conducting its balancing act? However, 
it is an incomplete approach as Serbian behaviour during the twelve years of the selected 
case study timeframe differed based on the historical stage in question. It was necessary 
to explain not just the causes behind the Serbian balancing act but also what causes the 
difference in manifestation and intensity of that balancing act during different empirical 
stages. Following that necessity, the research question was formulated as: Why is Serbia 
conducting its balancing act, which involves maintaining close ties with Russia, the 
pursuit of EU membership and a working relationship with the US? Also, what factors 
explain variation in that balancing during different periods? 
 
The researcher tested the following hypothesis: The Serbian balancing act between 2008 
and 2020 was a product of systemic pressures (the independent or the exogenous variable) 
to which Serbia was exposed, and so was the difference in the manifestation and intensity 
of that balancing act during various empirical phases. Given that the research project is 
based on four arguments: a) The independence of Kosovo and the international dispute it 
 
19 Dimitar Bechev, Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe (New Haven and London: 2017) 
20 Mladen Mladenov, ‘An Orpheus Syndrome? Serbian Foreign Policy After the Dissolution of 
Yugoslavia’, in Soeren Keil, and Bernhard Stahl (eds), The Foreign Policy of Post-Yugoslav States: From 




triggered is the first systemic pressure causing the Serbian balancing act, as the 
unresolved Kosovo dispute put Serbia in a state of systemic dependency on Russia and 
its diplomatic protection; b) The second systemic pressure is the regional power vacuum 
in the Balkans caused by the deadlock in EU enlargement and lack of US attention, 
creating a permissive environment for Russia to act more assertively in the region, and an 
incentive for Serbia to balance and play Russia and the West against each other; c) The 
difference in the intensity of the Serbian balancing act is determined by the state of 
relations between Russia and the West, as any major strategic frictions between these two 
force Serbia to hedge its bets and balance more openly and intensely; d) Party politics 
acts as the intervening variable through which systemic pressures are translated as Serbian 
political parties and their leaders use foreign policy in their mutual domestic competition 
to win power. 
 
The puzzle, research questions, and hypothesis as integral parts of any scientific inquiry 
have been laid out. What also needs to be laid out is what exactly the thesis tells us about 
Serbia’s foreign policy, and what contribution it makes to our understanding of Serbian 
foreign policy in terms of IR. This thesis lies at the peculiar intersection of Balkan politics, 
diplomatic history, general IR and foreign policy analysis (FPA). Consequently, it offers 
both academic and policy insights. The thesis will describe, analyse and explain Serbian 
foreign policy behaviour during twelve years of its recent political history regarding 
balancing Russia and the West. It outlines the changes in Serbia’s external environment 
that cause this balancing. It was possible to determine the key events since 2008 that 
resulted in Serbia recalibrating its foreign policy. Kosovo’s independence, the global 
financial crisis and the Ukraine crisis are the turning points in Serbia’s recent diplomatic 
history. 
 
Understanding the impact of these episodes is important from an empirical and policy 
standpoint. It allows us to gain insight into major international changes that shape Serbia’s 
behaviour, particularly as the effects of those changes remain in play today. These 
changes are all products of a global dynamic that impacts the Serbian regional 
environment. Even the independence of Kosovo, and the ensuing international dispute in 




great power dynamics (in the same way Russian decision to back Serbia should be viewed 
in the context of great power equilibrium). 
 
The thesis empirically identified the Kosovo dispute and the regional power vacuum in 
the Balkans as key systemic occurrences shaping Serbia’s behaviour. Serbian response to 
these occurrences manifests itself as the balancing act . One can say that this balancing 
act is a way of hedging for Serbia through diversification of partnerships and 
compensating for the lack of fully functional relationship with powers the EU and the US. 
The endgame for Serbia is to secure autonomy and increase its bargaining power with the 
West, ensuring a more favourable settlement to the Kosovo dispute, which is Serbia’s 
dominant foreign policy challenge, and Serbia’s place in the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ architecture. 
 
Applying the NCR as a theoretical framework allows the shaping of ample empirical data 
into a logically coherent whole. That way, it is possible to draw conclusions on the 
patterns behind Serbian foreign policy, particularly its tendency to balance between great 
powers, in this case, Russia and the West. The conclusion is that as long as the Kosovo 
dispute remains unresolved, and as long as the EU integration process is frozen, Serbia 
will keep the Russian option open and hence the balancing act.21 
 
The research also establishes that the state of relations between Russia and the West is 
the third factor in the Serbian systemic environment shaping Belgrade’s balancing act. If 
the international system puts the West and Russia on the trajectory of rivalry, Serbia 
responds to this systemic process by balancing more openly and more intensely to 
minimise risk and profit from playing off the ‘Great Powers’ against each other. If the 
point of any science is to identify patterns, this study has been able to identify the external 
realities to which Serbia responds. This study, as a result, put Serbian foreign policy in a 
wider, global context. The Balkans have been outside the scope of geopolitical breaking 
news. We can learn how small countries in these forgotten regions are impacted by global 
great power dynamics through this study. Furthermore, we learn how the countries like 
Serbia respond to this dynamic.    
 
21 Vuk Vuksanovic, ‘Why Serbia Won’t Stop Playing the Russia Card Any Time Soon’, Carnegie Moscow 




This study also provides novel insight into Serbian foreign policy because it delves into 
Serbian domestic politics. One can say that the two shortcomings of both the scholarly 
and policy deliberations on the international politics of the Balkans are: the neglect of 
domestic politics in foreign policy formulation in countries like Serbia; and that states in 
the region are treated as mere objects of great power politics, lacking any agency. This 
thesis, using the NCR’s claims on causal mechanisms, helps overcome these two 
shortcomings. In the first instance, NCR’s introduction of a domestic intervening variable 
helps the researcher unpack the domestic forces contributing to a certain foreign policy, 
in this case, a purposeful balancing act. In the second, by identifying the systemic factors 
causing the Serbian balancing act and analysing Serbian response to these factors, one 
can explain that while states like Serbia have limited capabilities, they still attempt to 
promote their interests, although engulfed with great power dynamics in its systemic 
environment. 
 
This approach accounts for an important contribution because theoretically, we have to 
unpack the black box of a sovereign state to uncover the domestic drivers of its foreign 
policy. By introducing the unit-level variable, one gets a more comprehensive overview 
of the forces behind Serbian behaviour. Indeed, as the NCR logic implies, the domestic 
factors filter systemic influences. Serbia is no exception on that front. As this project 
underscored, there is a strong nexus in Serbia between domestic and systemic, resulting 
in certain policies. 
 
It was established that Serbian party politics is the key domestic factor at play, providing 
this study with an additional edge. The research uncovered three ways in which party 
politics impacts foreign policy behaviour. First, Serbian leaders and their parties, 
following the logic of domestic political survival, avoid unpopular policies, like 
recognising Kosovo or alienating Russia. Second, in light of a divided constituency, 
Serbian political leaders and parties push for the balancing act to win the votes of both 
pro-Western and pro-Russian Serbs. Third, Serbian political parties, use foreign policy to 
gain an advantage over their political competitors. Political elites do this either by 
promoting themselves to the domestic audience as internationally respected leaders or 




These findings are of central importance to scholars and policy analysts who might 
inquire about Serbian foreign policy. Domestic vulnerability and opportunistic desire to 
catch both pro-Western and pro-Russian votes help explain why Serbian policy-makers 
are so stubbornly persistent in pursuing certain policies, including the policy of balancing. 
The third point about Serbian political parties using great powers to get ahead of their 
political competitors is equally relevant in enriching the knowledge of Serbian domestic 
politics and the country’s foreign policy. An important piece is added to the puzzle as it 
explains how the domestic environment shapes foreign policy and discounts the 
conventional wisdom that the Balkan countries are simply targets of influence by great 
powers. Instead, individual countries try to manipulate these great powers for their 
benefit. In this case, using foreign policy in the kingmaker game contributes to this type 
of behaviour.            
 
By using the NCR as a conceptual framework, one can give a nuanced multi-layer 
analysis of all the systemic and domestic factors that condition Belgrade’s behaviour with 
suitable explanatory sub-plots. The analysis based on NCR is capable of producing a 
scholarly work that is policy-relevant.  Except for Balkan scholars, countries like Serbia 
have been neglected. This study helps remedy that by providing new input for those 
interested in Serbia and the Balkans but does so by placing it within broader dilemmas of 
IR discipline.      
 
1.2 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework – Neoclassical Realism (NCR) 
 
This research project employs NCR as a suitable analytical framework to analyse the 
Serbian balancing act. This proposal is made because NCR offers a strong causal 
mechanism to determine the causation behind the Serbian balancing act, and also provides 
the opportunity to unify the empirical findings uncovered in the research into a single, 
logically coherent whole. The term NCR first came into circulation in 1998, when Gideon 
Rose used it in his article for the World Politics journal, in which he reviewed works of 





What is the crucial argument of NCR? Its proponents follow the vital claim of the realist 
tradition that a country’s foreign policy is a response to international systemic pressures, 
but NCR scholars also argue that those pressures are translated through unit-level, 
intervening variables.22 As the youngest of the three versions of the realist tradition, NCR 
tries to reconcile its older predecessors, classical realism and neorealism. From classical 
realism, NCR takes the concern for state-society relations while keeping the 
methodological and scientific rigour of neorealism with its a priori claim that the 
international system shapes states’ behaviour.23 
 
In other words, NCR claims that all states are subject to the influence of the international 
system. However, the way states respond to these systemic influences depends on unit-
level factors, like leadership perceptions (individual level of analysis) and domestic 
politics (state level of analysis). Therefore, in its essence, the NCR is not a theory of IR 
but a theory of foreign policy. In that context, William Wohlforth, one of NCR’s pioneers, 
went as far as to call it a “realist theory for foreign policy analyst.”24 NCR was selected 
as the analytical framework for the present study because there was a need for “a two-
level”25 analysis that takes into account both systemic and domestic factors. Indeed, as 
Kenneth Waltz pointed out, there are permissive causes (systemic environment) that make 
something possible, and efficient causes (unit-level factors) that make something happen 
at a specific moment.26 
 
As the Serbian case differed from most of the other countries in the region, it was evident 
that inspecting domestic factors was necessary to determine with certainty the causes of 
the Serbian balancing act. Consequently, this research did not entangle itself with “the 
actor-general foreign policy analysis (FPA)” that tends to put foreign policy behaviour 
under broad, general patterns, but it applies “actor-specific FPA” that considers the 
 
22 Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, Vol. 51, No.1, 
October 1998, p.146 
23 ‘Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy’, in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. 
Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
2009), p.19 
24 William C. Wohlforth, ‘Realism and foreign policy’, in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne 
(eds), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, 2nd Edition (Oxford: 2012), p.52 
25 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International 
Organization, Vol.42, No.3, Summer 1988, pp. 427-460 




individual uniqueness of a particular state.27 NCR was applied as a theory “that 
incorporates both external and internal variables” in its analysis.28 The theory that 
incorporates systemic-level and unit-level variables was an absolute must for this study. 
The research was able to identify systemic pressures that propelled the Serbian balancing 
act. These research findings, as a result, fit into the realist worldview. However, 
identifying systemic pressures affecting Serbia do not explain why Serbia responded to 
these pressures the way it did by adopting the balancing act as a policy. The application 
of NCR enabled both identifying systemic pressures conditioning the Serbian balancing 
act as well as the domestic factors that impacted Serbian response to these systemic 
pressures. 
 
The argument of this study is grounded in NCR’s causal mechanism. The systemic 
pressures are the key causal force behind the Serbian balancing act between 2008 and 
2020. These systemic pressures constitute an independent variable in the neoclassical 
realist worldview. Kosovo’s independence and the international dispute caused by it acts 
as the first intervening variable as Serbia became systemically dependent on Russia as it 
needed a diplomatic protector on Kosovo. The regional power vacuum in the Balkans 
also acts as an intervening variable, as the strategic inaction by the EU and the US left an 
opening for Russia to act more assertively there. This vacuum also generated a systemic 
temptation for Serbia to accept Russia’s overtures and use it to increase its bargaining 
powers with the West. There is a third systemic pressure that the research integrates as 
the independent variable, which is the state of relations between Russia and the West. 
This systemic pressure determines the variation in the Serbian balancing act in terms of 
its form and intensity. If the relations between Russia and the West are not adversarial, 
Serbia balances between the two with relative diplomatic and strategic tranquillity. 
However, if this relationship becomes adversarial, then Serbia balances more openly and 
more intensely to avoid choosing sides and potentially benefit by balancing and 
manipulating Russia and the West against each other. These systemic pressures act as 
intervening variables that operate at the systemic level and generate the Serbian balancing 
act, which stands out as an outcome or the dependent variable in NCR’s methodology. 
 
27 Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International 
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The application of NCR would not be complete without an intervening variable. In NCR’s 
paradigm, the intervening variable operates at the unit-level of analysis, impacting how 
systemic pressures are translated into foreign policy outcomes. The unit-level, intervening 
variables distort and filter these systemic pressures. Consequently, there is only 
infrequently a perfect process of international systemic pressures being automatically 
converted into an expected state behaviour. The research I conducted established that in 
the Serbian balancing act, Serbian party politics acts as the intervening variable. In Serbia, 
political parties and their leaders are opportunistic actors that dominate the political 
environment, capitalising on weak institutions and the non-existence of rule-of-law. In 
their domestic struggle for power, the political parties also use foreign policy to triumph 
over their competitors. As it has been stated already, in doing so, Serbian political parties: 
a) avoid pursuing unpopular policies; b) try to catch the votes of both pro-Russian and 
pro-Western constituents; c) try to acquire the support of great powers to achieve an 
advantage in the struggle to win power. Given this reality of the Serbian political system 
and the political parties’ opportunistic character, Serbian party politics distort and filter 
the systemic pressures impacting Serbia. The result of distorting and filtering systemic 
factors is the outcome, the Serbian balancing act. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
The central methodological issue of this study will concern causality or determining the 
causes of a certain effect. In methodology, there are two ways of addressing the issue of 
causality, one of quantitative methods where the approach “effects of causes” dominates, 
and one of qualitative methods where the “causes of effects” approach prevails. The 
former measures the average effect of the causal, independent variable, while the latter is 
associated with qualitative research where causes of particular effect within an individual 
case are being examined.29 This study will accept the qualitative “causes of effects” 
approach. In that regard, it will try to establish a clear relationship between the causal 
factor or, as it is called, the independent variable, and outcome, or dependent variable.30 
 
29 Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in 
Social Science (Princeton and Oxford: 2012), pp.41-42 




This research project used three methods: case study, process tracing and analytical 
narrative. 
 
The use of the case study method draws an ontological question, “a case of what.”31 On 
that front, it is always important to note that a case study stands for “a single case of a 
particular phenomenon.”32 Therefore, this project will address the case of an individual 
state’s foreign policy, in this instance the Serbian balancing act between Russia and the 
West between 2008 and 2020. As previously described, this case deviates from the type 
of policy one would expect empirically and theoretically, and so constitutes a puzzle. 
Furthermore, some of the chapters will also deal with specific Serbian governments’ cases 
and their foreign policy in a specific time frame. Putting these cases in chronological 
order can help the historically informed process tracing methods that should help 
determine causes of the outcome and understand the evolutionary process. 
 
This step will be made in chapters 5, 6 and 7, which are empirical case study chapters. 
The empirical chapters will test NCR’s causal mechanism on which this project is based, 
and one can determine in that way the causal forces behind Serbian balancing. This logic 
is particularly relevant in chapter 5, which analyses the Serbian balancing act between 
2008 and 2012, analysing how this policy came into being in the first place. The 
application of empirical, case study methods is also relevant for the second part of the 
project’s research question, which is “what factors explain variation in that balancing 
during different periods?” As the case studies are applied to policies conducted during 
different historical periods, this research project also has a small element of a comparative 
approach. A conclusion about variations in the Serbian balancing act can be drawn from 
comparing different periods. By comparing the individual cases, it is possible to 
determine why, between 2012 and 2014 (chapter 6), the Serbian balancing act was done 
without causing any strategic frictions, and why between 2014 and 2020 (chapter 7), its 
balancing act became more pronounced, and brazen. 
 
 
31 Audie Klotz, ‘Case Selection’, in Audie Klotz, and Deepa Prakash (eds), Qualitative Methods in 
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The second research method is process tracing, which frequently goes hand-in-hand with 
the case study method. The procedures of process tracing are used to “make causal 
inferences about a single case.”33 The process tracing methodology is intended “to trace 
the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. ... by focusing on “sequential 
processes”34 and as such it “identifies a causal chain that links independent and dependent 
variables.”35 The sequential analysis is linked with process tracing as a sequence of events 
is tracked, and “critical junctures” are identified.36 Process tracing allows the 
simultaneous use of inductive reasoning based on empirical factors and deductive 
reasoning that allows the formulation of research questions and theoretical foundations.37 
In that regard, the research will first try to establish an empirical/chronological overview 
of the Serbian balancing act between Russia and the West from 2008 to 2020, before 
using theoretical and conceptual tools to explain Serbian foreign policy’s determinants. 
 
In order to conduct the empirical process tracing, both primary and secondary sources 
were used. The main limitation of primary sources is that Serbian archives remain 
inaccessible. The primary research focused on newspapers and other media materials. 
Policy analysis produced by various think tanks were also consulted as part of the process 
tracing. In terms of secondary sources, a multiplicity of publications dealing with Serbian 
foreign policy are already existent in Serbia; however, they all have significant 
shortcomings. They are often ideologically burdened, oriented on a traditional empirical 
overview of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, and without any theoretical background, 
which is a gap that this research tried to fill. 
 
Interview as an instrument of qualitative research was essential for this project, 
particularly considering the lack of primary archival sources available for empirical 
process tracing. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 31 stakeholders in 
 
33 James Mahoney, ‘Process Tracing and Historical Explanation’, Security Studies, Vol. 24, Issue 2, 2015, 
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Serbia during a 2019 fieldwork trip to Belgrade. It included representatives of political 
parties, retired and current Serbian diplomats, parliament members, former and current 
government advisers, academics, journalists, and representatives of think tanks. The main 
ethical and practical risk in this task was the sensitivity of the subject and potential 
implications for interviewees’ position and reputation. This risk was particularly 
pronounced in regards to the sources who are still government employees. Therefore, all 
interviews were conducted after written consent was given and under the option of 
complete anonymity, which some sources took. As empirical research was able to sketch 
out the causal mechanism, an inductive discovery was possible, meaning that it was 
established that the uncovered causal mechanism fits the existent theory.38 As a result, 
the NCR, as a theoretical framework, could be formalised. 
 
Finally, analytical narrative, as an “organisation of material in a chronologically 
sequential order, and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with 
subplots”,39 was used in the final stage of the proposed project when the findings gathered 
had to be compiled in a coherent, written form. Thus, the project’s result is a thorough 
analytic narrative explanation of the Serbian balancing act between Russia and the West 
from 2008 to 2020, including explaining its causation. The systemic and domestic factors 
that respectively act as independent and intervening variables were used as sub-plots 
analysing Serbian policy towards the EU, the US and Russia during selected empirical 
phases. On that front, this dissertation can be defined as “a historical explanatory 
dissertation” that uses an established theory to explain the causes of a historical event and 
that gives “a good deal of description but focus on explaining what is described.”40 
 
1.4 Outline of Chapters  
 
Chapter 2 deals with NCR as the theoretical framework of this study. The chapter first 
examines the basic insights offered by two theoretical predecessors of NCR, classical and 
neorealism. The chapter continues by outlining NCR and how it overcame the 
 
38 James Mahoney, ‘Process Tracing and Historical Explanation’, p. 215 
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shortcomings of the previous versions of the realist school. The two general themes of 
NCR that apply to this study are also presented. The first theme is that different states 
respond differently to international systemic pressures. The second is that the salience of 
domestic politics as an intervening variable. 
 
Chapter 3 engages with the independent variable, the international systemic pressures 
impacting the Serbian balancing act. This chapter first ventures into the debate about the 
nature of the post-Cold War system impacting Serbia. The system is defined as a hybrid, 
uni-multipolar system. This systemic setting explains how Serbia interacts with three 
relevant global powers: Russia and those two powers constituting the West, the US and 
the EU. The specific systemic pressures causing the Serbian balancing act are explained. 
Kosovo’s independence and international dispute with substantial great power influx is 
the first systemic pressure. The regional power vacuum caused by Western inaction in the 
region is also identified as systemic processes impacting Belgrade’s balancing act. 
Ultimately, the chapter also identifies the third systemic pressure: the state of relations 
between Russia and the West that shapes the intensity of the Serbian balancing act. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses domestic factors that act as the intervening variable, which this 
chapter identifies as Serbian party politics. The concept of the intervening variable was 
discussed and the role that party politics played in existing NCR scholarship. On that 
front, this study differs from NCR as it considers the correlation between internal 
domestic party competition and foreign policy. The competition between Serbian political 
parties has a distorting effect on systemic forces affecting Serbia, and that is why it is an 
intervening variable. Before party politics is described in more detail, the alternative 
candidates for the intervening variable, namely perceptions and public opinion, are 
discounted as inadequate to play that role within the studied case. Ultimately, the chapter 
shows the Serbian political environment in which party politics and their leaders dominate 
public policy in the absence of functional democratic institutions. These party politics and 
party divisions became more toxic after Kosovo’s independence in 2008, establishing a 
new interplay pattern between Serbia’s foreign policy and its internal party politics. From 
that point onwards, Serbian political parties leverage foreign policy in three ways for the 




trying to win votes of both pro-Western and pro-Russian constituents, and c) trying to 
gain the support of great powers to get ahead of their competitors. 
 
Chapter 5 is the first chapter examining the independent and intervening variable in the 
empirical case study. This chapter analyses the Serbian balancing act between 2008 and 
2012, showing how Serbia’s relations with the EU, the US and Russia were shaped by 
the systemic pressures and domestic party politics that respectively acted as independent 
and intervening variables. It argues that Kosovo’s independence and the regional power 
vacuum propelled Serbia to embrace the balancing act in its foreign policy. The 
emergence of Russia is also explained in the context of Moscow trying to push back 
against the West. The chapter also filters Serbian policies towards three relevant great 
powers through the analytical filter of Serbian party politics, showing the political rift that 
emerged in Serbia after Kosovo’s independence in 2008. From that point on Kosovo 
dispute and relations with the EU, Russia and the US became instruments in domestic 
competition for power among Serbian political parties and elites. 
 
Chapter 6 engages with the Serbian balancing act between 2012 and 2014. Analytically, 
this chapter uses the same steps as the previous one of filtering Serbian policies towards 
the EU, the US and Russia through the analytical lenses of the intervening and 
independent variables. This chapter’s comparative element is essential, and relevant for 
the second part of the research question on the causes behind intensity variations of 
Serbian balancing. While the Kosovo dispute and power vacuum remained in play, the 
Serbian balancing act could continue as there was no major rivalry between Russia and 
the West at the time. Domestically, party politics remained the intervening variable. The 
chapter shows how former nationalists used foreign policy to win power by embracing 
European integrations and using their domestic resilience to the internal nationalist 
backlash to open normalisation talks with Kosovo under EU mediation. 
 
Chapter 7 is the ultimate empirical chapter, showing how independent and intervening 
variables operated during the final stage of the Serbian balancing act between 2014 and 
2020 when the Serbian policy of balancing was at its height. The chapter shows that 




enlargement given the geopolitical pressures impacting it, like the migrant crisis and 
Brexit. As a result, the Kosovo dispute intensified during the EU’s declining role as a 
mediator, energising the Russian factor again. This chapter argues that what really 
intensified the Serbian balancing act was the brewing rivalry between Russia and the West 
after the Ukraine Crisis. The Ukraine Crisis motivated Russia to view Serbia and the 
Balkans as theatres for pushback against the West. In that systemic environment, Serbia 
saw balancing as a way to minimise risk and extract benefits from both sides by playing 
them against each other. The chapter shows that, later on, the US played a part in 
suppressing some of the Russian influence, demonstrating that the US can be a 
gamechanger. Domestically, party politics continued to play the role of intervening 
variable, although in a context in which Serbia experienced a democratic backsliding 
transforming into an illiberal regime. In that context, the ruling elite still leverages great 
powers to acquire domestic legitimacy and stay in power. The chapter outlines that party 
politics in Serbia will continue to be the intervening variable that impacts systemic 
pressures impacting ties with Russia. The chapter concludes that this reality will not 
change soon given the domestic salience of the Kosovo dispute in Serbia and Russia’s 
potent popularity in the country. 
 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion, where the summation of the argument is provided. The 
methodology is revisited, showing the reader once again the steps undertaken to reach the 
conclusions contained in the conceptual and empirical case study chapters. The NCR as 
a theoretical framework is also laid out together with the methodology. Afterwards, the 
concluding chapter also reflects briefly upon the main research findings, and it will 
present a contribution the thesis made to the NCR literature, Balkan scholarship and 
general IR discipline. The concluding chapter will also provide recommendations for 
further research, as the case of Serbia can be attractive for empirical researchers, fellow 










This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism (NCR). While 
there is a whole set of other theoretical traditions through which the selected case study 
can be analysed, ranging from Innenpolitik theories focused on domestic politics, to 
liberalism and social constructivism, the empirical data collected through research can 
best be put together into a logical whole through the application of NCR. This chapter 
will explain NCR within the broader family of realist theories, as the latest version of a 
larger realist tradition stemming from classical realism and neorealism. While also 
showing the shortcomings of these two versions of realism, the chapter proposes NCR as 
the latest version of realist theory that tries to fill the gaps left by classical realism and 
neorealism.  
 
This chapter will also highlight two general themes of NCR, which apply to the selected 
case. The first theme is that not all states respond in the same way to the international 
system. The second theme concerns the use of domestic politics in NCR’s causal logic. 
Consequently, NCR with these two themes and its causal mechanism asserts itself as the 
conceptual and theoretical framework of analysis. Like any other state, Serbia responds 
to external, systemic pressures, but it responds in its own unique way, and the form of 
this response is dependent on its domestic politics. 
 
2.2 Classical Realism and Neorealism – NCR’s Predecessors  
 
Realism is quite a divergent theory. However, one can identify elements that are common 
to all versions of realism. These elements are usually defined as the “three Ss’”, consisting 
of statism (the state as the primary actor in the international system), survival (as the 




system).41 Robert Gilpin followed a similar logic, stressing that every realism has three 
basic assumptions: “the essentially conflictual nature of international affairs”, “the 
essence of social reality is the group”, and finally “the primacy in all political life of 
power and security in human motivation.”42 
 
Many associate the word realism with an entire grouping of classical political thinkers, 
including the likes of Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes. However, realism as a scholarly 
approach to IR is associated with two authors and their seminal works that are considered 
the archetypes of classical realism. They are E.H. Carr’s “The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-
1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Politics” (1939) and Hans 
Morgenthau’s “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace” (1948).  
 
While Carr’s work had a monumental impact on IR’s inception as a discipline, it did not 
offer a theoretically rigorous overview of IR and foreign policy. Carr’s entire logic was 
reduced to the intellectual critique of the liberal worldview, or as he labelled it 
utopianism, and the notion of the natural harmony of interests among states.43 John 
Mearsheimer points out similarly that Carr did not provide a theory of international 
politics but a rebuff of what he saw as the delusional neglect of centrality of power in 
international relations by liberals and idealists in the English-speaking world.44 
 
Unlike Carr, Morgenthau has gone much further in asserting realism as a theory. 
Morgenthau’s theory traces causality at the individual level of analysis in human nature. 
Morgenthau claimed that: “Social forces are the product of human nature in action” and 
that any politics including international politics is a power struggle.45 Therefore the only 
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way to act in a world dominated by unpredictable human nature is to pursue national 
interest defined in the context of power.46  
 
However, while Morgenthau and classical realists tried to “translate the maxims of 
nineteenth century’s European diplomatic practice into more general laws of an American 
social science”47, they failed to provide a theory that can be generalisable, as the notion 
of the state pursuing its national interest was too broad and too vague. Therefore, classical 
realism never intended to develop IR as a social science or provide its realist worldview 
with a scientific character.48 Consequently, while classical realism tends to appreciate 
nuances its overly descriptive and less rigorous approach disqualifies it as a potential 
framework of analysis for this study. 
 
Kenneth Waltz and his capital study “Theory of International Politics” (1979) tried to 
provide realism with what Carr and Morgenthau failed to do: scientific character, 
parsimony and a more generalisable character. Waltz did this by tracing causality at the 
international systemic level and its structure, thus paving the way for his version of 
realism, known as structural realism or neorealism. Waltz stressed that the structure of 
the international system with its two structural elements of anarchy and distribution of 
power capabilities seriously constrains the range of foreign policy options that individual 
states have at their disposal within that same system. Therefore, regardless of political 
units’ internal character, the anarchic system based on self-help compels states to behave 
in a specific fashion, pursuing security and maintaining the balance of power.49 However, 
in its attempt to provide a general overview, Waltz’s theory did not offer instruments to 
analyse specific policies. 
 
Waltz’s theory faced numerous critiques in the post-Cold War period. While Waltz’s 
neorealism rightly stressed that the Cold War was brought about by the Soviet decline in 
relative power capabilities, the neorealist emphasis on the international system failed to 
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provide the complete overview by neglecting unit-level factors. In that context, 
neorealism was unable to explain the role that Reagan’s and Gorbachev’s policies or the 
crisis of the Soviet system had in ending the Cold War. Furthermore, many of the 
neorealist predictions based on the systemic logic have also failed, like why there has 
been no effective great power coalition to balance the US after the end of the Cold War.50 
These examples showed both the limitations of the systemic approach and the need to 
introduce unit-level factors to explain the deviations from systemic theories’ propositions. 
 
Neorealism can analyse Serbia’s balancing act, but it also has its major limitations. The 
neorealist assumption is that smaller states, like Serbia, lack material capabilities and have 
very few foreign policy options except to bandwagon with a great power. Although 
neorealism, with its presumption that the international system determines state behaviour, 
is an effective way of analysing international outcomes, it is not suitable for explaining 
an individual state’s conduct. Neorealism has been inefficient because it has left unit level 
determinants outside of its analytical scope. As the most famous name associated with 
neorealism, the late Kenneth Waltz himself acknowledged in the article with the same 
name that “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy.”51  
 
This acknowledges that there is a clear-cut distinction between the two. Namely, the 
systemic theory of international politics addresses the issue of interaction between 
political units operating at the systemic level, with systemic forces compelling different 
units to behave similarly; while the theory of foreign policy examines policies conducted 
at the national level, particularly in the context of individual states behaving differently 
when faced with the same systemic pressures.52 Neorealism tries to make predictions on 
all states’ behaviour on the average within the international system, by implying that 
systemic incentives compel states to either bandwagon or balance.53 In that context, 
neorealism provides little insight into foreign policy behaviour that does not fall into the 
dichotomy of bandwagoning and balancing. Therefore, neorealism cannot explain the 
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case that is the subject of this study as Serbian actions can hardly be qualified under the 
mentioned dichotomy. 
 
That is to say, Serbia is not pursuing a full-fledged bandwagoning as it is not attempting 
full integration with the West as are almost all of the countries in the Balkan region. 
Serbian aspiration to join the EU might be interpreted as a form of bandwagoning, but 
Belgrade is not going all the way with bandwagoning as it is not interested in joining 
NATO. On the other hand, Serbia is not pursuing balancing behaviour either. The word 
balancing in systemic realism is associated with the notion of balance of power. Balancing 
is taken against a particular state either through internal balancing, where the state that 
balances is strengthening its power capabilities, or through external balancing where state 
forms an alliance. This type of behaviour is also not applicable to the Serbian case because 
if Serbia were pursuing a balancing action, it would create an alliance with Russia against 
the West.  
 
Instead, Serbia is conducting a balancing that is not balancing against a particular actor 
but balancing between several geopolitical actors at once. Namely, with Serbia’s current 
systemic and domestic environment, Serbia cannot make a full-tilt towards either Russia 
or the West. In both cases, from the Serbian standpoint, that would imply the loss of 
autonomy. That loss would suggest Serbia sacrificing some of the interest it deems vital. 
Aligning with the West means the resolution of the Kosovo dispute in the way the West 
prescribes it. That way is where Serbia accepts the loss of territory and where Serbia is 
perceived as the sole loser of the Kosovo dispute. An option deemed unacceptable for 
both the Serbian elite and the public. Aligning with Russia would imply turning its back 
on the West, an irrational policy course as Serbia’s primary partnerships revolve around 
the West in economic and security terms.  
 
Equally important is that in an environment where the EU membership remains an 
unrealistic prospect, Serbia has little incentive to give up on cooperating with Russia, 
although its cooperation with the West is more extensive. Therefore, through 
diversification of partnerships and hedging, Serbia maintains the balance between Russia 




as Serbia’s leverage and bargaining instrument with the West. Russia is used to score a 
better bargain with the West, not just on Kosovo but on Serbia’s relations with the West. 
It is about securing beneficial terms under which Serbia becomes part of the Western 
architecture without paying the price deemed unacceptable by Belgrade, for instance, 
Kosovo.  Consequently, Serbian foreign policy behaviour does not fit into the neorealist 
predictions on state behaviour. On the contrary, Serbian behaviour is more nuanced and 
complex and cannot be easily captured and explained by Waltz’s theoretically elegant, 
parsimonious concepts.  
 
With that in mind, it is evident that this study needs to apply a theory dealing with foreign 
policy behaviour and not a theory of international politics. Suppose one relies on 
neorealism as the analytical framework. In that case, one can understand the systemic 
environment and restraints and enablers of a country’s foreign policy, but it cannot 
explain why a country chooses a specific policy. This shortcoming of neorealism is that 
irrespective of a state’s position in the international system inquiry into unit-level factors 
is necessary to determine the causes of a particular foreign policy behaviour. The US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be explained by the systemic factors of unipolarity and US 
military capabilities as enablers of the invasion. However, to explain why the US invaded 
Iraq, one needs to go beyond systemic factors. Although Serbia is in no way in the same 
power rank as the US, the same remark on the limitations of systemic theories is 
applicable in the Serbian balancing act. 
 
Suppose one intuitively applies a systemic approach to Serbia’s balancing act. In that 
case, one can say that since 2008 the Western players, the US and the EU, have been 
distracted away from the Balkans, enabling Russia to play a more assertive role. This does 
not imply that Serbian foreign policy is dependent on Russia. It suggests a systemic reality 
in which Serbia cannot conduct a balancing act if Russia does not have the ambition to 
play an active Balkan role. In contrast, when it is active, Serbia has a systemically 
conditioned option of balancing among two or more external powers. Namely, if only the 
Western powers were engaged in the Balkans the range of Serbian foreign policy options 
would be restrained, forcing Serbia to coordinate its policies with the Western actors. 




Serbia has an incentive to balance Russia and the West. However, while this explains 
what made that policy possible, it does not explain why Serbia is pursuing such a policy. 
As the title of one study points out, the systemic approach to foreign policy does not 
explain: “why state X made a certain move last Tuesday.”54 
 
2.3 Neoclassical Realism (NCR) 
 
Ultimately, NCR emerged as a theory that tried to fill the void left by classical realism 
and neorealism. The term NCR was first coined by Gideon Rose in 1998 when he wrote 
a review of several works of post-Cold War realist scholarship. Rose famously described 
what characterises the scholars of NCR: “Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition 
of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international 
system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are 
realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign 
policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through 
intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.”55 
 
Given this description, NCR tries to develop “a greater methodological sophistication 
than their classical realist predecessors”, but it also acts as a theory of foreign policy, 
unlike neorealism that acts as a theory of IR that explains international outcomes.56 While 
neorealism deals with circumstances affecting the states, NCR deals with how individual 
states respond when faced with these circumstances.57 In that context, neorealism stands 
as a normative theory that describes how states should behave under the presumption of 
certain circumstances, while NCR is somewhat of a descriptive theory describing how 
states behave, deviating from the ideal outcomes of neorealism given the intersection 
between the domestic and systemic forces at play.58 One can also say that NCR is a 
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reconciliation between two previous strands of realist thinking, classical realism and 
neorealism, and is doing this by correcting the shortcomings of one tradition with the 
insights of the other. Simply put, the variance of classical realism is framed more 
systematically into the parsimony of neorealism, while the structural logic of neorealism 
is enriched in explanatory power.59 
 
By reconciling classical realism with neorealism, NCR has used themes belonging to 
classical realism like state-society relations and statesmanship. However, NCR is 
divergent from classical realism in giving causal primacy to systemic variables and 
insisting on social science methodology.60 Therefore, NCR does not focus on grand 
theory, but the contingent, middle-range theory that underscores context, placing itself 
between IR and diplomatic history, with the former using theoretical explanation and the 
latter using descriptive narratives of certain events.61 One can say that by reconciling the 
neorealist theorising on the international system with a classical realist account of 
particular foreign policy, NCR has rectified the imbalance that exists between the general 
and the particular.62 
 
NCR was also able to develop a more elaborate causal mechanism for the study of foreign 
policy by filling the void left by both Innenpolitik theories and neorealism. It did this by 
noting that the international system determines a state’s foreign policy, but also by 
underlining that “systemic pressures are translated through unit level intervening 
variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structure. In the 
neoclassical realist world leaders can be constrained by both international and domestic 
politics.”63 In that regard, NCR as a theory implies the existence of a “two-level game”,64 
or as a prominent NCR theorist Thomas Christensen paraphrased it, a “two-level 
approach”65 meaning that both systemic and domestic factors are at play.  
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The significant contribution of NCR was reconciling the difference between the 
Innenpolitik approach and systemic theory, achieving the recommendation that Fareed 
Zakaria provided back in 1992, that “a good account of a nation’s foreign policy should 
include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of the policy 
can be explained by what factors.”66 Waltz would not disagree with Zakaria’ assertion. 
After all, in his book “Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British 
Experience” (1967), Waltz took into account the role of the democratic system of 
governance in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of the US and the UK.67 Even 
Waltz, the father of structural realism, knew that domestic factors need to be considered 
when analysing foreign policy. NCR took this reality into account.   
 
Using this approach, NCR has also acted in line with the belief that realism should address 
the interaction between domestic and international politics, instead of engaging in a 
debate about whether one takes precedence over the other.68 That way, NCR has 
renounced Waltz’s proposition that theory “ought not include explanatory variables at 
different levels of analysis.”69 NCR has tried to resolve this dispute by avoiding positing 
a simple multi-level approach, asserting instead that systemic pressures hold primacy in 
determining foreign policy conduct, but the form of response to those systemic pressures 
depends on unit level variables.70 
 
One other important element makes NCR even more interesting for the study of particular 
foreign policy cases. By introducing intervening variables at the unit level, NCR 
integrates FPA’s insights on leadership, perception and domestic structure into a realist 
paradigm.71 An important point to make, as for many years FPA has been set apart from 
IR’s main theories, with FPA frequently claiming that is a corrective to realist insights.72 
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NCR and FPA share an interest in various unit-level factors like cognition and leadership 
perception of the international realities, bureaucratic organisations and policymakers’ 
institutional autonomy.73 However, it might be too early to label NCR as William 
Wohlforth did as a “realist theory for foreign policy analyst.”74 That is to say, NCR 
believes in the primacy of international system over unit level factors treating the system 
as the independent variable, while FPA treats unit level factors as the independent 
variable, which means that NCR and FPA are “separate but related research agendas.”75 
 
In general, realism has been said to be a theoretical tradition with the firmest foundation 
in real-life foreign policy practices that, at the same time, tries to conceive a general 
theory.76 The NCR has kept the scientific and theoretical rigour of theorists like Kenneth 
Waltz, but without discarding practical insight into statecraft and foreign policy found 
with classical realists like Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger and Arnold Wolfers.77 That 
way, NCR has tried to avoid robust debates that make the discipline of IR produce 
apolitical pieces of scholarship, losing sight of the fact that IR’s main point is to explore 
policy and politics. This approach is relevant as there is a trend of IR tending to produce 
a more apolitical scholarship as it becomes “more self-conscious” as a discipline.78 By 
keeping in mind all of these observations about NCR as the latest stage in the evolution 
of a broader realist theoretical tradition, and its attributes and its advantages in analysing 
foreign policy behaviour, we can address the NCR themes that apply to this particular 
study. 
 
2.4 NCR Themes 
 
If one chooses to apply NCR, one also needs to explain what one means by NCR when 
using that theory. Over time it has evolved as a theory and caused a discussion of what 
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the term implies. As one of the recent studies on NCR stresses there are three versions: 
NCR as the explanation of anomalies of neorealism; as a theory of FP; and most recently 
as a theory of IR.79 
 
The last version is based on the notion that “policies and strategies selected by the major 
powers of the international system …can have important effects on international 
outcomes and systemic structure over time”, meaning that “in the short and medium 
term”, NCR is an approach to foreign policy; while “in medium to long-term” NCR is an 
approach to IR.80 Serbia is not a great power, but a small state with limited power 
capabilities. Therefore, Serbian actions do not produce systemic effects over structural 
outcomes. As such, this study requires the use of NCR to explain deviations from 
neorealism, and as a theory of foreign policy, rather than as a theory of IR. With that in 
mind, this study will be based on two general themes of NCR: the first is that not all states 
respond in the same fashion to the international system’s stimuli, and the second is NCR’s 
insistence on domestic politics. 
 
With the first theme, NCR points to the reality that escaped the neorealists, that there is 
no simple, direct and straightforward causal relationship between the international system 
and the foreign policy behaviour of particular states, or that there is “no immediate or 
perfect transmission belt.”81 Jeffrey Taliaferro provided a very illustrative example of 
states responding differently to the challenges of the international system. Namely, in the 
19th century China and Japan faced the same systemic challenge, of being targets of 
Western powers. However, the two countries responded differently. While Japan initiated 
reforms and modernisation that enabled it to become a great power able to compete with 
the Western powers, China failed in achieving the same feat, becoming entrapped in what 
was known as the Century of Humiliation.82 
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By explaining these deviations from neorealism, NCR pointed out that while all states are 
under the international system’s influence, they have different interests, and the interest 
formation is conditioned not just by the state’s systemic environment but also by its 
domestic dynamics. Therefore, a state’s behaviour depends not just on the international 
system but also on the state’s interests. This proposition has recently attracted criticism 
from political scientist Kevin Narizny, who emphasised that the priority of security in the 
realist paradigm and the notion of anarchy as the ordering principle seriously 
compromises NCR’s proclivity to underscore different interests of different states.83 
 
Narizny focuses on the notion that realists have different definitions of security that he 
perceives as impermissible from the realist paradigm’s standpoint. However, all realists 
prioritise security, and their definition of security has a common denominator, which is 
the value of survival, allowing states to pursue other goals once survival is ensured. As 
John Mearsheimer frequently notes, survival is the primary goal of every state, because 
if survival is not assured, states cannot pursue other goals.84 Moreover, given that realists 
are mindful of threats to their security/survival from the international system, Narizny 
discounts NCR’s attempt to stress that states have different goals and preferences. 
 
However, as a trio of prominent NCR proponents (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell) 
observed, the state’s survival is not frequently tested by the international system as: 
“States are rarely faced with such stark choices. In the more common circumstances, 
when the international environment does not represent a clear and imminent threat, states 
often have a range of policy options to choose from, rather than a clearly optimal policy 
dictated by international circumstances.”85  
 
Many realists would discount these situations as “low politics.” However, Norrin M. 
Ripsman dismissed those realists who claim that national security issues qualify as “high 
politics”, while other issues like economics fall under “low politics.”86 Ripsman’s 
primary argument is that issues like economics can be treated as “high politics.” However, 
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there is a wider ramification here, as well. Namely, neither history nor the world of 
international affairs and foreign policy resolves solely around dramatic situations where 
the state's survival is at stake. Instead, international politics also operates between those 
decisive historical moments, and realism is alive and well in those situations too.  
 
As a dictum derived from classical realism states: “Inhumanity is just humanity under 
pressure.”87 To paraphrase, while sometimes systemic pressures do put an individual state 
into a situation where its behaviour needs to be guided by survival logic, the systemic 
pressures are not always of that kind and of that intensity. While Narizny makes an 
interesting case highlighting complexities that are inevitable when it comes to the equally 
complex theoretical tradition that is realism, there is a whole set of policy cases that are 
not driven solely by the exclusive logic of survival. These policy cases can still be 
analysed using a context salient, and the elaborate causal mechanism and analytical 
framework offered by NCR. 
 
With that in mind, Randal Schweller’s insistence upon the notion of state interest and 
political goals as opposed to neorealist concepts of power capabilities and threats holds a 
high degree of salience for the Serbian case.88 As another study in NCR suggests, a good 
analysis does not give advantage to either power resources or intentions when predicting 
the state’s foreign policy, but takes the two into account. As this study says: “‘A does do 
what A can do’, that is, a resource-driven argument, rather than ‘A does do what A wants 
to do’, an intent-driven argument. I would rather suggest that ‘A does do what A wants 
to do and can do.’”89 It is insufficient to rely solely on the systemic factors but to analyse 
intentions and interests that differ from one political unit to another as well. Unit-level 
processes also play a role in shaping and defining a state’s interest alongside the systemic 
forces impacting the individual state. 
 
The description is salient as Serbia lacks international power capabilities, except in its 
region, the Balkans. Still, it is also overburdened by its domestic political divisions. In 
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that context, Serbia fits into what Schweller called a lamb state: “Lambs are weak states 
in that they possess relatively few capabilities and/or suffer from poor state society-
relations for a number of reasons: their elites and institutions lacks legitimacy vis-à-vis 
the masses; they are internally divided along, ethnic, political, class, religious, or tribal 
fault lines;90 or they are what Samuel Huntington calls torn countries… .”91 Schweller 
argued that being that lambs are prey, they sometimes choose to bandwagon with the 
more powerful state, and sometimes distances itself from the most threatened ones.92 One 
can say that Serbia fits into that description because it considers itself to be extremely 
vulnerable within the international system and it is burdened with domestic divisions, 
meaning it tries to avoid alienating any of the major external powers. 
 
The second notion of NCR that this study builds on is the insistence on domestic politics, 
or in the words of Stephen Walt NCR “places domestic politics as an intervening variable 
between the distribution of power and foreign policy behaviour.”93 Unlike the metaphors 
of black box or billiard balls associated with neorealism, NCR by including domestic 
politics in its causal mechanism perceives the state in its full complexity, and not as a 
unitary, homogenous actor insulated from the rest of the society. In doing so, NCR traded 
parsimony for accuracy and policy relevance.94 As such, NCR addresses the issues of 
state-society relations and domestic political agency. 
 
Regarding state-society relations, NCR renounces the neorealist logic of state by forming 
a unique whole of state-government apparatus and a wider society or a nation. As Zakaria, 
being one of the NCR authors who reintroduced the state-society dichotomy that was 
previously present in the work of classical realists, puts it: “Foreign policy is made not 
by the nation as a whole but by its government.”95 However, while Zakaria was much 
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more interested in the state’s ability to mobilise material resources from its society, 
Thomas Christensen’s concept of national political power holds a value for the Serbian 
case as it demonstrates the two-way street that exists between the state and society.  
 
Thomas Christensen defined national political power as “the ability of state leaders to 
mobilise their nation’s human and material resources behind security policy initiatives.”96 
This concept reflects the reality in which Serbia’s political elites have competed to gather 
society’s support for different conceptions of the state’s foreign policy. Christensen, as 
the founder of the concept, stressed that leaders that do not face substantial domestic 
political hurdles would very quickly mobilise society’s resources and support for their 
foreign policy initiatives, while those facing significant domestic political hurdles will 
deviate from the patterns predicted by the black box structural concepts.97 
 
Precisely because NCR scholars like Christensen recognise the domestic hurdles, they 
renounce the idea that states are unitary actors whose political leadership is insulated from 
the societal pressures and backlashes from their domestic political base. This assessment 
is accurate, regardless of the nature of the political regime. A pair of researchers used 
NCR’s insights to deduce that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević, during the 
negotiations that preceded the Kosovo War of 1999, could not meet the Western demands 
on Kosovo, even though he was faced with a more powerful force. By using the logic of 
his domestic interests and political survival, the two concluded that Milošević could not 
yield without a fight, as he built his image of a leader by inciting nationalism with his 
constituents, including by invoking the symbolic sanctity of Kosovo for Serbian people.98 
Ultimately this brings us to domestic political agency, which is relevant for the Serbian 
case as the political parties and their leaders use foreign policy to compete for influence.  
 
Moreover, the vulnerability to the opposition’s criticism represents a political hurdle for 
every power holder in Serbia. One author provides us insight into the role of domestic 
actors: Jack Snyder, in his book that is considered a pioneering piece of work for the new 
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generation of realists “Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition” 
(1991). While Snyder is not frequently mentioned as a representative of NCR, one of 
NCR’s most notable representatives, Jeffrey Taliaferro, includes him in the category, 
qualifying him more narrowly as a member of the defensive neoclassical realism.99 This 
study primarily dealt with great powers that would overexpand due to political systems 
dominated by various interest groups that would compete and compromise, eventually 
resulting in a self-defeating foreign policy. That way, domestic politics disrupt the dictum 
that the state behaves strategically in accordance with the logic of the international 
system. That is why Snyder can be included in the category of NCR, although he dedicates 
for a realist disproportionally close attention to domestic factors. In Snyder’s world, just 
like in the world of NCR, domestic politics disrupted systemic pressures. 
 
Snyder’s concepts will not be strictly implemented, but his study has utility for Serbia. In 
Serbia’s case we also talk about a political system, with weak institutions dominated by 
interest groups that are political parties and their leadership. One can say that Serbia is 
caught in what Snyder described as “blowback”, a phenomenon in which political elites 
become entrapped by the rhetoric they used to gather domestic support for their policies, 
either out of intellectual confusion or because they cannot afford to denounce their initial 
rhetoric and policy justifications.100 In a way, Serbian political elites frequently suffer 
from a form of “blowback”, having convinced its constituents that close ties with Russia 
can be pursued without any risks. 
 
Another NCR academic familiar with the dilemma of party divisions is the already cited 
Randall Schweller. He examined the cases of Britain and France between the two world 
wars, who failed to form an effective alliance to balance Nazi Germany as the systemic 
logic mandates. As Schweller stressed: “States respond (or not) to threats and 
opportunities in ways determined by both internal and external considerations of policy 
elites, who must reach consensus within an often decentralised and competitive political 
process.”101 By analysing these cases, Schweller identified four unit-level causes that 
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condition states to go against the systemic/balance of power mechanism. These are elite 
consensus about the nature and extent of the threat; elite cohesion, that is, the degree of 
persistent internal divisions within the central government’s leadership; social cohesion 
in the balancing society; and regime or government vulnerability to political 
opposition.102 If one eliminates the notion of balancing and applies it to the Serbian case, 




This chapter defined the theoretical and conceptual framework of analysis for this study, 
which is NCR. While there are many great theoretical traditions in IR that can have a shot 
at the selected case study, like Innenpolitik, liberalism and social constructivism, NCR 
was chosen as a theory that offers a suitable causal mechanism that integrates empirical 
data uncovered in the course of research. 
 
This chapter viewed NCR compared to the previous two, older versions of the realist 
tradition, classical realism and neorealism. It first identified what realism is and what are 
the traits shared by all versions of realism. Readers were introduced to the pioneers of 
classical realism, E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau; classical realism played a major part 
in the inception of the realist tradition and IR discipline. However, their focus on 
statesmanship, human nature and national interest lacked the rigorous theoretical and 
scientific character. 
 
As opposed to that, Kenneth Waltz pioneered neorealism identified causality at the level 
of the international system. In doing so, Waltz provided realism with what classical 
realists failed to do. It gave it parsimony, theoretical and methodological rigour and a 
more scientific character. However, neorealism also had its failures and its critiques. With 
its insistence on systemic factors, neorealism failed to predict some significant 
international occurrences, like the abrupt end of the Cold War. It has attracted critics who 
point out that it cannot be used to analyse specific policies. In that context, this chapter 
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also pointed out that neorealism can be useful for the selected case study but that it is 
limited by leaving out unit-level factors, making it unsuitable for individual foreign 
policies being a general IR theory. 
 
Based on this, the selected case study required a theory of foreign policy and not a theory 
of IR, giving credibility to the use of NCR. A definition of NCR was provided to the 
readers, including its emergence in the IR lexicon and academia, and the critical pieces 
of NCR scholarship. NCR made an essential contribution by noting that the state’s 
response to systemic influences is dependent on the unit-level factors that act as an 
intervening variable between the international system and the state’s foreign policy.  
 
NCR qualified itself as a suitable framework of analysis, one that has reconciled 
numerous traditions within its scholarship, and bypassed their shortcomings. NCR has 
been able to combine the context-salient emphasis that classical realism puts on state-
society relations and statesmanship with the systemic, scientific, theoretical precision of 
neorealism. That way, NCR has asserted itself as a descriptive theory able to analyse 
specific policies in a given historical period, finding itself at the crossroads between IR 
and diplomatic history. With its combination of systemic and domestic factors, NCR has 
also succeeded in reconciling realism and Innenpolitik tradition and integrating insights 
of FPA into a realist worldview. The policy relevance and foundation of NCR in practice 
also makes it adequate for this case study. 
 
While NCR has three versions: NCR as the explanation to anomalies of neorealism; NCR 
as a theory of foreign policy; and NCR as a theory of IR, the study will only employ the 
first two versions, as Serbia is not a great power whose behaviour produces systemic 
outcomes. Consequently, further study will rely on two general themes of NCR: the 
notion that not all states respond in the same manner to the international system and the 
relevance of domestic politics. The first theme is relevant as it is essential to determine 
why Serbian behaviour is so different from the behaviour of other countries in its region 
and in light of Serbia lacking power capabilities. The second theme is also relevant as it 
involves the reliance on domestic hurdles, state-society relations and the elite in 




with the international system and its influence, the next step is to identify systemic forces 










As the previous chapter outlined NCR as a conceptual and theoretical framework, this 
chapter needs to analyse the systemic factors. That approach is necessary as NCR, just 
like any other realism, stresses that the international systemic pressures are the primary 
force of causation in international politics. Consequently, there is a need to identify 
systemic stimuli that impacted the Serbian balancing act between 2008 and 2020. For 
NCR authors, foreign policy is primarily about a state responding to the international 
systemic processes. Empirical research has established Serbian foreign policy to be “more 
reactive than proactive” because Serbia mostly reacts to processes which it is “exposed 
to externally.”103  
 
Serbia’s systemic environment as it pertains to its balancing act is marked by the 
unresolved Kosovo dispute, regional power vacuum caused by the Western distraction 
from the region, and occasional tensions between Russia and the West, which became 
particularly acute after the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. Serbia starts to hedge its bets in that 
systemic environment by diversifying partnerships and compensating for any stagnation 
in the EU integration process. On top of that, Serbia increasingly used Russia as leverage 
with the West. By balancing and playing Russia and the West against each other, Serbia 
hopes to better bargain with the West, including on Kosovo.   
 
In that context, we need to clarify what is meant by the use of the term ‘systemic’. This 
study will treat as systemic any process and event that shapes Serbian foreign policy 
behaviour that is not a product of domestic dynamics but of Serbia’s external 
environment. Here, the words systemic and international are not used interchangeably. 
Namely, as some academics pointed out, the concept of the system is meaningless without 
interaction.104 If sovereign states, as the fundamental unit of the international system, 
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interact, this interaction is international. Furthermore, as international politics operates 
within the framework of the international system, these interactions are inevitably 
systemic as well. The international system operates through the interaction of its units, 
which means that state A will respond to the behaviour of state B. 
 
Moreover, the systemic pressures to which Serbia responds in its foreign policy behaviour 
affect Serbia through international interaction, like in the case of the Kosovo dispute that 
is shaped by a great power dynamic. In that context, systemic pressure is any occurrence 
that affects Serbia externally and that propels Serbia to conduct its balancing act. As such, 
these occurrences come from the external environment and are not the product of unit-
level factors. 
 
In doing this, chapter 3 will first identify the nature of the international system, and it will 
try to go beyond the binary debate about whether the post-Cold war system is unipolar or 
multipolar. The system will be identified as a hybrid system, a uni-multipolar system. 
This distinction is relevant as it identifies three global powers around which the analysed 
policy revolves: the EU, the US and Russia. Moreover, it shows that these powers are not 
in the same power ranking. Most importantly, it explains that these three powers form a 
single causal whole, as the same set of systemic processes drives the Serbian balancing 
act between these three powers. Therefore, some other great powers like Japan or China, 
and regional powers like Turkey, are not analysed as they are not part of the same set of 
systemic processes. 
 
This chapter identifies, through research, three systemic processes that have enabled and 
propelled the Serbian balancing act. The research entailed analysing secondary source 
materials and fieldwork research in Serbia, where interviews with relevant sources were 
conducted. The first systemic process is the independence of Kosovo and the international 
dispute that followed. This dispute is viewed in a systemic context as Kosovo’s 
independence came about due to Western support. In turn, Serbian foreign policy began 
to be dominated by the Kosovo dispute. As a result, Serbia had to rely on Russian backing, 




Kosovo dispute has a systemic effect as it cannot be resolved by Serbia alone and without 
the external, great powers. 
 
The second systemic process behind the Serbian balancing act is the regional power 
vacuum that emerged in the Balkans in 2008. Namely, after the global financial crisis of 
2008 that overspilled onto the EU in the form of the Eurozone crisis, the EU’s ability to 
continue enlargement to the Balkans has been disrupted. The fact that the world’s sole 
superpower, the US, did not consider the Balkans to be a priority also helped create the 
regional power vacuum. This power vacuum continued to deepen with other occurrences 
that diverted the EU’s attention, like the migrant crisis and Brexit. In those circumstances, 
Russia seized the opportunity by stepping in through more assertive policies. For local 
nations like Serbia that became stranded on the Western periphery, external powers like 
Russia provided an opportunity to engage in hedging through diversification of 
partnerships and leveraging the West by balancing and playing the West and Russia 
against each other. The ultimate fate of the power vacuum that acted as a permissive 
environment both for Russian policies in the region and Serbian balancing will be 
determined by the exercise of US might. 
 
The list of systemic processes that impacted the Serbian balancing act does not end with 
the Kosovo dispute and the regional power vacuum, though the balancing act exists 
primarily because of these two processes. However, the balancing act implemented 
during the twelve years was not always be the same. On the contrary, the policy of 
balancing is different in both its form and intensity depending on the circumstances of a 
given period. The form and intensity of balancing are frequently dictated by the rivalry 
between Russia and the West. Russian overtures towards the Balkans often correspond 
with Moscow’s feuds with the West in 2008 and post-2014. When the West-Russia 
relations are not burdened with rivalry, Serbia can balance without any strategic or 
diplomatic tensions. However, when these relations become confrontational, Serbian 
balancing becomes much more pronounced and riskier. The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 is a 




position where it had to start balancing more openly.105 In those circumstances, Serbia 
tries to maintain balance to minimise dangers and profit by playing Russia and the West 
against each other and building better bargaining power with the West in the process. 
 
3.2 The International System 
 
If one examines the international system as a factor influencing Serbian foreign policy, 
one will first have to make a specific assessment of its nature. Since the end of the Cold 
War there has not been consent in the IR discipline on the nature of the international 
system. The debate fluctuated most frequently between those who stressed the 
unipolarity, like Charles Krauthammer and William Wohlforth, and those who spoke of 
a new multipolarity, like Henry Kissinger and Christopher Layne.106 
 
As one study accurately observed: “Polarity is a theoretical construct; the international 
systems only approximate various polar ideal types.”107 Therefore, this study is in line 
with the work of theorists, such as Samuel Huntington, Barry Buzan, and Colin Dueck. 
These authors claimed that the international system is a hybrid combination of unipolarity 
and multipolarity, a uni-multipolar system. In this system, the US is the only superpower. 
The other powers are great powers operating on the global level of the international 
system, and regional powers.108 
 
The international system structure is described through the formula 1+4, where the US is 
the only superpower, followed by four globally relevant great powers: the EU, Russia, 
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China, and Japan,109 with the first two being major players in the Balkans. Considering 
that “interaction is crucial to the concept of system, for, without it, the term system has 
no meaning,”110 this study will consider Serbia’s balancing act between three global 
powers that are most active in the Balkan region: two Western powers, namely the US 
and the EU, and Russia. 
 
Some other actors will be left out of this study. This study will have to treat Western 
European powers, such as Germany, France, and even the UK, as part of a larger whole, 
namely the EU. Naturally, there are instances when individual countries, most notably 
Germany, make consequential decisions. However, the EU weighs prominently in 
Serbian foreign policy considerations. Therefore, the most effective way to analyse 
Serbian foreign policy towards individual Western European powers is in the EU context. 
This framing also helps in terms of analytical and conceptual elegance. 
 
Japan will not be analysed as it is not a Balkan player, and this study also leaves China 
out. China has unquestionable great power status, and its engagement with the Balkans 
has increased under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, China 
is a newcomer to the Balkans. More importantly, the systemic forces driving Chinese 
engagement with Serbia are different from those applying to Serbian interaction with 
Russia and the West, the Kosovo dispute, the power vacuum, and West-Russia rivalry. 
Serbia’s relationship with Turkey will also be left out of this study, as Turkey is a regional 
power and not a global power, meaning that Turkey is not part of the same systemic, 
power dynamic impacting Serbian balancing. 
 
By using the international system to analyse Serbia’s foreign policy, one can observe a 
specific pattern. The full shift towards the balancing act happened in 2008 as a result of 
two processes. The first was Kosovo’s independence. Serbia found itself on this issue on 
the opposite sides to the US and most of the EU members that recognised Kosovo’s 
independence (save for Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Spain). Simultaneously, 
the US did not consider the Balkans a priority as it was more dedicated to other regions 
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of the world, like the Middle East. For the EU, the great power replacing the US as a 
geopolitical stabiliser in the Balkans, Serbia, and the rest of the region became secondary 
priorities as the EU became engulfed in the global financial and Eurozone crises. As such, 
the West does not act with the same level of efficiency as it did before 2008. 
 
These trends created the second process. As EU became distracted with its internal 
problems and other crises, e.g. the migrant crisis, a state similar to regional vacuum 
emerges, and within that environment, Russia conducts a more assertive policy, 
frequently through overtures towards Serbia whenever Russia senses that the West is 
strategically neglecting the Balkans.111 With the Kosovo issue and the regional power 
vacuum, Russia saw an opportunity to return to the Balkans as it began to recover from 
the traumas of the 1990s. As such, it had a greater ability and ambition to be more 
assertive in the Balkans. This ambition is particularly pronounced when Russian relations 
with the West are adversarial. When that happens, Russia starts to perceive the Balkans 
as a place to counter the West for its intrusion in the post-Soviet space, and use the 
Balkans’ territorial dispute as a precedent in the post-Soviet frozen conflicts. 
 
As Serbia became burdened with the Kosovo dispute and as it became evident that it 
would remain stranded on the Western periphery without the possibility of changing that 
with EU membership, Russia began to resurface in Serbian foreign policy. As Kosovo 
started to move towards independence, Serbia sought a great power willing to back its 
case. Serbia needed Russian support in opposing Kosovo’s independence internationally, 
primarily through the Russian veto in the UN Security Council. Serbia was also 
discouraged by the global financial crisis and the fact that its EU path was destined to be 
uncertain. This change instilled a perception among Serbian leaders that the EU and the 
West were vulnerable and that Serbia needed to develop alternative partnerships with 
non-Western powers, including Russia. 
 
This impulse to balance is even more powerful when Serbia notices increased rivalry 
between Russia and the West. Then Belgrade tries to avoid the risks of aligning with one 
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of the two sides and tries to profit from balancing between external powers. With that in 
mind, this helps to identify three systemic processes conditioning the Serbian balancing 
act, and that will be individually assessed in more detail: the Kosovo dispute, the regional 
power vacuum in the Balkans, and the state of relations between Russia and the West. 
 
3.3 The Kosovo Dispute  
 
The international dispute caused by Kosovo’s independence is the first systemic process 
that shaped the Serbian balancing act during the designated period. Some interviewees 
have defined the issue of Kosovo as “an absolute parameter and axiom” of Serbian foreign 
policy.112 At first glance, this process might fit more into the definition of an international 
rather than a systemic process. However, the Kosovo dispute will be analysed as a 
systemic process because it has that kind of effect on Belgrade’s behaviour.  
 
That is to say, since the end of the Kosovo War in 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 
1244 placed Kosovo under UN administration while acknowledging Yugoslav 
sovereignty over the territory. The ultimate fate of Kosovo prevailingly resides in the 
hands of great powers. Kosovo’s independence came about due to great power politics, 
namely through the military intervention and later diplomatic recognition by the key 
Western powers. Simultaneously, the resolution of the Kosovo dispute cannot be conjured 
without the involvement of great powers, which in this case involves the West and Russia. 
This setting implies that Serbia’s most critical issue is dependent on the broader systemic 
dynamic of great power constellations. 
 
As Kosovo started to move towards independence, the West and Russia took different 
stances on this issue. The US and most Western capitals were convinced that independent 
Kosovo would be the adequate and final closure of the Kosovo issue. On the other hand, 
Russia saw the opportunity to expand its influence in Serbia, and by extension in the 
Balkans, by supporting the Serbian case on Kosovo and promoting its vision of European 
and international affairs. 
 
 




With the independence of Kosovo, the Serbian foreign policy elite found itself in a 
dilemma. The first option for Serbia was to insist solely on the Kosovo issue and pursue 
a counter-secessionist policy. This option would entail closer ties with Russia and full 
abandonment of its EU aspirations. Abandoning the EU path would imply that Serbia 
gives up on its leading economic partner, whose members geographically encircle Serbia. 
The continuation of the EU path would entail accepting Kosovo’s independence, a non-
starter as Belgrade perceived it as an unjust outcome. 
 
Serbian foreign policy took a middle road on which it perseveres to this very day. The 
middle road is the “controlled process” in which Serbia upholds the principle of its 
territorial integrity while still keeping an option open of joining the EU one day when the 
Kosovo issue gets resolved.113 However, in lack of a Western ally on the Kosovo issue, 
Serbia had to find another great power willing to back its case on Kosovo. For Serbia, 
burdened with the Kosovo dispute, Russia was the only viable option. As Srećko Đukić, 
former Serbian diplomat, told the author: “The balancing that began in 2008 started 
because of Kosovo … We had to start balancing our relations with Russia primarily 
because of Kosovo. Balancing is in play because the West was pressing us severely as we 
could not find common ground with them on Kosovo.”114 
 
Dragan Šutanovac, former Serbian defence minister, similarly stated: “Serbia found itself 
in a situation where, objectively, it does not have an honest, genuine ally that would help 
it develop primarily according to its own interests. Instead, Serbia is finding itself between 
a rock and a hard place, East and West.”115 Maxim Samorukov, from the Carnegie 
Moscow Center, agreed: “Because there were no good alternatives to that [Russian 
support]. The West did not provide any way out for Serbia in this situation. They forced 
Serbia into Russia’s embrace, so I would not really blame Serbian leadership for making 
this choice because actually, they had no choice.”116 
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Indeed, the Serbian balancing act revolving around the Kosovo dispute shows a strong 
systemic logic. Serbia invokes and nurtures partnership with Russia because Serbia has 
no major partner in the West on the Kosovo issue. As it lacks any other alternative, Russia 
becomes a factor and a necessity for Serbia. However, this logic does not imply a rigid 
binary divide where Serbia cuts its ties with the West and establishes a full-fledged 
partnership or alliance with Russia: it would be strategically irrational for Serbia to turn 
its back on the West and pivot towards Russia, even in light of differences on Kosovo. 
Why would that hypothetical pivot to Russia be strategically irrational? 
 
Firstly, Serbia is economically dependent on the EU. In 2019, the EU constituted 62 per 
cent of Serbia’s total trade, with 66.3 per cent of Serbian exports and 58.2 per cent in 
Serbian imports. In contrast, Serbia’s trade with Russia and the Russia-led Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU) was 8 per cent of Serbia’s total trade, with 5.4 per cent of 
exports and 9.4 per cent of the country’s import.117 From January 2010 to September 
2019, the EU constituted 72.27 per cent of net foreign direct investment in Serbia, while 
Russia with 11.21 per cent was second.118 
 
Secondly, Serbia is geographically encircled by countries that are either members or 
aspiring members of Western institutions such as the EU and NATO. Geographic logic 
plays a prominent role in Serbia’s desire to join the EU. Serbia’s neighbours Bulgaria and 
Romania joined in 2007, and Croatia in 2013. In the case of NATO, two of Serbia’s 
neighbours, Montenegro and North Macedonia, joined the alliance in 2017 and 2020. 
Therefore, the reality of geographical encirclement by NATO and the EU is highly 
pronounced for Serbia. In that regard, it is worth remembering that for NCR geography 
falls under the category of “structural modifier”, meaning “a class of material variables 
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at the level of the international system or a regional sub-system, but which are not 
structural.”119 
 
Thirdly, the West outguns Russia in terms of power capabilities, including in the Balkans. 
Russia has an economy dependent on gas exports that in 2019 was slightly bigger than 
the US state of Texas.120 Situation will no change in the foreseeable future as Russia is 
fighting with the fallout from COVID-19 pandemic like everybody else. According to the 
World Bank, Russia’s 2020 GDP growth contracted by 3 per cent due to the COVID-19 
pandemic.121 Unlike the US with a military presence through NATO, Russia has no 
military forces in the Balkans to project its power. Moreover, Russian military spending 
of USD 61.7 billion in 2020, is outmatched by the US spending of USD 778 billion.122 
Therefore, even in the context of the Kosovo dispute, Serbia cannot make a pivot to a 
Russia that is not a peer competitor to the West, neither globally nor in the Balkans. 
 
This Serbian tendency to try and form partnerships with both Russia and the West is 
neatly explained with a concept developed by two Serbian political scientists, Dragan 
Živojinović and Dragan Đukanović, called “the complex of the 1990s.” This “complex” 
is the constant fear that Serbia will be left alone and without allies – as in the 1990s. The 
“complex” was triggered by Kosovo’s independence and the slowdown in the process of 
European integration after the 2008 financial crisis.123 
 
These two academics invoked a puzzle highlighted by political scientist Glenn Snyder, 
who pointed out that states face a specific form of security dilemma in which they either 
risk facing a security threat alone (without allies) or risk losing their autonomy within an 
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alliance. As Snyder noted: “The obverse of the fear of the abandonment is the fear of 
entrapment. … As the cost of abandonment is a serious loss of security, the cost of 
entrapment is an extreme form of lost autonomy.”124 Serbia, in a way, found itself in a 
situation similar to the dynamic Snyder described. The EU remained the guiding principle 
of Serbian foreign policy to overcome “the complex of the 1990s” and avoid international 
isolation as under Milosevic. However, embracing the EU as an alliance was likely to 
result in a loss of autonomy, which would mean accepting an unpopular settlement to the 
Kosovo dispute. Serbia could not pursue EU membership with the same drive and 
dedication as before, as this policy became more difficult after 2008 and continues to be 
so today. 
 
At some points, which will be examined in more detail in the empirical chapters, Serbia 
would occasionally tilt towards either the EU or the US if Belgrade perceived them as 
more suitable partners on Kosovo. The period between 2012 and 2014 resulted in 
particularly close ties between Serbia and the EU, as it was during that period that an 
agreement on normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the so-called 
Brussels Agreement, was achieved under EU mediation.125 However, the declining clout 
of the EU in the Balkans, especially post-2014, also led to the EU’s failure as a mediator 
on Kosovo. Boško Jakšić, a Serbian diplomatic commentator, elegantly summarised this 
failure: “Some results on technical agreements were reached, but if the result of an entire 
decade of talks is agreement on dial code and car licence plates, it is extremely 
underwhelming.”126 
 
Something similar happened in regards to the Serbo-American relations. As deadlock in 
the Belgrade Priština dialogue carried on, the US became more acceptable for Belgrade 
as a great power that should be persuaded to influence Priština. Slobodan Samardžić 
explained this shift: “The US was a distant observer, except in some crises when they 
would get involved directly, particularly in the last one to two years when the EU lost 
control of that enlargement and accession process. The EU lost its role as a decisive 
mediator between Serbia and Albanian institutions in Kosovo. And as such, the US acts 
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more like something of an active, corrective factor. ... We see that the US assumes the 
main role in this process of a transition into the so-called final phase of resolving the 
Kosovo issue.”127 During the presidency of Donald Trump, it appeared that Serbia could 
get a better deal on Kosovo. Even though Kosovo’s independence was an irreversible 
process for the US, the Trump administration had a more relaxed position towards 
Belgrade, leading Serbia to see a more positive role for the US as a partner that can secure 
a more beneficial agreement in this dispute.128 Naturally, with the electoral defeat of 
Donald Trump in November 2020, this attempt of developing a modus vivendi with the 
US also failed. 
 
However, Russia was never eliminated from the Serbian policy agenda (despite 
occasional attempts to do so) to engage with the EU and the US on Kosovo. As long as 
the Kosovo issue remains in play, Serbia will have to keep the Russia option alive in 
hopes of getting a less painful settlement of the dispute. As Dragoljub Mićunović, former 
Chairman of the Serbian Parliament and former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Serbian parliament, told the author: “Russia and particularly China 
strengthened their international position which creates the illusion of an easy resolution 
of the Kosovo dispute. This is unlikely to happen, but it leaves an open space to regulate 
some things about the position of the Serbian population in Kosovo, the position of 
Northern Kosovo and its autonomy, property, cultural monuments.”129 
 
However, resolution of the Kosovo dispute remains elusive, particularly in regards to the 
three great powers. An introvert EU unable to enlarge to the Balkans cannot act as an 
effective mediator of the region’s remaining conflicts and disputes, including Kosovo. 
Consequently, the resolution of the Kosovo dispute rests on the role of the US. In the 
words of one interviewee: “That is the main problem - that without the United States, it 
cannot be resolved. Only the United States has the ability, capacity, and resources to 
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resolve the issue. Maybe they do not have the commitment, but they have the ability and 
capacity.”130 
 
The list does not end there. On the Kosovo issue, partnership with Russia is necessary for 
Serbia, but it is also a challenge and an impediment. For Russia, an unresolved Kosovo 
dispute ties Serbia, the most consequential country of the Balkans, to Russia, providing 
Moscow one of the last remaining sources of influence in the Balkans, and a bargaining 
chip in hypothetical great power bargaining with the West. Serbia is in a state of 
uncomfortable systemic dependency on Russia, as Russia opposes any settlement of the 
Kosovo issue, denying Russia the opportunity to ask something in return from the US.131 
Therefore, the resolution of the Kosovo conundrum will reside with the US, Russia and 
the EU, leaving Serbia in a challenging position to balance these powers to try and get 
some concessions in this hypothetical scenario.132 This cements the Serbian reality where 
the Kosovo issue is not just an international, territorial and diplomatic dispute, but also a 
systemic constraint. It is a process dependent not on Serbian conduct but on the great 
power dynamic. Certainly; there is no ultimate end date for the Serbian balancing act 
between Russia and the West, as there is no end date for the resolution of the Kosovo 
issue.133 
 
3.4 The Power Vacuum in the Balkans 
 
The next external force behind the Serbian balancing act that will be examined is the 
regional power vacuum. For realists who apply Kenneth Waltz’s “images” - or levels of 
analysis as J. David Singer renamed the concept134 - the international system acts as a 
permissive cause of foreign policy behaviour, while unit-level factors are treated as an 
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efficient cause.135 In that regard, the regional power vacuum acted as a permissive 
environment for non-Western powers like Russia to be more assertive in the Balkans. It 
also created an incentive for Serbia to engage in its balancing act. 
 
How and when did this power vacuum happen? The starting date was 2008 when the 
global financial crisis was unleashed, overspilling onto the EU with the Eurozone crisis. 
After the financial crisis, the EU slowly lost interest in the Balkan region, which became 
“terra incognita” as one Serbian diplomat told the author.136 The Eurozone crisis has 
paralysed the EU’s ability to enlarge to the Balkans and removed the region from the 
EU’s strategic priorities list. This crisis has made the Balkans “the periphery of the 
periphery” within crisis-laden Europe and has led the EU to adopt a “wait and see 
approach” towards enlargement.137 Indeed, Belgrade took note that starting with the 
budgetary year of 2009, the number of visits by the EU officials to both Serbia and the 
region decreased compared to the period between 2000 and 2007.138 
  
Worth highlighting is that the power vacuum did not become all-encompassing with the 
global financial crisis, just that the financial crisis marked the beginning of this process. 
Equally important is that the power vacuum does not imply the complete European 
absence from the region. After all, Montenegro and Serbia began their accession talks in 
2012 and 2014, respectively,139 Croatia joined the EU in 2013.140 However, after Croatian 
membership, the notion of enlargement fatigue became stronger, questioning the 
possibility that others may join Croatia anytime soon.141 In those circumstances, the EU 
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enlargement resembles more of a bureaucratic process rather than a genuine policy game-
changer.142  
 
As a result, the EU is not out of the region, but its main leverage, the prospect of 
enlargement, is weakened. This is best summed up by scholar Ivan Krastev who stated: 
“The EU has the power of attraction, but its transformative powers are more limited.”143 
The EU has not left the region, and the prospect of membership is an attractive long-term 
prospect. However, because this prospect is distant, EU’s leverage is reduced, and so is 
the incentive for a country like Serbia to base its foreign policy solely on the EU 
aspiration. This creates an opening for power like Russia and creates an incentive for 
Serbia to do short-term and mid-term hedging by engaging Russia.     
 
The crisis of 2008 strengthened all the voices within the EU that already existed that 
believed that the EU is not ready for further enlargement, a move that has to be postponed 
as long as possible.144 All these occurrences, “created such an odium against further 
enlargement that no one at that time considered the fact that in politics and geopolitics, 
just like in a human body, there is no such thing as a vacuum. So, there is a space. It is 
empty, as someone has emptied it. Immediately, someone else (e.g. Russia) jumps into 
that empty space, and that is what started to happen here.”145 As another interviewee said: 
“Russia started to prepare itself back in 2004, and they only waited for the right 
opportunity to execute their policy. During 2008 and 2009, through a unilateral 
declaration of Kosovo’s independence and economic crisis, there has been a visible retreat 
of the EU from our region in every sense. That space was filled by someone else, by 
someone who was not necessarily stronger, but willing enough to fill that space that was 
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left empty with minimal efforts. That space is filled, and for now, they are holding it. It 
will be tough to change that space.”146 
 
In that chaotic regional and systemic environment, the EU no longer played a prominent 
role in Serbian foreign policy. The role of the EU in Serbian foreign policy since 2008 
became “minimal”, “because after 2008 and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence there is a crisis in the EU and the EU’s declining presence in Serbia. There 
was still insistence on integration, and there were various stages. The integration process 
has commenced, but the EU’s influence on foreign and security policy has been minimal. 
It was greater in 2008, as opposed to after 2008.”147 
 
In January 2012, then Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremić spoke at a Serbian Ambassadors’ 
Conference. In this conference, Jeremić explained the systemic forces that continue to 
shape Serbia and its balancing act to this very day. He spoke on the emergence of a new 
“multipolarity” and “high level of geopolitical volatility”;148 a view shared by the Serbian 
foreign policy elite to this very day. Jeremić further observed that non-Western powers 
were looking for their share of international spoils while referring to “Russia’s renewal.” 
He also observed the crisis that had hit the EU and the bloc’s diminished the capacity to 
act assertively in the Balkans – not least its inability to absorb a country like Serbia.149 
The fact that Serbia faced a dilemma Kosovo or the EU never escaped Jeremić, including 
while making this statement. However, it is equally certain that Serbian elites were 
becoming aware that the EU, burdened with other issues, has less desire to dedicate its 
efforts to the region. Therefore, decreasing Belgrade’s resolve to follow the EU’s lead, 
including on Kosovo.  
 
Within this systemic context, all Serbian governments are aware that the pursuit of EU 
membership is their safest strategic bet in the long-term. Therefore, no government in 
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Belgrade can afford to demote EU membership as the primary goal. However, 
simultaneously Serbian politicians are aware that the EU cannot offer Serbia membership. 
The reasons for this are numerous, internal crisis in Europe, unresolved Kosovo dispute, 
and unfinished domestic reforms. Thus prompting Belgrade to look for other partners in 
the international system. This change instilled a perception among Serbian leaders that 
the EU and the West were vulnerable and that Serbia needs to develop alternative 
partnerships with non-Western powers, including Russia. As Boris Tadić, former Serbian 
President noted: “We are moving towards the EU that has a crystallised system of the 
human society, but that does not mean that the EU is invulnerable … Therefore, Serbia 
has been developing a policy of alternative pillars with China, Russia, Japan and 
Brazil.”150 There is no evidence that Serbia achieved anything substantial in its ties with 
Japan and Brazil. While Tadić’s mention of these countries is probably a political name-
dropping, his statement does inform us of the Serbian logic in engaging powers like 
Russia and China. 
 
However, the Serbian balancing act does not revolve solely around the logic of hedging 
through diversification of partnership, but also around the Serbian desire to develop 
leverage with the West by playing the Russia card. When Belgrade looks at its systemic 
environment, it observes a world in flux, where non-Western powers like Russia fill the 
void whenever and wherever Western powers are not present. Serbia perceives Russia as 
a form of balance whenever hope is lost in the fundamental strategic commitment, a 
relatively accelerated accession to the EU.151 In this state of vacuum, where the Balkans 
is neglected, for a country like Serbia “balancing and playing off rival powers in order to 
reap short-term benefits at the expense of long-term public interest” becomes the 
dominant strategy.152 
 
The state of a power vacuum did not end solely with the Eurozone crisis of 2008. The EU 
is incapable of engaging Serbia and the Balkans with the same proficiency as in the past. 
The challenges that the EU faced, like the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit, 
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have also made the EU more introverted and unable to act effectively in Serbia and the 
Balkans.153 The role of the EU’s enlargement policy in Serbian foreign policy “from the 
moment of Brexit is becoming even more difficult, more confused,”154 as “everybody is 
looking at the UK to see how things will unfold.”155 As a Serbian MP explained: “The 
West openly pulled back taking their own needs into account. Today, they think that 
Europe will sort out its affairs, and then be back after ten years to continue with the 
enlargement process. I tell them that is great but do not expect that the status quo awaits 
you in ten years.”156 
 
The enlargement as the primary form of the EU’s strategic leverage lost its credibility, 
not just because of the crisis impacting the EU, but also because the voices within the EU 
that oppose further enlargement are getting more impactful on the policy.157 As Spyros 
Economides put it, the idea of EU enlargement went “from fatigue to resistance.” 
Economides explains that unlike the past when there was a debate on how to correct the 
mistakes associated with EU enlargement as in 2004 and 2007, today, the discussion is 
on the future of EU enlargement and the consequence of receiving new EU members.158 
Tired of constant waiting without any adequate progress towards membership, Serbia and 
other EU membership candidates are more encouraged to accept overtures from external 
powers offering various forms of economic and political cooperation, as well as religious 
and cultural solidarity.159 Thus, the vacuum continues to provide Belgrade with a chance 
to play its balancing act. 
 
The power vacuum also shapes Serbian balancing in regards to the US, as the lack of US 
interest has also contributed to the power vacuum in the Balkans.160 After 2000, 
 
153 Dimitar Bechev, Rival Power, p.16 
154 Author’s interview with Dragan Šutanovac, former Serbian Defence Minister, Belgrade, February 2019 
155   Author’s interview with a Serbian diplomat and an adviser in the Serbian government, Belgrade, March 
2019 
156 Author’s interview with an MP from the ranks of the DS, Belgrade, February 2019 
157 James Ker-Lindsay, Ioannis Armakolas, Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat, ‘The national politics of EU 
enlargement in the Western Balkans’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 4, Spring 
2017, p.519 
158 Spyros Economides, ‘From Fatigue to Resistance: EU Enlargement and the Western Balkans’, 
Dahrendorf Forum IV, Working Paper No. 17, 20 March 2020, p.3 
159 Ibid., p.7 
160 Author’s interview with a former member of the Foreign Policy Council of the Ministry of Foreign 




Washington began to lose interest in Serbia and the Balkans, as the region was no longer 
the theatre of violent conflicts, and as the Milošević regime was overthrown. This process 
has been further exacerbated by 9/11, which redirected US attention away from the 
Balkans and towards other regions, passing the buck of stabilising the Balkans to the EU, 
making it the main external guarantor of regional security in the Balkans.161 This trend 
was cemented after 2008 as the US continued passing the buck to the disoriented EU, as 
Washington struggled with its financial crisis, reset with Russia, pivot to Asia, and its 
military engagements in Afghanistan and the Middle East.162 
 
This systemic reality poses a significant challenge for Serbian foreign policy. While 
Serbian relations with the US were marked with the bitter legacy of the 1990s and the 
disagreements on Kosovo, Serbia cannot resolve the Kosovo issue nor improve its 
regional positions without establishing a new form of relationship with the US.163 The 
problem for all Serbian governments since the fall of Milošević’s regime in 2000 was that 
this partnership could not be formed. In a systemic context, where the Balkans are not a 
priority for the US, Serbia could not expect the same level of dedication from the US, as 
was received by other post-communist Eastern European states in the 1990s. One can say 
that Serbo-American ties are marked with what a Serbian expert on the US, Dragan 
Živojinović called a “mutual wishful thinking.”164 In that context, Serbia has an 
unrealistic expectation of reenacting a modus vivendi with the US from the days of the 
Cold War. However, Serbia no longer has the same strategic weight as the former 
Yugoslavia did. The US also has an unrealistic expectation of Serbia becoming 
uncompromisingly pro-Western, although Serbia’s recent history is different from the 
other post-communist countries. 
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While every Serbian government after 2000 has proclaimed promoting good relations 
with the US as one of the foreign policy priorities,165 the US could not make a shift in its 
Balkan policy. The US was losing interest in the Balkans, as it no longer perceived it as 
a strategic priority deserving major US attention. That left the planning of the US policy 
towards the region in the hands of State Department bureaucrats, without the political 
capacity to make an innovative Serbian policy.166 This was a significant impediment for 
US-Serbian relations. It was evident that without a major strategic change regarding the 
region, one will not see a completely new US policy towards Serbia, and Belgrade will 
not be able to improve the relationship with Washington. 
 
Despite this impediment, Serbia tries not to make the US an enemy, making relations with 
the US part of Serbian balancing policy. This policy is based on the systemic reality of 
enormous disparity in the distribution of power between the two countries, which forces 
Serbia to establish a cordial, working relationship with the US. Serbia is aware of US 
primacy in the international system, and this has been present in the official policy 
narrative. The Serbian National Security Strategies from 2009 and 2019 both stressed 
Serbian desire and a necessity to improve and strengthen ties with the US, despite 
disagreements on issues like Kosovo.167 
 
Indeed, the role of the US in Serbian foreign policy is “enormous” even when the US is 
not “in a front-row” as Serbian leaders see the US as “a global leader” shaping the world, 
including the Balkan region. As the US interest is not always aligned with Serbian 
interest, the Serbian elite, including the incumbent coalition between the Serbian 
Progressive Party (SNS) and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), try to develop leverage 
vis-à-vis the US, on Kosovo and bilateral ties, by balancing between the EU and Russia.168  
This is the reality acknowledged by most of the interviewees, regardless of their party 
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affiliations. As former Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Živković told me: “We must 
recognise that the US’s significance and influence in world politics has consequences, 
including for Serbia. So, it is very important what Washington thinks of Serbia, at least 
as important as the opinion of Brussels, and slightly more important than what Moscow 
and Beijing think.”169 Even for the conservative, anti-Western Democratic Party of Serbia 
(DSS) and its president Miloš Jovanović, this systemic reality is self-evident, as the power 
that the US wields and the memory of the 1990s created a sense of “apprehensiveness and 
awe” towards the US in Serbia. Consequently, even for the DSS, the “relations with the 
US are not friendly, but since it is the superpower, the relations cannot be overly hostile 
as Serbia cannot afford it.”170 
 
The US did not, however, wholly disengage from the region. On the contrary, the US has 
the ambition of being engaged in the region until it is stabilised so that the 1990s US 
“policy products” are preserved. This primarily refers to the unity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the independence of Kosovo. The US is focused on finishing this task 
in order to dedicate its attention and resources to other regions more fully. It needs to be 
underlined that both of these two issues, Bosnia and Kosovo, directly concern Serbia 
which is why Serbia is still on the US radar, although to a limited extent. For the US, 
integrating Serbia and the Western Balkans in a network of Western institutions, namely 
the EU and NATO, is an essential part of this stabilisation effort.171 As the later empirical 
chapter will show, post-2014 the US re-activated itself in the Balkans when it rolled back 
Russian influence in the Balkans by pushing for the NATO membership of Montenegro 
and North Macedonia, shattering Moscow’s ambition to derail NATO expansion in the 
region.172 During this time, Serbia unsuccessfully tried to build something of an alliance 
with the Trump Administration. The empirical analysis will show how this ultimately 
failed with the electoral defeat of Donald Trump. However, the systemic and geopolitical 
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reality is that the US remains a superpower. Even with limited engagement, thanks to its 
power capabilities, it can step in when the EU fails and can outmatch Russia. 
 
Although the Balkans remain “diplomatic underbrush” for the US, as one US journalist 
described it in 2005, for Serbia the US will remain a factor that will be taken into account 
in foreign policy considerations, given that country’s superpower position in the 
international system. Until either a major systemic threat emerges that will foster a firmer 
relationship between the USA and Serbia, as it did in the past (Germany on two occasions, 
and the Soviet Union later), and/or a significant change in Serbian and US policy, the 
relationship between the two will most likely remain “formal but weary friendship.”173 
 
Given this systemic reality of US leadership, Serbia will continue trying to secure a 
healthy modus vivendi, making the US equally important in the balancing policy as the 
EU and Russia. This will be difficult to achieve with the presidential administration of 
Joseph Biden, as Serbian leadership constantly fears that Biden’s administration will be 
tougher on Belgrade in regards to both Kosovo and ties with Russia and China. However, 
Serbia will continue to balance its relationship with the US, the same way it does with its 
ties with the EU and Russia. How the US acts towards Serbia might well be the decisive 
systemic force that might end both the power vacuum in the Balkans and the Serbian 
balancing act. 
 
Given that the EU remains a long-term foreign policy goal of Serbia, it is doubtful that 
any Serbian government will give up on EU membership. However, given that in the short 
and medium-term, that goal will remain elusive for Serbia, the country will try to diversify 
its foreign policy partnerships until that happens, and try to use Russia to build bargaining 
power with the West. Nevertheless, this opportunistic policy can be pursued only as long 
as there is a strategic leeway. As the EU lacks the clout to impose restraint on both Russian 
activities in the Balkans and Serbian balancing, it is up to the US to act on behalf of the 
West. In the words of Russian political scientist, Ekaterina Entina: “The US is more 
attractive than the EU. It promises nothing, but when it acts, it acts effectively, with a 
 




clear message ... and quickly.”174 The answer to the questions how long and to what extent 
will Belgrade continue to play its current game lies in Washington. 
 
3.5 West-Russia Relations 
 
Ultimately, the state of relations between Russia and the West is the third systemic 
processes shaping Serbian balancing act. However, there is a caveat. The Kosovo dispute 
and the regional power vacuum remained the systemic forces that came into being in 2008 
and shaped the Serbian balancing act during the designated period. The state of relations 
between Russia and the West, and whether those relations are cooperative or 
confrontational, do not act as independent causal forces of the Serbian balancing act. The 
Kosovo dispute and the power vacuum play that role. One can say that Serbia balances 
not because the relations between Russia and the West can become more turbulent as they 
briefly were in 2008 with the Russo-Georgian war, or dangerous as they have been since 
the Ukraine Crisis of 2014, but despite these tensions.175 
 
The tensions between Russia and the West do not cause the Serbian balancing act, but 
these tensions help shape the form and intensity of that balancing. If the relations between 
Russia and the West are relatively peaceful, the balancing act can be done with relative 
tranquillity. However, suppose the West-Russia relations become dominated by tensions, 
hostility and rivalry. In that case, the balancing becomes more tenuous and riskier, but it 
also becomes more intensive. Serbia ups the ante on its balancing act to hedge against 
any potential risks and try and profit from the competing powers by playing them one 
against the other. The validity of this assertion will be tested during the empirical 
chapters. The three stages of a Serbian balancing act during the designated period 
correspond with periods of rivalry between Russia and the West. 
 
It needs to be stressed that when Russia boosted its engagement with Serbia on the 
Kosovo issue and when the Serbian balancing act commenced in 2008, this was when the 
relations between Russia and the West were on a downward spiral. It was when Russia 
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started opposing the US hegemony and Western attempts to expand NATO and the EU 
into the post-Soviet space.176 In that context, Russia uses the Balkans and Serbia to 
counter the Western international order and reassert itself as a great power that deserves 
its seat at the table, after years of weakness and humiliation in the 1990s.177 When Russia 
is in rivalry with the West, it becomes more interested in the Balkans. If Russia is 
excluded from the Balkans, it is excluded from European affairs, and unable to play a 
more significant role internationally. In the words of Barry Buzan, and Ole Wæver: 
“Russians are not generally willing to sacrifice much for the Serbs. They saw support for 
Serbia as important to gaining acceptance of the principle that Russia should be heard 
both because it is a global great power (UN Security Council logic) and because it is a 
European great power.”178 
 
By having leverage in Serbia and the Balkans, particularly on sensitive issues like 
Kosovo, Russia has a potential bargaining chip to employ in deal-making with the West. 
This is particularly important, as Russia has found a direct link between Kosovo’s 
independence and territorial disputes in the post-Soviet space. In both the case of the 
Georgian War of 2008 and the Ukraine Crisis of 2014, the independence of Kosovo was 
invoked by Russia, both as precedent and a way of deflecting Western criticism, accusing 
the West of hypocrisy with the Kosovo example. Russian journalist Konstantin Von 
Eggert stated: “The Balkans are this eternal example to which you can recur in the Russian 
Foreign Ministry or in the Kremlin whenever you need to tell the Westerners to go to hell 
with their advice.”179 
 
For Serbia, interested in gaining leverage with the West and acquiring a protector on 
Kosovo, a Russia that wants to show strength to the West is a suitable partner. However, 
Serbia since 2008 mostly tried avoiding getting embroiled in a major conflict between 
Russia and the West. During the period between 2008 and 2012, when the balancing act 
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commenced, Belgrade avoided aligning itself too closely Moscow, despite the latter’s 
support on Kosovo, as Serbia did not want to recognise the independence of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia or join the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
as an observer.180 The same can be said of Serbia’s later decision not to recognise Russian 
annexation of Crimea.181 During the later stage between 2012 and 2014, Serbia did its 
balancing in a calm manner without causing any frictions. This situation was not the 
product of Serbian policies, but of the fact that the West was still prepared to tolerate ties 
with Russia as there were no overwhelming tensions with Russia, especially as the 
Ukraine Crisis has not yet happened.182 
 
As will be elaborated in the empirical chapters later on, there is an evident difference in 
the Serbian balancing act’s intensity depending on the period during which that policy is 
implemented. These changes in intensity account for various stages in the Serbian 
balancing act depending on the period, and at no point was this reality more evident than 
after the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. In that context, the Ukraine Crisis represented “the 
moment before and after” for Serbian foreign policy.183 
 
As the Ukrainian Crisis caused the lowest point in West-Russia relations since the end of 
the Cold War, the Balkans started to be perceived as one of the locations where Russia 
can oppose the West at low-cost and low-risk. In this conflictual systemic environment, 
and with Eastern Europe becoming the theatre of rivalry between West and Russia, the 
Balkans became “Europe’s soft underbelly”,184 a region that might again set off a spiral 
of crisis and violence if left to its own devices. Within that “soft underbelly”, Russia can 
instigate a controlled crisis to pressure the West, primarily the EU, and distract them from 
the Ukraine.185 In doing so, Russian policy in the region became one of “a spoiler power”, 
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trying to undermine Western initiatives like NATO expansion and EU enlargement.186 As 
EU membership of the Balkan countries, unlike potential Ukrainian membership of 
NATO, does not directly impact Russia’s security, Russia can bolster strong ties with 
Serbia and the Balkans. Once these countries join the EU and/or NATO, they can either 
strengthen the group of countries within the EU that are friendlier towards Russia or 
create a division within NATO.187 
 
The EU also started to be concerned about the Russian factor in the Balkans. Before the 
annexation of Crimea and the emergence of the Russian-backed insurgency in Donbas, 
the Balkans was not on the Western agenda; the EU was more tolerant of Serbian ties 
with Russia.188 Before the Ukraine Crisis, the EU could tolerate Serbia “hanging in the 
middle”, because this type of policy would not be atypical of other European countries, 
and even Germany was at the time in “the camp of engagement” with Russia.189 The EU 
and the West observed a very similar situation in the Balkans as in Donbas, one of a 
depressed, impoverished post-socialist region that people are moving from, that still can 
flare-up with the interference of some malign foreign power, like Russia.190 
 
Serbia began to be increasingly fearful of the dangers and risk that came from the option 
of aligning with either West or Russia. The Ukraine Crisis generated a more turbulent 
external environment for Serbia. Serbia perceived this environment as a dangerous 
landscape of great power rivalry that could overspill onto Serbia, and where Serbia might 
be forced to choose between the two sides. As Đukić told the author: “Serbian foreign 
policy must remain ambivalent up until the moment when the great power relations 
reposition themselves differently. ... Today we have the new Cold War. For small 
countries, like Serbia and its foreign policy, the only thing that remains is to carefully 
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observe everything that goes on and avoid becoming a victim in the new configuration of 
the world.”191 
 
Consequently, the Ukraine Crisis forced Serbia to balance more openly.192 Mićunović 
neatly summarised the Serbian policy of balancing after the Ukraine Crisis: “With new 
diplomatic clashes between Russia and the West, it became increasingly difficult to 
balance. The new government, led by SNS, came to power which advocated friendship 
with Russia in a more boastful fashion. However, it still persevered on the obligations it 
assumed from the previous governments, the orientation towards the EU, and cooperation 
with NATO through Partnership for Peace, counting to remain neutral that way.”193 
 
How did this change come about? Again, the rivalry between Russia and the West did not 
cause the Serbian balancing act, but it has intensified it by intertwining with the other two 
systemic realities shaping Belgrade’s policies, the Kosovo dispute and the power vacuum, 
causing Serbia to diversify partnership. Indeed, Serbia could not side with Russia, as it 
was about to start accession negotiations with the EU, and it could not side with the EU, 
as it could alienate Russia from whom it was buying gas and whose support on Kosovo 
Serbia still needed.194 As Međak explained: “From the foreign policy standpoint, for us, 
the crisis in Ukraine is a lose-lose situation. Whatever we do, we will experience a 
setback. If we back the Russians, we create a setback in the EU association process. If we 
back the EU, we create a problem for ourselves on Kosovo.”195   
 
In that chaotic systemic environment, Serbian foreign policy’s primary consideration has 
been to decrease “the level of confrontation” with the EU and the US, and “increase 
cooperation capacity with all the other countries”, particularly Russia.196 This logic 
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towards Russia has become pronounced regarding the diversification of partnerships, and 
the issue of Kosovo still dominates the political theatre both domestically and 
internationally. Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić said in a conversation with his 
Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in 2016: “If it were not for Russia, Serbia would be in 
a much more difficult position.”197 For the Serbian elite, the best option was to try and 
stay away from the West-Russia conflict as much as it can. 
 
Apart from minimising the risks associated with the rivalry between the West and Russia 
after the Ukraine Crisis, another logic kicked in due to this crisis. Namely, Serbian 
leadership believed that in the systemic context of the great power rivalry involving the 
West and Russia, the West starts to perceive Russia as a threat. In that environment, 
Serbia can build ties with Russia to strengthen its leverage with the West. Serbian political 
science professor Tanja Miščević said that the logic was: “If Europe does not want us, we 
have kept good relations with other players, and we can use them to maintain the 
balance.”198 
 
That leverage can be applied in numerous situations. It can be to get a better bargain on 
Kosovo; to manipulate the EU to speed up the accession process, get a geopolitical deal 
on a partnership with the US, and even get the West to turn a blind eye to domestic 
illiberalism. Serbia hopes that it will extract concessions and better deal with the West if 
it has a Russian option available in all of these situations. Former Serbian Foreign 
Minister Vladislav Jovanović was very blunt on this issue in 2014. He authored a 
newspaper article when Serbia chaired the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE). In this article, Jovanović urged Serbia to resist the US and the EU’s 
pressures to join their “offensive policy towards Moscow”, as that would eliminate the 
possibility for Serbia to “milk two cows at the same time.”199 This outlook led Zoran 
Živković, former Serbian Prime Minister, to call this policy “hypocritical”, as Serbia is 
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still going in the direction of the EU, while the government in Serbia since 2012, and 
more forcefully since 2014, portrays itself as Putin’s best associate in this region.”200 
 
Paradoxically, the return of great power rivalry in Eastern Europe, involving Russia, led 
the US to pay much closer attention to Serbia and the Balkans. During the Trump years, 
by expediting NATO enlargement and engaging Serbia, the Russian influence in the 
region was rolled back. For a while, it even appeared that Serbia would pivot towards the 
US. The rivalry between the West and Russia is not over, and it will continue to impact 
Serbian behaviour. As long as Russia is treated as a rival by the West, the risk that Serbia 
will be faced with the ultimate choice will continue to loom. Belgrade will try to avoid 




This chapter has identified and analysed the systemic pressures that caused and shaped 
the Serbian balancing act between 2008 and 2012. These systemic pressures were 
identified through research that entailed analysing the secondary source materials and 
fieldwork interviews with sources in Serbia. The research findings fit into the realist 
paradigm on which this study is based, that believes in the primacy of the international 
systemic pressures as the driving force behind the state’s behaviour. The research 
identified three systemic pressures that shaped the Serbian balancing act. These systemic 
pressures were: the independence of Kosovo and the international dispute it caused; the 
regional power vacuum in the Balkans; and the state of relations between the West and 
Russia, that became confrontational in the wake of the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014. 
 
Before these systemic pressures were analysed deeply, the chapter first examined the 
nature of the post-Cold War international system. The international system was identified 
as a uni-multipolar system, a hybrid between unipolar and multipolar system, where the 
US is the only country with superpower status. At the same time, the EU, Russia, China 
and Japan are great powers operating on the global level of the international system. The 
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analysis leaves out Serbian interaction with Japan and China. The former was left out 
because it is not a major player in the Balkans. In contrast, the latter was left out because 
its interactions with the Balkans and Serbia are more recent and not guided by the same 
systemic forces as the US, the EU and Russia. Therefore, by using the criteria of 
interactions, these three powers were identified as the global geopolitical players that are 
most active in the Balkans, and that are part of the same set of systemic forces, shaping 
the Serbian balancing act: the Kosovo dispute; the power vacuum; and the state of 
relations between the West and Russia. 
 
The Kosovo dispute is the first external process which propelled Serbia to balance 
between Russia and the West. The reliance on Russian protection and veto in the UN 
Security Council became Belgrade’s strongest asset on Kosovo, putting Serbia in a 
systemic dependency on Russia. Serbia was forced to pursue a partnership with Russia 
on account of the Kosovo issue, as it could not find common ground with the West. Serbia 
could not entirely turn its back on the West, as the West outperforms Russia in power 
capabilities, and remains Serbia’s primary partner in terms of economy and security. 
However, due to Kosovo, Serbia started its balancing act. The Kosovo dispute is treated 
as being not just an international dispute, but as a systemic force affecting Belgrade’s 
behaviour. The Kosovo issue’s resolution has been in the hands of great powers since the 
end of the Kosovo War in 1999, and its independence is the product of support by Western 
powers. Even today, that issue cannot be resolved without great powers, while Russia 
does not want to see the Kosovo issue resolved unless it can get something in return from 
the US in a great power bargain. Until the issue gets resolved, Serbia is systemically tied 
in its balancing act. 
 
The second systemic process in 2008 that contributed to the Serbian balancing act during 
the designated period was the regional power vacuum. The vacuum was created in the 
wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, engulfing the EU with the Eurozone crisis. 
The lack of US attention that was focused elsewhere also helped form this vacuum. As 
the EU could not continue with enlargement in the region, there was an empty space in 
the region and Serbia found itself on the European periphery. The vacuum provided a 




Moreover, the vacuum provided Serbia with the leeway and incentive for its balancing 
act. As Belgrade could not count on a viable European perspective, it tried to hedge its 
bets by diversifying partnerships, including with Moscow, while also using Moscow as 
leverage with the West. Later on, the power vacuum intensified with the migrant crisis 
and Brexit, generating an even stronger desire from Serbia to continue balancing and 
playing Russia and the West against each other. The duration of this power vacuum will 
depend on US policies in the region, as the EU remains strategically unprepared. At the 
same time, during Trump’s presidency, one could see that the Russian influence in the 
Balkans was rolled back due to US opposition. How the US behaves in the future will 
remain the systemic limitation on Serbian balancing. 
  
At the very end, the chapter analysed the third systemic process behind the Serbian 
balancing act, which is the state of relations between Russia and the West. This chapter 
stressed that this factor is not an independent causal factor. That role is left to the previous 
two systemic processes, the Kosovo dispute and the regional power vacuum. The chapter 
established that Russia-West relations act as a systemic factor that does not cause the 
Serbian balancing act. Instead, it helps shape its form and intensity.   
 
This notion will be essential later on when the reader reaches the empirical chapters, 
explaining different stages in Serbian policy. Namely, if the West-Russia relations are 
peaceful, Serbia can pursue its balancing with relative tranquillity. Serbian balancing 
becomes more tensious if these relations become confrontational due to the more 
dangerous environment, but Serbia also intensifies its balancing. Although the Russian 
decision to back Serbia on Kosovo has been motivated by the Russian need to reassert 
itself as a great power and counter the West, this balancing could be done, as the rivalry 
between two sides was not at its zenith.  
 
In that regard, Serbia even managed to balance in the state of full tranquillity between 
2012 and 2014. However, after the Ukraine Crisis of 2014, that led to the breakdown of 
relations between Russia and the West, Serbia found itself at risk of being forced to 
choose. To avoid making a choice between the EU that Serbia wanted to join, and Russia 




importantly, in the context of the increased rivalry between Russia and the West, Serbia 
strengthened its policy of balancing and pitting Russia and the West against each other, 
hoping that the Russian card will increase its bargaining power with the West. 
 
The chapter listed and examined three systemic pressures that caused the Serbian 
balancing act between 2008 and 2020, and its differences in intensity and manifestation 
during different empirical stages. The research findings back the realist logic that 
emphasises that pressures from the international systemic environment shape a state’s 
behaviour. However, the identification of systemic processes does not provide a full 
explanation of foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, as the NCR causal mechanism 
dictates, it is also essential to identify the unit-level factor at play that acts as an 









When NCR is the analytical framework, one must identify the critical intervening variable 
within the domestic level of analysis. This chapter will also explain why party politics in 
Serbia is the intervening variable within NCR’s theoretical framework. The intervening 
variable represents a decisive factor in NCR’s causal mechanism. The systemic pressures 
to which Serbia is exposed to are adapted for domestic consumption by the Serbian elite 
with the goal of remaining in power.201 Domestic factors act as translating filters between 
international s pressures and Serbian behaviour. 
 
The research conducted through study of theoretical and empirical materials and 
fieldwork interviews established that Serbian party politics plays the role of that filter, 
fitting NCR’s qualification of an intervening variable. A cautionary remark must be 
provided that this study in NCR’s spirit does not ascribe causal independence to party 
politics and intra-elite competition. However, it highlights continuity in how political 
parties utilise international events and foreign policy issues, with political parties acting 
as unit-level, intervening variable that filters and distorts systemic influences. 
 
The reader will first be introduced to the concept of an intervening variable, the role that 
domestic factors play in the realist worldview and the novelty that NCR scholarship 
brought in the IR discipline by introducing domestic elements as the intervening 
variables. While NCR theorists have been frequently accused of the lack of parsimony 
due to the ad hoc selection of intervening variables, the attempts were made to make 
precise identification of the domestic elements that qualify as the intervening variable. 
An explanation will be provided as to why party politics as the intervening variable 
applied to the Serbian case fits well with this effort to have a precisely defined intervening 
variable. More importantly, this research fills the gap left by NCR scholarship. There 
have been NCR scholars like Jack Snyder, Randall Schweller, and Colin Dueck, who paid 
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attention to the role of party politics. However, their research involved states with great 
power status and mature constitutional democracies, unlike small states that lack great 
power capabilities with semi-functional, hybrid political systems like Serbia. Unlike NCR 
theories, this study will analyse the conflict and competition between Serbian political 
parties that use foreign policy in that competition, which is precisely why party politics 
is the intervening variable. 
 
Within this chapter, party politics is compared to the other two unit-level factors, 
policymakers’ perceptions and public opinion. The perceptions of Serbian policymakers 
judging from both their public statements and the interviewees’ insights is that there is a 
powershift propelled by Russia’s resurgence and China’s rise. These shifts are giving rise 
to the new multipolarity. The stalemates between Russia and the West are seen as 
analogous to the Cold War, and Serbia is sometimes seen as similar to Tito’s Yugoslavia. 
However, these perceptions are mostly a product of a simplistic, instinctive reaction to 
the global events that are later adapted for a domestically popular narrative, rather than a 
serious analysis forming Serbian policies.202 Public opinion is more relevant, mainly 
because Serbian political parties are susceptible to public moods. However, public 
opinion is part of the broader fabric of party politics fighting for domestic turf and not an 
independent process. 
 
The chapter will also explain the context of the Serbian political system. This context is 
essential so that the reader can understand how the system based on parochial interest and 
weak democratic institutions enables the political parties and their leadership to dominate 
public policies and the political spectrum. Partisanship is a dominant reality even under 
the incumbent hybrid, illiberal regime in Serbia, as there is still a multi-party system in 
Serbia. With that in mind, this chapter will show three ways in which foreign policy is 
being used in the party competition. Thus, acting as an intervening variable filtering 
systemic pressures. 
 
The first way is that Serbian parties avoid domestically unpopular measures. This posture 
is the product of Kosovo’s independence, where Serbian politicians must be engaged in 
 




strong anti-secessionism, which requires them to use Russian backing and the growing 
Russian popularity. As alienating Russia is domestically unpopular, Serbian political 
leaders implement policies that will not be detrimental for their respective parties’ 
domestic position, especially when it comes to their electoral chances. The second way is 
an extension of the previous one. Instead of risking alienating the electorate divided into 
pro-Western and pro-Russian camps, Serbian political parties to be competitive insist on 
the balancing act so that they can catch the votes of both pro-Western and pro-Russian 
Serbs. Ultimately, using foreign policy can help political parties gain an advantage over 
their competitors, either by being promoted as an internationally acceptable political force 
or getting the support of great powers. 
 
4.2 NCR, the Intervening Variable, Party Politics and the Research Gap 
 
The intervening variable operating at the unit-level of analysis gives NCR an edge in 
analysing specific policy cases. The difference between three versions of the realist 
tradition, classical realism, neorealism, and NCR is the degree to which unit-level factors 
play a causal role within each one of these three versions.203 In the NCR version, the 
intervening variable is a unit-level cause that mediates between systemic pressures and 
the individual state’s behaviour. The intervening variable translates systemic pressures 
into a specific form of individual foreign policy behaviour. It accounts for the difference 
in how individual states behave when faced with the same set of systemic circumstances. 
Kenneth Waltz himself acknowledged that the introduction of the unit-level variable is 
necessary given that a systemic theory like the balance of power, for example, fails to 
account for the explanation of foreign policy or individual historical events.204 
 
The intervening variable is the crucial element of NCR. While in the long term a state’s 
foreign policy behaviour will converge with neorealist, systemic prediction, in the short 
term it is highly likely to diverge from systemic realities, creating the need to analyse 
domestic level factors.205 As Thomas Juneau explained: “Intervening variables act as 
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filters or transmission belts between the international distribution of power and the 
foreign policy outcome, explaining the conversion from the possible – the range of 
feasible outcomes – to the actual, the foreign policy choice. They are domestic political 
processes determining how usable power is translated into foreign policy, or how the 
opportunities and constraints shaped by power are translated into actual choice.”206 
 
The intervening variable also helps overcome the dilemma of stressing systemic and unit-
level factors that have burdened the realist theorists and the broader IR discipline. While 
not a representative of NCR, Thomas Risse-Kappen summarised this dilemma. He 
stressed that a “complex model of international politics has to be conceptualised which 
integrates the three levels of analysis: society, political system, and international 
environment.”207 The use of intervening variables has attracted some criticism at the 
expense of NCR. These critiques said that by integrating unit-level factors like domestic 
politics and ideas, NCR provides “ad hoc” or “post hoc” explanations of anomalies of 
neorealism.208 
 
Stephen Walt similarly criticised NCR on that ground, saying that: “Neoclassical realism 
tends to incorporate domestic variables in an ad hoc manner, and its proponents have yet 
to identify when these variables have greater or lesser influence.” Walt noted that NCR 
that way gave up on “generality and predictive power” for the sake of “descriptive 
accuracy and policy relevance.”209 The issue of choosing the intervening variable has 
been with NCR since the introduction of the term by Gideon Rose in 1998. Back then, 
Rose acknowledged only two unit-level factors that act as intervening variables, the 
perceptions and misperceptions of policymakers, and state-society relations, emphasising 
the strength of state apparatus.210 More recently, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell 
introduced a slightly broader and more detailed list of elements that can stand out as 
intervening variables, including: leader’s images, strategic culture, state-society relations, 
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and domestic institutions.211 In doing so, these authors tried to give NCR a greater 
theoretical precision and avoid the accusation of ad hoc selection of intervening 
variables.212 
 
With this in mind, party politics is still relevant as an intervening variable. In Serbia, 
political parties and political leaders outweigh institutions and constitutional 
arrangements.213 That is to say, political leaders operate in a political environment 
dominated by party politics, where all of their perceptions and strategic culture are 
affected by this fact. Simultaneously, political leaders and their political parties dominate 
the formal political institutions, while political parties are also the only effective 
transmission belt between the society and state. The party politics can be an all-inclusive 
factor that entails all the elements, cited by the NCR theorists, as the most frequent 
candidates for domestic, unit-level variables. 
 
NCR has had a history of addressing the issue of party politics. For Peter Trubowitz, Jack 
Snyder’s ideas - whose work has already been cited as thematically relevant for this study 
- represent a rare case of a realist scholarship analysing party and coalition politics’ 
influence on foreign policy behaviour.214 Randall Schweller’s work on domestic politics 
affecting balancing action of great powers is relevant for this study, as Schweller shows 
how domestic political divisions and competition among the elites distort systemic 
pressures. Another NCR author who has factored party politics into his work is Colin 
Dueck, who focused on the President-Congress dynamic within the US political system 
that shapes foreign policy.215 However, all of these studies appear to apply to great powers 
with much more systemic leeway than a small country like Serbia, with insufficient power 
capabilities. These studies also mostly focus on well-established and stable democracies, 
and not on immature, transitional democracies like Serbia, where the domestic 
environment is fragmented and divisive. 
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Beyond the NCR framework, a notable piece of scholarship is the 2011 book by Peter 
Trubowitz “Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft.” 
Trubowitz provides a model of grand strategy that combines systemic factors with 
domestic politics, namely partisanship. In this study Trubowitz, unlike in the NCR 
paradigm, gives causal primacy to domestic factors over systemic ones. However, 
Trubowitz has a fundamental observation about domestic politics as a factor in NCR’s 
conception. As Trubowitz said: “They [NCR authors] do not consider the competition 
and conflict between groups with different visions of the national interest, and shy away 
from arguments about domestic electoral and distributional conflicts over foreign 
policy.”216 As such, this study will be a compromise between two approaches. 
 
Namely, this study will use party politics as the intervening variable, and by doing so will 
act according to the NCR dictate that gives priority to systemic factors. However, it will 
also observe political parties in the context of competing elites and leaders who are 
organised in political parties, applying Trubowitz’s critique of NCR, while still upholding 
causal primacy of the international system. The Serbian political elites and political 
parties will be treated as opportunistic actors within a parochial, domestic scenery 
engaged in a political turf battle. These domestic actors will use in their mutual 
competition foreign policy issues to prevail in that same competition. 
 
That way, when a significant systemic change takes place, like a power vacuum in the 
Balkans, that propels Russia’s more assertive presence in the region, Serbian political 
parties will try to leverage that. For instance, by using the Russian factor as an argument 
against the competitors advocating pro-Western foreign policy, or pursuing ties with 
Russia to avoid alienating pro-Russian elements of public opinion. How political parties 
leverage the systemic environment in their domestic competition varies depending on the 
circumstances; consequently, so does the balancing act. However, the leveraging of 
systemic factors by the elites and parties ultimately results in the Serbian balancing act, 
and as such, the causal mechanism fits into the NCR paradigm. This brings us back to 
Thomas Christensen concept of national political power, described in chapter 2, where 
national leaders try to gain support from the population for foreign policy initiatives, both 
 




in terms of popular support and the resources that need to be invested in certain policies. 
Applied to Serbia, Serbian politicians win electoral support by asking for support for their 
conception of Serbian foreign policy. It also means that Serbian politicians, once they are 
in office, are frequently stuck with the original script that they sold to their electorate. 
Thus, they are faced with the domestic hurdle interfering with systemic imperatives.     
 
However, before one addresses party politics as the intervening variable, one will also 
have to briefly examine two other unit-level factors that are important for context: 
perceptions and public opinion. They are not selected as intervening variables because 
neither one is as all-encompassing of domestic forces affecting Serbian foreign policy as 
is party politics. Moreover, it is party politics through which these two unit-level factors 
are filtered. Foreign policy elites in Serbia do not act independently on them, but take 
them into account and frame them in the context of their party struggle to remain in or 
win power. Therefore, while party politics is not the only potential unit-level factor, it is 
treated as the intervening variable within this study. 
 
In Serbia, political parties and their leadership are the most critical unit-level determinants 
of foreign policy within this study. This is the direct outcome of Serbia’s political reality 
in which the political parties are the primary power holders. The political parties and their 
leadership dominate the entire political spectrum and have a final and defining saying in 
shaping the state’s public policy, including its foreign policy. The source of political 
power for the elite in Serbia is derived from their membership or control over a political 
party that is in power at a particular moment. However, more importantly, within NCR it 
is a constraining factor in Serbian foreign policy behaviour. It mediates and distorts 
international systemic pressures, making political parties a logical choice for the 
intervening variable. 
 
Nicholas Kitchen’s study is very illustrative of the need to select a critical intervening 
variable. Kitchen treats ideas as the intervening variable because in his words “prevailing 
ideas influence the type of foreign policy response to structural imperatives.”217 For 
Kitchen ideas are the intervening variable because ideas are portrayed as present within 
 




a whole set of different channels, including individual policymakers’ personalities, 
cultural preferences of a given society, and political institutions.218 To modify Kitchen’s 
logic, if ideas can be selected as an intervening variable because of their presence in 
various channels, one can also use party politics in Serbia: whatever other unit-level 
factors are at play, they are being filtered and framed within the broader mechanism of 
party politics. Whatever perceptions individual leaders might have on the systemic 
environment, they are being adapted for the political parties and elites’ competition. 
Public opinion is also one of the guidelines in that same competition. Therefore, party 
politics is chosen as the intervening variable because all other unit-level factors are 
filtered through it. Moreover, it is an umbrella term that encompasses this wide range of 
domestic factors in play, affecting the country’s foreign policy behaviour. Before we 
analyse party politics as the intervening variable, we need to briefly consider the other 




Perceptions are frequently seen as an essential element in the study of foreign policy.219 
That is to say, the way political leaders, strategists and policymakers perceive the 
country’s systemic environment affects the policy they adopt, the moment they decide on 
a particular policy and the instruments they chose to utilise. Many realist scholars used 
perceptions within their paradigm, with Stephen Walt being one of the more prominent 
examples.220 
 
As a theory engaged with the art of statesmanship, classical realism emphasised the role 
of a leader’s perception. These ideas are present in the works of thinkers and writers like 
Thucydides, Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger and Walter Lippmann.221 Kenneth Waltz 
also briefly touched on how systemic constraints are perceived, but noted that the idea 
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belongs much more to the domain of a unit level theory of foreign policy. “The clear 
perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected reactions of states, but by 
itself the theory cannot explain those reactions. They depend not only on international 
constraints but also on the characteristics of states. How will a particular state react? To 
answer that question, we need not only a theory of the market, so to speak, but also a 
theory about the firms that compose it”, Waltz noted.222 Stephen Walt’s balance of threat 
theory stands as a bridge between Waltz’s neorealism and NCR by stating that alliances 
are formed based on threat perception. Walt notes that the presence of perceptions and 
motivations as equally impacts the alliance formation process as do the contextual 
factors.223 
 
NCR has been known to put special emphasis on perceptions as an important factor in 
their causal logic. Famous cases of perceptions being utilised within NCR scholarship are 
works by Aaron Friedberg on the British perception of its power decline relative to its 
great power rivals at the end of the 19th century, and by William Wohlforth on Soviet 
and American perceptions of the balance of power during the Cold War. Wohlforth 
described very well the validity of including perceptions in the study of foreign policy: 
“If power influences the course of international politics, it must do so largely through the 
perceptions of the people who make decisions on behalf of states.”224 Wohlforth 
accurately stated: “Some leaderships will overestimate their power, others will 
underestimate it.”225 
 
By including perceptions, NCR occupies the middle ground between neorealism and 
social constructivism. It reconciles the neorealist logic about the direct impact of systemic 
structure on a unit’s behaviour and the constructivist idea that structure is socially 
ordained, by acknowledging that while there is an objective reality of power relations, 
states do not necessarily have a clear grasp of that reality.226 Shifts in the balance of power 
do happen, but they do not impact the state’s immediate behaviour until they are 
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perceived.227 Frequently, leaders’ understanding of their country’s strategic environment 
differs from an objective reality leading to the adoption of the wrong policies, as the 
international system operates and affects the units irrespective of the perception of power 
balance.228 Moreover, even if political leadership accurately perceives and assesses the 
systemic environment, this does not mean that adequate policies will be adopted in 
response, which proves the limits of rationality presumption.229 
 
The notion of perception touches upon the idea of how limited human rationality is, as 
frequently perceptions are developed as a result of an individual’s limits in processing 
complex information, from the use of simplified rules or from the propensity to draw the 
wrong lessons from historical experiences.230 Drawing lessons from history to understand 
contemporary policy challenges is a well-documented phenomenon where historical 
analogies act as mental shortcuts.231 If we logically presume the limits of human 
rationality, Serbian policymakers are no exception. Based on the rhetoric they use when 
discussing foreign policy issues and international affairs, one can see that there is no 
incredibly sophisticated analysis of Serbia’s strategic environment. Moreover, Serbian 
leadership frequently invokes historical analogies to explain Serbian foreign policy 
behaviour and account for their overly simplified perception of the international system. 
 
In Serbia, the Cold War analogies and the invocation of the non-aligned legacy of Tito’s 
Yugoslavia are compelling for the country’s leadership. One can see that from the 
vocabulary of a man who personifies this logic, the former foreign minister (2014-2020) 
and current parliamentary speaker Ivica Dačić: “We need to be smart, to try to have as 
many allies as possible, without losing a single friend. Serbia cannot be strong without 
them. If Tito could do it, why couldn’t we?”232 This notion of Serbia being in the middle 
of the new Cold War also corresponds with what has been called “a complex of the 
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1990s”, a trauma that Serbia will be isolated without allies as it has been during the 1990s, 
creating a need for nurturing, even contradictory ties, with numerous great powers at 
once.233 
 
However, the notion of the new Cold War is very far off from the present geopolitical and 
historical realities of both the Balkans and the global international system, and the same 
goes for some other historical motives, like the one of Tsarist Russia.234 By invoking Cold 
War analogies, the Serbian leadership exercises what is known as cognitive consistency, 
which is “the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate 
incoming information to pre-existing image”, leading it to “fit incoming information into 
pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there.”235 
 
The notion of multipolarity is deeply ingrained in how Serbian political elites perceive 
Serbia’s strategic environment irrespective of ideological differences between political 
parties or the difference in personalities of the ruling party leaders in different periods. 
For Boris Tadić and his pro-Western Democratic Party (DS) that was in government 
between 2008 and 2012, the notion of multipolarity was rekindled by the global financial 
crisis of 2008. The financial crisis instilled a belief in the EU’s weakness and the necessity 
to establish partnerships with non-Western powers deemed rising powers, including 
Russia.236 
 
This perception of multipolarity in 2008 was also ignited by other significant geopolitical 
events and crises, like the Russia-Georgian War of 2008. After 2012, this perception of a 
multipolar international system has been maintained by all other major geopolitical events 
like the Ukraine Crisis, Russian intervention in Syria, and the EU’s perceived inability to 
handle the Eurozone and refugee crises, Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump. While 
the geopolitical and power realities are naturally more complicated than generally 
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perceived by Serbian leadership, these crises and events play a part in keeping the idea of 
multipolarity alive among Serbian elites. Robert Jervis’s observation that “in politics, 
sudden events influence images more than do slow development”, is truly vindicated.237 
 
The former member of Tadić’s foreign policy team, also said that there was a perception 
of the shift in the balance of power and the emergence of multipolarity: “That was simply 
something that was maturing as an understanding, and not just in our minds. That was so 
obvious. We really would have had to be retarded not to have observed that. … In any 
case, we knew what the realities of the world were. We saw that the world was going 
towards multipolarity, and accordingly, we were developing our bilateral ties with China 
and Russia.”238 One should not take these statements at face value as a more critical view 
of this perception was provided: “It is the consequence of the unipolarity of the 1990s and 
great pressure exercised on Serbia in the 1990s by the US. Any information, or semi-
information, a glimpse that points to the decline of the US global influence, is perceived 
here as the great success of the other side or finding a solution, a simpler solution, to 
Serbian problems through the declining influence of the US. So, this should be viewed 
through that prism and not through the prism of what happened. Something did happen, 
but not to the extent as implied by the perception. Wishful thinking, but the perception of 
foreign policy elites does not match the circumstances affecting Serbia.”239 
 
The perception of a multipolar international system exists even with the incumbent 
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who succeeded Tadić as the most powerful man in 
Serbian politics in 2012. In his lecture at the Faculty of Security Studies within the 
University of Belgrade in May 2017, Vučić offered a view of the international power 
structure and what he deemed the most relevant great powers. He said that: “The 21st 
century is not a century without conflicts and tensions. On the contrary … Thirty years 
ago, you had one, absolutely dominant military, political and economic power (the US). 
Today, if you take all these three elements, it is still the strongest great power. … With 
its economic, but also with its military and political power, the People’s Republic of 
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China dramatically catches up. With its military and political power, Russia has risen. … 
For the first time … you have something that tries to assert itself as the fourth global 
power. That is Europe, without Great Britain. … Add to that the different regional powers, 
like Japan, India and Great Britain.”240 
 
This speaks to the fact that the idea of an international system inhabited by numerous 
global and regional powers that compete among themselves is present and deeply salient 
in the Serbian political class. However, apart from occasional mentions in public 
speeches, the Serbian leadership does not appear to be engaged in a detailed assessment 
of global trends. Instead, they are more focused on domestic politics. The perceptions can 
be a source of behaviour change, but it is more an issue of rhetorical framing and 
justification of policy for the domestic public in the Serbian case.241 The notion of a 
multipolar system inhabited by multiple powers and small Serbia trying to navigate these 
troubled geopolitical waters is much easier to sell domestically and to frame within 
domestic competition among the political elites and political parties. 
 
4.4 Public Opinion 
 
Public opinion is a significant factor in Serbian politics, as politicians within both 
government and opposition are trying to win its approval, and adjust the attitudes they 
display in domestic political competition to that effort. Naturally, this is not necessarily 
unique to Serbia, but it indicates a parochial domestic party scenery. In the foreign policy 
domain, the political parties avoid implementing unpopular measures, like following the 
EU’s lead in introducing sanctions against Russia. One can say that what has been called 
“the logic of political survival” is very present in Serbian political elites’ sensitivity to 
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public opinion.242 The fact that Serbia does not have a clearly defined long term foreign 
policy strategy is frequently reflected in confusing public opinion attitudes.243 
 
Classical realism acknowledged the role of public opinion in the formulation and conduct 
of foreign policy. E.H. Carr cited power over opinion as one of three elements of power, 
alongside economic and military power.244 Hans Morgenthau spoke of national morale as 
being “the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of 
its government in peace or war”, expressed in the form of public opinion.245 For Henry 
Kissinger: “The acid test of a policy … is its ability to obtain domestic support.”246 For 
neorealists, public opinion is not part of the equation, as a states’ behaviour is driven by 
the international system, not by unit-level factors like public opinion. 
 
For NCR theorists like Thomas Christensen, public opinion is a unit-level factor that has 
a distorting effect on systemic pressures, as the general public has limited access to 
information on international affairs and consequently limited rationality compared to the 
leadership.247 One NCR analysis of classical realist scholarship indicates that one of the 
main reasons that balance of power geopolitics operated so efficiently in the 19th century 
was that almost all of the states were monarchies insulated from public opinion 
pressures.248 Colin Dueck briefly mentioned, in the US context, the ability of public 
opinion to limit executive control over foreign policy, but stressed that these limitations 
are “broad and elastic.”249 Alex Edwards went so far as to claim that public opinion is “a 
viable candidate” to be an intervening variable within the NCR tradition.250 NCR 
scholarship is aware that many leaders will favour short term gains over long term ones 
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due to their need to stay in power.251 Leaders frequently fail to act in accordance with 
systemic logic when their preferences are directed towards domestic concerns over 
international ones, and when domestic costs are too high.252 
 
For the Serbian elite, the domestic price of alienating Russia might be too high given the 
pro-Russian sentiments in Serbian public opinion. Russian President Vladimir Putin 
remains the most popular foreign leader in Serbia and 40 per cent of the Serbs in public 
opinion polls view Russia as Serbia’s greatest friend.253 Consequently, Serbian power 
holders have been conducting their balancing act to avoid alienating pro-Russian 
constituents.254 As a former member of the Foreign Policy Council of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Serbia stated in an interview with the author: “One of the main reasons 
why Russia is influential is because it is so popular in public opinion. The whole thing 
started with President Tadić in 2008. He conducted a public opinion survey among his 
constituents. He found that one half of his voters favoured the EU over Russia. The second 
half favoured Russia over the EU. So, he had to find a way to unify all these votes. Most 
politicians shape their policies based on public opinion polls. They are not strategists: 
most do not think further than one month ahead. Few amongst them think three months 
in advance.”255 
 
According to the same interviewee, this sensitivity towards public opinion is most 
pronounced in Serbia’s relations with NATO, as the number of those in favour of Serbian 
NATO membership rarely exceeds 10 per cent creating an obstacle that is difficult to 
overcome, even though some in the Serbian elite would be willing to entertain the 
possibility.256 Indeed, at the end of 2020, only 3 per cent of Serbs favoured Serbia’s 
NATO membership.257 The incumbent President Vučić also highlights this issue: “If 
Serbia were to join NATO, it would resolve one part of its problems. It would more 
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quickly become a member of the family of Western people. But do not forget that Serbia 
would do so against 75 per cent of its population. … Once you enter into NATO opposed 
to the will of your population that is an irreparable decision. And then you will leave a 
deep disturbance of conflict within your people in the decades ahead of us.”258 This makes 
Serbia interesting, as Norrin Ripsman stressed, in that public opinion influences policies 
indirectly through legislative representatives, rather than directly influencing the 
executive.259 As such, in Serbia the executives themselves take into account public 
opinion before taking policy action. 
 
Some caveats need to be taken into account when it comes to public opinion. Firstly, for 
all the talk about pro-Russian sentiments, these sentiments are not the product of historical 
or cultural ties, but of Serbian frustration with Western policies of the 1990s and Kosovo’s 
independence.260 As described by Nikita Bondarev, who leads research on the Balkans at 
the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI, which is part of the Russian presidential 
administration): “The most ardent Russophiles I had a chance to meet in Serbia have 
never been in the Russian Federation, many of them don’t know the Russian language 
and form their judgment about Russia after the Princess Anastasia TV series. For them 
Russophilia is, above all a rejection of Western values and a symbol of a traditionalist 
and conservative system of values, and Russia is for them the personification of that 
notion. It is very rare to notice amongst them a true knowledge of Russia, its culture, its 
realities, or the processes taking place in Russia and overall of Russian people’s life.”261 
 
Secondly, Russia has been very effective in keeping pro-Russian sentiments alive by 
using soft power instruments in Serbia and the Balkans, like maintaining ties with local 
social movements, political figures, the church and the media.262 In that context, Serbian 
public opinion towards Russia has been high due to Russian support for Serbia on issues 
like Kosovo. Still, afterwards, Russia has been successful in keeping pro-Russian 
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sentiments high through these soft power instruments. However, it is still inaccurate to 
allocate Russia’s influence in Serbian public opinion to Russian actions, as the local 
agency is more deserving of that by manipulating its relations with Russia and public 
opinion narratives for domestic ends. The political elites and the media are happy to 
project pro-Russian content to appease their constituents and divert the public’s attention 
from other issues, like the fact that Serbia cooperates more with NATO and Western 
countries than it does with Russia.263 
 
Thirdly, in December 2019 23 per cent of the Serbs falsely believed that Russia is the 
largest donor to Serbia since 2000.264 Despite the presence of these irrational beliefs, 
parties that advocate either ardent pro-Western policies (membership of the EU or 
NATO) or a passionate pro-Russian policy of entirely severing ties with the West, are 
marginal players in the political arena.265 Moreover, the Serbian leadership adapts its 
policies to public opinion pressures, but it does not take it in an irrational direction. Vučić 
himself admitted this: “For those who would say that 70 per cent of us [Serbs] are for 
joining the Russians against the West, these people do not think about where our market 
is, where do we export our goods to, from what will we live tomorrow, what will our 
economy be like.”266 Therefore, Serbia’s public opinion plays a role, but it is not an 
independent causal force, nor is it the prevalent domestic factor at play. Instead, it is part 
of the broader framework of party politics, the real intervening variable. 
 
4.5 Party Politics 
 
This research established that Serbian party politics is the prevalent domestic factor that 
acts as the intervening variable within NCR’s causal mechanism. Party politics play the 
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role of intervening variable between systemic pressures and policy choices as Serbian 
political parties use foreign policy for their domestic ends.  
 




For the Serbian political parties and their leaders in the current political landscape, the 
balancing act between Russia and the West has three functions, showing how Serbian 
party politics acts as an intervening variable. The first function is the logic of political 
survival, where Serbian political parties and their leaders try to avoid domestically 
unpopular policies that would endanger their public ratings or electoral chances. 
Therefore, by engaging Russia, the EU, and the US, Serbian political parties try not to 
estrange any potential voters. The second function builds upon the previous one. By 
having a multidimensional foreign policy, the political parties and elites reach out for the 
votes of various pockets of the electorate, each with its sympathies. The third function is 
that parties use foreign policy to gain an edge over their competition, utilising it in the 
kingmaker’s game. This can be done in two ways. Firstly, through foreign policy, parties 
and their leaders legitimise themselves by portraying themselves to the domestic public 
as internationally recognised political leaders. Secondly, an advantage over competition 
is gained by acquiring support from the relevant great powers. Both ways serve the same 
purpose. 
 
Before analysing the way party politics affect foreign policy in Serbia, qualifying party 




first. Serbia is a low-income country without a developed middle class. In such a social 
setting, the traditional social and ideological divide between the left and the right as in 
more developed liberal democracies does not fully apply. Therefore, in Serbia political 
parties are motivated by the desire to snatch as much of the electoral votes as possible, 
even if that means aiming for voters who do not belong to a traditional social group that 
one would associate with a given party’s ideological profile. While in the age of mass 
politics, every political party has to behave in that fashion, in Serbia, the element of 
political opportunism strongly outweighs the nominal ideological factor. 
 
Consequently, to win these votes, these political parties do not send coherent messages 
to their constituents. In these endeavours, the political parties are also using foreign policy 
issues like Kosovo or relations with Moscow in the same instrumental fashion.267 
Therefore, political parties equally use foreign policy to drop a wide web over the 
electorate to gain votes from as many sides of the social and political spectrum as 
possible. 
 
This process happens in a political regime with weak institutions, underdeveloped civil 
society, and ineffective rule of law mechanisms. The political parties reflect this reality 
of Serbia’s political system. Serbia in the post-Milošević period has become an electoral 
democracy, as the government in power reflects the people’s electoral will. However, it 
is not a sophisticated democracy. According to Freedom House, Serbia under the 
incumbent President Aleksandar Vučić ceased being a democracy, forcing the watchdog 
organisation to qualify it as a hybrid regime. This change is because Serbia marked a 
decline in political freedoms, civil rights, and media freedoms, and opposition and civil 
society organisations are faced with pressures.268 
 
In such a political order, political parties and their leadership can dominate the political 
scenery, including foreign policy. Serbia is not a liberal democracy, which requires strong 
institutions, rule of law mechanisms, and public administration that acts as a corrective 
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instrument towards the political parties and their leaders. For a better part of its post-
Milošević history, Serbia can be described as a semi-functional or even an illiberal 
democracy. It is a very fertile political terrain for political parties and their leaders to 
assert themselves over the entire political spectrum, including the foreign policy. 
 
Consequently, some have characterised such political order in Serbia as a “soft 
autocracy”, where political opposition competes with the government in formally free 
elections. However, the ruling party’s hold over media, judiciary, government agencies 
and security services give that party a decisive edge over political competitors.269 A study 
by a team of Serbian political scientists published in 2011 portrayed the environment 
which several years later allowed one man to dominate the country’s politics, which is 
the case with the incumbent President Aleksandar Vučić. The study declares the 
following: “Rule of law obviously does not reside here, and informal institutions - e.g. 
clientelism and corruption - dominate. The executive branch of government obviously 
ignores constitutional limitations and dominates the parliament, judiciary, and different 
agencies of horizontal responsibilities, manufacturing an arbitrary and inefficient 
government, endangering long term chances for economic growth and democratic 
development.”270 At the same time, this study also underlines that the opposition is 
frequently similar to the government, as it is also based on strong leaders, vague 
programs, and irresponsible, populist tendencies.271 In a report authored for the US 
Congress by the Congressional Research Service in 2009, this reality of Serbia and 
Balkan countries is also pronounced: “Too often, party leaders, with their power to 
distribute patronage, contracts, and other sources of largesse, are the real power in these 
countries, overriding the rule of law.”272 
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In that political environment, political parties are the primary source of power and 
influence. However, most of these parties are conceptually and in terms of the actual 
organisation based on a predominant leader. These leaders have broad authority, 
dominating the internal party dynamics and processes, while at the same time, most of 
the Serbian constituents identify political parties with the party leaders.273 Later on, upon 
eventual assuming of public office, these individual leaders replicate their dominance of 
the ruling party over the entire political spectrum. For instance, Boris Tadić, as the 
President of Serbia between 2008 and 2012, asserted himself as the country’s most 
powerful individual. Tadić achieved this not based on his constitutional authority, as the 
Prime Minister holds a higher degree of power in Serbia. Tadić did this because he was 
the President of the ruling DS through which he dominated Prime Minister Mirko 
Cvetković, a member of his party. 
 
As a result, most policy leaders, even the most dominant ones, operate from a party 
leaders’ position, rather than from a position of strategically-minded statesmanship,274 or 
even the bureaucracy-bound position of state officials.275 Serbia does not fit into 
traditional FPA debate on whether foreign policy planning is more dominated by leaders 
or bureaucracy. Serbian foreign policy leaders act from a parochial party politics 
standpoint, based on short-term calculations in a political context, that is highly disruptive 
for strategic thinking and planning on foreign policy issues. 
 
The political parties as domestic constraints have been all-too evident features throughout 
most of the post-Milošević period. The coalition that overthrew Milošević in 2000, the 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), was composed of 19 different parties; as such, 
it was a heterogeneous coalition of parties of different sizes, ideological profiles, and with 
a long history of mutual competition. After Milošević’s overthrow, the glue that kept this 
colourful coalition together was gone, and the struggle for power and a share of the spoils 
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between various parties ensued.276 Given the high degree of the partisan divide, it was 
doubtful that a country could conduct a coherent and effective foreign policy, and it is 
improbable that it will happen in the conceivable future. Ivo Visković, a political scientist 
and former Serbian ambassador stated that the Serbian party system boosted by a 
proportional representation electoral system creates a cruel reality of a divided society 
that mostly lacks the firm majority needed for a coherent foreign policy strategy.277 
 
As political parties have personalised leadership and political leaders base their political 
power on their party positions, Serbian domestic politics and foreign policy was 
frequently marked by dramatis personae. The notion of dramatis personae refers either 
to the dominant leaders or the competing leaders. This competition further exacerbated 
the extant divides in Serbian politics that impeded the formulation of coherent foreign 
policies. As such, in the first years of the post-Milošević era, the policy spectrum was 
marked by competition between President of the DS and Serbian Prime Minister Zoran 
Đinđić and Yugoslav President and President of the DSS, Vojislav Koštunica. Later on, 
this clash continued between Koštunica and Tadić, in their respective roles as the PM and 
President of Serbia. 
 
In the later period, the Serbian policy spectrum on both the domestic and foreign policy 
fronts was dominated by individual leaders, as was the case with Boris Tadić between 
2008 and 2012, and since 2012 by Aleksandar Vučić, leader of the SNS, who was deputy 
prime-minister (2012-2014), then prime-minister (2014-2017), and since 2017 president. 
Serbia under Vučić in both domestic and foreign policy terms became dominated by a 
single man and a single party in a fashion unseen since the early 1990s, when Milošević 
and his party dominated. As a result, the reality of Serbian semi-functional democracy 
came even more to the surface than before. 
 
In the first year of the post-Milošević period, the central line of party divisions was among 
those parties that were part of the Milošević’s regime before 2000, like his SPS and their 
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right-wing coalition partner, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), and those who were part of 
the DOS coalition. The central political clash was between DOS coalition’s two dominant 
parties, the social-democratic, pro-Western DS and conservative DSS. The latter was not 
anti-Western at first, but less enthusiastic on this matter, and tougher on issues like the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Kosovo. During 
that time, the SRS and SPS did not appear to be that much of a domestic threat for the 
ruling parties. However, in the period between 2003 and 2004, SRS, which has 
recuperated from the electoral debacle in the presidential elections of 2000, has also 
sucked in the significant part of the SPS electorate, becoming a leading force for the 
electorate loyal to Milošević and the previous regime. 
 
From that moment up until Kosovo’s independence in 2008, two dominant political 
cleavages existed. The first one related to the divide between the former DOS coalition 
parties, more precisely DS and DSS. The second one was between the parties of the 
former DOS coalition, that were usually called the democratic or civic bloc, that was 
associated with the EU and the West, and the SRS that led the charge on behalf of those 
who formed the government in the 1990s, and advocated closer ties with Russia. 
 
These domestic political hurdles made a coherent foreign policy even more difficult for 
Serbia. The executive government would always face vocal outrage from the SRS on a 
whole set of domestic issues, including Kosovo, ICTY, the policy of joining the EU, and 
any cooperation with the US and NATO. This created “the nightmare of the coalition 
government.”278 The pro-Western parties faced with a powerful right-wing opposition in 
the form of SRS, struggled to form a coalition majority, creating another domestic 
constraint. Former Serbian President Boris Tadić recalled this constant problem for the 
pro-Western parties: “Many believe that the democratic and civic bloc had a majority in 
the past. It never had a majority. Even when we were winning in the elections, we were 
barely making a small majority. We did not have a real majority on the 5th of October 
[2000], and neither did we have it in 2004 and 2008.”279 
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In that polity, party politics is a decisive conduit between the systemic pressures to which 
Serbia is exposed and the country’s policies. This mechanism operates in three ways. 
Serbian political parties operate under the basic logic of political survival. That logic 
dictates that to win power or remain in power, the parties must avoid pursuing unpopular 
policies that would diminish their public standing. As other authors have implied it in the 
past, the domestic actors have the greatest influence on foreign policy in states where 
foreign policy and national security executives enjoy low structural autonomy.280 If these 
executives have structural autonomy in regards to the society at large, the general public, 
and societal groups, they will act in accordance with the dictates of structural realism, but 
if they do not (as in case of Serbia), they “must struggle with and seek to overcome 
domestic opposition or bargain with opponents over the content of the policy.”281 
 
Kosovo, as the dominant issue of Serbian foreign policy, exemplifies this logic. The party 
divisions became more extreme with Kosovo’s independence and the power that the 
Kosovo issue still holds in Serbian politics. A 2007 publication on the Western Balkans 
by the Paris-based European Union Institute for Security Studies very lucidly noted that 
the “continuing dominance of the Kosovo issue on the political agenda means nationalists 
always have a trump card over reformists.”282 To paraphrase and extend this, we can say 
that the causal and sequential logic can go in the following fashion: as long as Kosovo 
continues to dominate the political agenda, the nationalists will always have a trump card 
over any Serbian government. As long as that is the case, Serbia will be formally opposing 
independence. As long as Serbia continues to oppose Kosovo’s independence, it will have 
to rely on Russia. 
 
The issue of Kosovo and exposure to nationalist attacks is the constant reality of every 
Serbian government. The whole rationale is very neatly summarised in a conversation 
that the first US ambassador in post-Milošević Serbia had with the PM Đinđić about the 
nature of a Serbian electorate: “One third, he [Đinđić] said, were hopeless nationalists 
who had been brainwashed and were simply ’lost’ for the foreseeable future. Another 
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third on the other end of the spectrum were moderates, wanting a European future and 
real democracy to take hold in their country. … The middle third has a combination of 
nationalistic tendencies combined with a desire for the benefits of closer ties to the 
West.”283 In light of that, one can say that every Serbian government tried to win the 
allegiance of this one third by conducting specific policies domestically and 
internationally. The policy “both EU and Kosovo” associated with President Tadić and 
Foreign Minister Jeremić between 2008 and 2012 was an attempt to win that one-third of 
the electorate.284 
 
The 2008 independence of Kosovo has created a significant change in Serbian political 
scenery. Kosovo’s independence angered the DSS, who hoped that by asserting itself as 
the central defender of Serbia’s stance on Kosovo, it would become a dominant party able 
to win power and form its government. That way an uneasy alliance between the DS and 
DSS was broken. Moreover, the DSS shifted from being part of the pro-EU political bloc 
to being a most vocal member of the conservative anti-EU, anti-Western club that 
advocated abandoning the EU membership path, strong opposition to Kosovo’s 
independence, and alliance with Moscow. To avoid political downfall due to Kosovo, the 
DS, and every government since 2008, had to oppose Kosovo’s independence, with 
Russia being an unavoidable ally in that task. 
 
Russia’s growing popularity in Serbian public opinion also became a powerful 
determinant for a Serbian balancing act. There is an agreement among several 
interlocutors interviewed by the author that it is not just the vulnerability to the Kosovo 
issue, but also the growing popularity of Russia which forced Belgrade to recalibrate its 
policy towards Moscow. Russia’s increasing popularity implies that a Serbian leader 
might be labelled as a traitor if he or she is not cultivating a friendship with Russia.285 
Jelica Kurjak, former Serbian Ambassador to Russia, had a clear idea of the domestic 
benefits Serbian politicians since 2008 to this very day expect from their balancing act. 
For Kurjak this is: “Survival in power. To win the support of nationalist structures, the 
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nationalist leaning voters.”286 Serbian politicians fear not only the loss of power but also 
being declared traitors by nationalist structures, which can also endanger their lives, 
mainly since Tadić always had in mind the assassination of Zoran Đinđić in 2003.287 
 
The Russian factor is even more pronounced in case of the SNS. Unlike the left-of-centre, 
pro-EU DS, it has an electorate which has to a great extent been transferred from its 
nationalist predecessor, the SRS. Thus, most of SNS constituents are mostly socially 
conservative, nationalistic minded, pro-Russian individuals who are not sincerely, or at 
least not fully dedicated emotionally, politically, and ideologically to the notions of 
Western modernity and Serbian EU membership. As Dragoljub Mićunović again notes: 
“This has no chance of succeeding because it is not on a firm foundation. The SNS 
electorate does not believe in a story of Europe, which their party advocates.”288 As such, 
the SNS is using Russia to prevent the alienation of pro-Russian constituents, particularly 
as the SNS voters harbour pro-Russian sentiments. 
 
As all of the political parties and their leaders are trying to remain in power and avoid 
angering the public, some policies are constant for most of them: anti-secessionism on 
Kosovo, EU membership, not joining NATO and partnership with Russia.289 The anti-
secessionism on Kosovo will remain the norm as long as Serbian leadership lacks a 
settlement acceptable internationally and domestically. On that same front is the refusal 
of any possibility of NATO membership. Kosovo’s independence plus the memory of 
NATO intervention made it impossible for any Serbian government to join NATO, 
leaving the country satisfied with its membership of the Partnership for Peace program. 
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Keeping the EU option on the table as a long-term option is also a consistent element. 
Even though the EU no longer has the same strategic appeal as before due to the delays 
in enlargement and crises impacting the EU, it is too complicated and expensive to sever 
ties with the EU.291 Given the deep connection with Europe, Serbian political parties still 
use Europe as a card in domestic competition.292 As such, it strategically makes sense for 
Serbian parties, except for the few conservative right-wing ones, to at least formally insist 
on EU membership irrespective of how unrealistic it is at this moment. 
 
Ultimately, Russia will continue to be deemed an important foreign policy partner for 
almost all political parties. The anti-EU, right-wing conservatives and nationalists will 
even go so far as advocating the abandonment of EU membership and favouring an open 
alliance with Russia. This stance is an inevitable product of the unresolved Kosovo 
dispute and Russian popularity in Serbia. As long as that remains the case, Serbian 
political parties will use Russia to score domestically, impacting the country’s policies. 
 
The second mechanism applies to the political parties’ desire to continuously operate as 
“catch-all parties”, trying to win both pro-Russian and pro-EU votes.293 Instead of being 
forced to choose unpopular policies like alienating Russia that would harm them 
domestically, Serbian political parties embrace the balancing act in the hope that they can 
electorally win different parts of the Serbian electorate with different sympathies. By 
embracing the EU, Serbian politicians promote themselves as the modernising force in 
society while also avoiding the political downfall that would come from alienating 
Russia. A 2013 report by the Serbian think-tank the International and Security Affairs 
Centre (ISAC) concludes that every political party needs to rely on the Russian factor to 
have a shot at winning power in Serbia. The report stresses that by abandoning political 
contacts with Russia, the party that would do so would allow rival parties to win over pro-
Russian voters easily, and become a decisive political force in Serbia.294 
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This mechanism is the logical continuation of the first one. Instead of engaging in 
politically risky behaviour of alienating voters, parties try to manage the risks by going 
for the votes of various pockets of the Serbian constituency. The idea of catching both 
pro-Western and pro-Russian voters has been practised by both the DS and the SNS. One 
contact explained to the author: “At some point, the DS got surveys which demonstrated 
that half of their voters were for closer ties with the West, and another half for closer ties 
with Russia, and they realised that they have to play with that. So, you need to have 
policies which are inconsistent, which are daily policies rather than some strategic 
decisions, and that is how it works. That is how it has worked and is going to continue to 
work in the foreseeable future.”295 
 
Serbia’s balancing act is conditioned with the structure of Serbian electorate and party 
coalitions; as pro-European parties were always in need of forming coalitions with parties 
who were asking for balancing between Europe and Russia, as well as between Russia 
and the US.296 Indeed, the need to win over various factions of Serbia’s divided society 
remains the norm for all political parties in the country, irrespective of differences in their 
ideological and political profiles. Serbian political scientist Filip Ejdus explained to the 
author that Serbian politicians face conflicted identities and conflicted psychological 
emotions in Serbian society, leading them to the balancing policy. As Ejdus stated: “The 
political parties simply try to play along, and they try to hit the middle and catch or capture 
the imagination of most voters.”297 
 
The third mechanism is when political parties use foreign policy to gain an advantage 
over their rivals, primarily by gaining support from great powers to win power. In Steven 
Lobell’s words, the foreign policy executive can act, as “kingmaker”, putting some 
domestic political actors in winning or losing positions.298 In contrast, some political 
actors use foreign policy to improve bargaining positions, vis-à-vis the competing 
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political groups described by Miriam Fendius Elman.299 Gaining the support of great 
powers to achieve an advantage over your competition has been the hallmark of Serbian 
party politics and foreign policy during the twelve years analysed in this study. 
 
This practice of Serbian political parties using foreign policy to win power in their 
domestic competition started to take deeper root in 2008. This was evident when the 
incumbent Serbian President Boris Tadić and his Democratic Party (DS) achieved an 
electoral win over the anti-EU bloc led by then-incumbent PM Vojislav Koštunica after 
having signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. 
Simultaneously, the shift was made as the pro-EU DS needed parliamentary support from 
SPS to form a slim parliamentary majority. The EU and the US provided incentives for 
SPS to abandon its old ways and join the pro-EU club.300 
 
This transformation by the SPS provided a pattern later on for the interim leadership of 
SRS, Tomislav Nikolic and Aleksandar Vučić to abandon the nationalist, anti-Western 
policies of their party chief Vojislav Šešelj (who was on trial at the time in the ICTY), 
and form their own Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). The West had naturally provided 
legitimacy for such a type of transition believing that it will strengthen the pro-Western 
camp in Serbia and ameliorate the nationalist tendency in the Serbian body politic, paving 
the way for the SNS to rise to power. By leveraging the Radicals to abandon their 
nationalist policy, the West was trying to acquire “a majority shares package” in Serbian 
politics.301 President of the SNS at the time Tomislav Nikolić publicly acknowledged his 
logic behind the transformation in a political talk show in 2009: “I got tired of me and my 
party, losing the elections because Olli Rehn (European Commissioner for Enlargement, 
2004-2010) would appear two days before the elections and give the counter-candidate 
decisive advantage. Let us see now whether there will be that decisive advantage.”302 By 
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changing its policy, the SNS could secure Western support and become more acceptable 
for the average Serbian voter, assuring its rise to power. This dynamic was pronounced 
during the period between 2012 and 2014. 
 
Post-2014, under SNS and its leader Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia transformed itself in a 
hybrid, illiberal regime. The increasingly illiberal politics of Serbia is extremely 
conducive for the balancing act. The SNS rule is a part of the broader trend in the Western 
Balkans. The Balkans’ ruling regimes increasingly fit the description of illiberal 
democracy or “managed democracy” as they are referred to by former Albanian diplomat, 
Agim Nesho.303 This transformation entails a “movement toward higher levels of 
authoritarianism” which “stops short of reverting to outright authoritarianism” resulting 
in a hybrid regime defined by Florian Bieber as competitive authoritarianism.304 Even 
though the political environment gives a strong edge to Vučić and his party, there is still 
party pluralism and elections. Aleksandar Vučić and the SNS still need to have a base in 
the numerical majority, which means that the logic of partisanship perseveres, and 
continues to impact the country’s foreign policy. 
 
The trend of managed democracies results from several factors: failing transition, 
particularly in economics; weak political institutions; incompetent public administration; 
and an underdeveloped political culture. At the same time, these trends have been boosted 
by the fact that civic parties of liberal and social-democratic profile have in places like 
Serbia compromised themselves with histories of corruption and cronyism scandals, with 
the global crisis giving the final blow to these parties and paving the way for SNS and 
other similar parties. 
 
In this landscape of managed democracies, Serbia is ruled by the leaders of political 
parties, some of them with baggage from the 1990s. These parties and leaders are more 
than willing to use elections to gain a popular mandate, but beyond that they are not ready 
to apply liberal policies as it will cost them their power and privileges. Instead, they try 
 
303 Agim Nesho, ‘Germany’s Challenge: Ensuring Democracy in the Western Balkans’, The National 
Interest, 28 August 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/germanys-challenge-ensuring-democracy-the-
western-balkans-11159, accessed 24-02-2017 




to break social and institutional constraints and embark on subversive policies towards 
the opposition, independent media and civil society. 
 
This state of affairs has been further exacerbated by the EU and the US, as the Western 
institutions’ full expansion in the Balkans is postponed. As such, the Western actors are 
sacrificing liberalisation and democratisation for the sake of stability, in Serbia and the 
rest of the Western Balkan countries. These actors appear to be prepared to tolerate 
illiberal domestic tendencies and disregard of the rule of law by SNS in Serbia as long as 
that government guarantees regional stability by being cooperative on issues like Kosovo 
or the refugee crisis. A phenomenon that some Balkan specialists call “stabilitocracy.”305 
 
As scholar Besnik Pula described very vividly and delicately: “A new generation of 
autocrats has been taking over the region, sometimes with the direct complicity of 
overzealous American policymakers and distracted EU officials. The apparent 
Westernisation of the region, it’s now clear, has come at great cost. Both U.S. and EU 
policymakers have been willing to turn a blind eye to corruption, which plagues the 
region’s governments, and have either downplayed or ignored the creeping rise of 
autocratic rulers. These autocrats operate under a different, savvier playbook than those 
of the 1990s: Internationally, they enthusiastically embrace the EU in their foreign policy. 
With the exception of Serbia, they express the same fervour for NATO. They are well-
coached in telling Western diplomats what they want to hear, while blatantly undermining 
democratic principles and the rule of law at home.”306 The challenge is how long the EU 
will turn a blind eye to the illiberal domestic policies of the SNS?307 
 
Serbia’s more illiberal domestic political environment creates an incentive for its 
leadership to conduct the balancing act. Serbian leaders believe that maintaining an open-
door policy towards Russia and pitting external great powers against each other will help 
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them retain their domestic position and prevent their downfall. The reason why Serbian 
leaders have “not exactly thrown the Kremlin’s phone number into the trash” is to 
maintain leverage with the West by keeping the Russian option open.308 As such, the SNS 
is using Russia as a factor to gain deflection vis-à-vis the EU regarding any potential 
future criticism by the EU of democratic backsliding at home. Party politics remains the 




Chapter 3 provided an analysis of the systemic factors impacting the Serbian balancing 
act. However, in explaining foreign policy behaviour, the systemic approach covers an 
integral part of the explanatory narrative but not the full explanation. As the NCR 
theoretical and methodological setting implies, it is needed to identify a domestic force 
(the intervening variable) that determines how an individual state, Serbia, responds to the 
systemic pressures affecting it. The research conducted through analysis of theoretical 
and empirical materials and fieldwork interviews established that Serbian party politics 
play this role. Chapter 4 provided an argument for this claim. 
 
NCR has dedicated a certain amount of attention to the role of the political parties and 
elites through the works of Jack Snyder, Randall Schweller, and Colin Dueck. However, 
their scholarships relate to great powers and seasoned democracies like the US. My 
research fills the gap by showing the interplay between systemic pressures and party 
politics regarding a state with fewer power capabilities and whose rule-of-law institutions 
do not function effectively. As Peter Trubowitz pointed, the NCR neglected the role of 
conflict and competition between political parties. This research shows that party 
competition is where the domestic pressures distort systemic pressures. 
 
This chapter first compared party politics with the other two conspicuous domestic 
factors, the policymakers’ perceptions, and public opinion. It proved that perceptions and 
public opinion, while far from irrelevant, could not act as the intervening variable. The 
perceptions are a combined product of an instinctive reaction to global trends and shallow 
 




historical analogies, later adjusted to the domestic narratives. Public opinion is a powerful 
force, being a benchmark in Serbian political parties and elites’ competition. Therefore, 
these two elements are part of the broader fabric of Serbian party politics. 
 
This chapter laid out the Serbian political context defined by weak civil institutions 
dominated by party interest and party leaders. In that environment, parties and their 
leaders dominate and shape public policies. The chapter outlined three ways foreign 
policy is used by political parties in their mutual struggle, displaying how systemic 
pressures are impacted by domestic forces. First, the political parties avoid unpopular 
policies to prevent domestic backlash, particularly regarding Kosovo and ties with Russia. 
Second, political parties try to win the votes of both pro-Western and pro-Russian Serbs. 
Third, parties use foreign policy to gain an edge over their competitors, either through 
their leaders who legitimise themselves domestically as internationally respected 
statesmen, or by acquiring great power backing. 
 
This behaviour is prevalent in Serbia irrespective of the party in power. Therefore, party 
politics regularly impact the systemic processes affecting Serbia. Chapter 3 identified 
three external conditions/processes behind the Serbian balancing act, while this chapter 
defined the intervening variable, the domestic element through which these systemic 
forces are filtered. The next three chapters will be the empirical chapters, showing how 
the intersection of systemic and domestic factors described in chapters 3 and 4 manifested 
during the different stages of recent Serbian history, shaping the Serbian balancing act. 











This chapter covers the period from 2008 to 2012, starting with Kosovo’s independence 
in 2008 and concluding with the DS’s electoral loss in Serbia’s 2012 presidential and 
parliamentary elections. This chapter is the first of three to address the empirical elements 
of this study; they will empirically examine the concepts laid out in the previous 
theoretical and conceptual chapters.  
 
This chapter is fundamental for this analysis because it marks the beginning of the Serbian 
balancing act between Russia and the West. In terms of causality, the systemic and 
domestic factors that drive the Serbian balancing act emerged during this period, and they 
remain in place today. This chapter analyses Serbian policy regarding the three external 
powers - the EU, the US, and Russia - between 2008 and 2012 by examining the systemic 
and domestic factors that shaped these policies as analytical benchmarks. 
 
At a systemic level, Serbian foreign policy was affected by two realities that emerged in 
2008 and which persist today. The first is the independence of Kosovo. The second is the 
power vacuum caused by the 2008 international financial crisis, and the subsequent 
inability of the EU to focus on the Balkans.309 In 2008, Serbia’s decisive moment was 
Kosovo’s independence, which will be regarded as a systemic factor, as independent 
Kosovo was the product of key Western countries. It forced Serbia to recalibrate its 
foreign policy. The reason for this is simple: as counter-secession became one of the main 
features of Serbian foreign policy, Belgrade had to re-evaluate its relationship with the 
West, as the US and most EU members supported Kosovo’s independence. At the same 
time, Russia supported the Serbian position on Kosovo. Caught between two sides, Serbia 
had to develop a balanced approach to Russia and the West. 
 





An already complex environment became even trickier as, in 2008, a power vacuum 
emerged in the Balkans. The EU and the US became distracted from the Balkans because 
of the financial crisis and a preoccupation with other regions, like the Middle East and 
the Indo-Pacific. Russia seized the opportunity to act more assertively in regards to Serbia 
and the Western Balkans. For Serbia, burdened with the Kosovo dispute and left without 
any tangible possibility of joining the EU, balancing became the defining feature of its 
behaviour. This period was shaped by rising tensions between Russia and the West, 
particularly the US, on issues such as the coloured revolutions, missile defence, NATO 
expansion, and the Russo-Georgian War. Kosovo’s independence became part of the 
same rivalry and provided Russia with an opportunity to confront the West while also 
asserting itself in the Balkans. 
 
Strong domestic factors also promoted Serbia’s balancing between Russia and the West 
in 2008: Serbian political parties began to leverage foreign policy matters like opposition 
to Kosovo’s independence and relations with Russia, to score political points. Bitter party 
divisions and party competition, an integral part of Serbian politics in the years before 
2008, were further exacerbated by the Kosovo issue, which began to dominate domestic 
politics. Nationalist parties opted to use Kosovo to achieve victory over pro-European 
parties, while the pro-European parties feared a popular backlash if they adopted a soft 
stance. Moreover, due to Russian support on Kosovo, pro-Russian sentiment in Serbian 
public opinion became extremely high. Serbian policy-makers had to take these new 
domestic realities into account when they formulated foreign policy. In that context, 
engaging Russia and winning over the pro-Russian constituents was a useful way for 
Serbian politicians to avoid domestic backlash. In that context, one can say that the 
national political power of the Serbian elite was disrupted as they faced more domestic 
hurdles, and they needed to alter their foreign policy conception in order to continue 
enjoying popular support. 
 
This chapter is a case study of one stage in Serbia’s foreign policy behaviour as a 
balancing act between Russia and the West, the period between 2008 and 2012. It will 
use similar methods to the rest of the study in theoretical and empirical terms, mixing 




– and secondary sources. The years 2008 to 2012 are a key initial stage of the foreign 
policy behaviour that this study explores. It allows the reader to get an empirical sense of 
the process and become aware of the causal systemic and domestic forces at play. 
 
As the purpose of this study is to determine causality in the emergence of Serbia’s 
balancing act, process tracing takes centre stage in determining systemic and domestic 
factors that lay behind that balancing act, putting cause and outcome in sequential order 
and establishing a link between independent and dependent variables. The dependent 
variable is Serbian foreign policy behaviour, or its balancing act between Russia and the 
West. The independent variable is the international systemic level: Kosovo’s 
independence and the power vacuum are part of a systemic environment that generated 
the Serbian balancing act and allowed Russia to assert itself in the Balkans. 
 
However, the domestic factors also impacted the Serbian balancing act. As such, NCR 
methodology and its causal mechanism imply an intervening variable operating at the unit 
level of analysis, affecting how systemic impulses are translated into a state’s foreign 
policy behaviour. This intervening variable lies at the state level of analysis. This chapter 
will empirically establish that the variable in question is political parties and the mutual 
competition between them, in which foreign policy acts as a card in domestic political 
games. 
 
This chapter, and the study as a whole, is based on analytical narrative as it provides a 
chronological, empirical account, illustrated by sub-plots. These sub-plots are the 
thematic benchmarks around which the empirical account revolves. As sub-plots, this 
chapter describes the systemic and domestic factors that impacted Serbia’s relations with 
the EU, the US, and Russia over this period. 
 
5.2 Serbia and the European Union 
 
During this period, two systemic factors shaped Serbian policy towards the EU: Kosovo’s 
independence and the power vacuum caused by the financial crisis of 2008. With the vast 




objections, and as it became increasingly clear that Serbia’s hope-for EU membership 
was not a viable proposition, this resulted in a series of incoherent and self-defeating 
moves for the DS government. Domestically, the Serbian party-political scene splintered 
after Kosovo declared independence, while party attitudes towards the EU also started to 
shift in the ensuing turmoil. The domestic salience of Kosovo and Russian popularity in 
Serbia significantly impacted Serbian policy. 
 
5.2.1 Systemic Factors 
 
Kosovo’s independence caused a rupture between the coalition government formed 
between the DS and the DSS, particularly over the future for Serbia’s foreign policy. The 
DS was persistent in its stance that EU integration and Kosovo were unrelated issues and 
saw EU integration as essential for Serbia’s future. The DSS, however, insisted not only 
that the two were interlinked, but insisted that Serbia should prioritise Kosovo – even at 
the expense of European integration.310 
 
An example of such a clash between the two parties was Serbia’s decision to recall 
ambassadors from countries that recognised Kosovo’s independence. The DS saw the 
withdrawal of ambassadors as a way of signalling Belgrade’s displeasure without the risk 
of Serbia isolating itself internationally;311 a stark contrast to the DSS which wanted to 
sever diplomatic relations with all countries that recognised Kosovo.312 Serbia’s Foreign 
Minister Vuk Jeremić, from the DS, also conveyed to the ambassadors of countries in the 
region that they would be declared persona non grata if their governments recognised 
Kosovo.313 However, Belgrade only issued this warning to the ambassadors of smaller 
countries, including its regional neighbours, while leaving out the ambassadors of more 
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powerful countries who were the leading champions of Kosovo’s independence.314 
Systemic realities of power relations influenced even regular diplomatic efforts. 
 
For the DSS, the global changes of 2008 were sufficient reason for Serbia to re-examine 
its foreign policy. Slobodan Samardžić, then a member of the DSS and Minister for 
Kosovo and Metohija (Serbian name for the territory), criticised the DS, stating that 2008 
was the year of “pluralisation of international relations, where the unipolar world slowly 
moves towards the multipolar”; where instead of making a significant shift, the DS held 
a “dogmatic view on a dynamic which no longer exists.”315 
 
The DS eventually defeated the DSS in this debate, (explained in more detail in the sub-
section on domestic factors), as it formed a government after the parliamentary elections. 
When the DS eventually prevailed after the May 2008 parliamentary elections, it tried to 
balance Serbian foreign policy between Kosovo and European integration. The slogan 
employed for electoral purposes, “both the EU and Kosovo” became a mantra for Serbia’s 
foreign policy. The new government chose to oppose Kosovo’s independence, as 
Koštunica wanted, but sought to do so through international engagement. By doing so, 
and not retreating into “embittered self-isolation,” Serbia hoped that it would undermine 
Kosovo’s independence, forcing new negotiations over Kosovo while getting the EU to 
embrace Serbia strategically.316 
 
The newly inaugurated government led by PM Mirko Cvetković tried to achieve this by 
giving equal weight to EU integration and the issue of Kosovo, in stark contrast to 
Koštunica’s prioritisation of Kosovo.317 In parliament, Cvetković defined “fully-fledged 
EU membership” as “the core interest of the Republic of Serbia” while also stressing that 
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Serbia “will undertake all legal and diplomatic measures so as to preserve Kosovo and 
Metohija as an integral part of the Republic of Serbia.”318 
 
Nevertheless, beyond the Kosovo drama, there was a broader systemic process in play, 
the emergence of the Balkans power vacuum, which created a permissive environment 
for Serbia’s balancing act. As Vladimir Međak, a Serbian specialist on the EU affairs 
said: “A serious vacuum exists, and it came about with Romanian and Bulgarian entrance 
into the EU because the EU thought ‘The Romanians and Bulgarians are members. We 
drew the border on the Carpathian Mountains towards the Russians. Everything westward 
of that border will be resolved by itself.’ … They thought that it was over. That Russia 
has rolled back, being on the other side of the Carpathians and that whatever they do in 
the Balkans will have no effect, as it is the EU’s sphere of interest. However, we saw that 
this is not the case. It is difficult to reverse things.”319 The power vacuum in the region 
kicked in when the institutional and global financial crises of 2008 convulsed Europe. 
This set of crises diverted the EU’s attention away from Serbia and the Balkans; they 
related to the failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005, the difficulty 
in signing the Treaty of Lisbon (the Reform Treaty) in 2007, ultimately culminating in 
the Eurozone crisis in 2008.320 
 
The vacuum became greater as other trends in the EU impeded its ability to integrate the 
Balkans: The EU, and Germany in particular, became more opposed to further 
enlargement after the 2004 accession of Cyprus with its unresolved territorial dispute, and 
the 2007 addition of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, both of who were unprepared for 
membership. Berlin would eventually pledge that Germany would never let in anyone 
“who is unprepared like Romania and Bulgaria and who has an unresolved territorial 
dispute like Cyprus, making Serbia the worst of both worlds.”321 Simultaneously, the 
Eurozone crisis “induced the growth of scepticism towards the enlargement and reception 
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of new members”, according to Boško Jakšić. It also caused a sort of “spasm” within the 
EU and its institutions.322 
 
Despite these harsh realities, Serbian policy-makers and diplomats continued to stress EU 
accession as the country’s strategic priority during the next four years. In 2008, 
Ambassador Čedomir Radojković, then Assistant Foreign Minister, called the EU “the 
key partner of the Republic of Serbia.”323 Meanwhile, the new Serbian government tried 
to repair the relationship with the EU and its member states. In July 2008 Serbia decided 
to return the ambassadors it had withdrawn from the EU countries that had recognised 
Kosovo’s independence.324 Nevertheless, over this period a growing number of questions 
arose about the coherence of Serbian foreign policy – above all in regards to its 
proclaimed goal of joining the EU. In August 2009 Serbian President Boris Tadić said 
that Serbia had “four pillars” of its foreign policy: the EU, the US, Russia and China.325 
 
Tadic’s terminology of pillars received much criticism for its apparent lack of priorities 
and unrealistic aims. Some critics were very passionate indeed: “A pillar of foreign policy 
is its principles, values, priorities. I have been going mad over this for years. What we 
need most is a priority hierarchy. In general, it is stupid to say that we need three priorities. 
Priority is what is first. The second cannot be a priority.”326 Even one of Tadić’s former 
associates said that this was not “an accurate and precise definition” adding that “it would 
have been more accurate to say it was a 1+3 policy instead of four pillars, because this 
way it appears that for us the EU is the same as the other three pillars, which is untrue 
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The inherent tension between the Kosovo dispute and its European aspirations burdened 
Serbia. This tension came to the fore when Serbia, led by Foreign Minister Jeremić, asked 
for an advisory, non-binding opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the 
legality of Kosovo’s independence. The ICJ avoided this sensitive issue, going the safest 
option by deciding, in July 2010, that international law contained no “prohibition on 
declarations of independence.”328 The ICJ’s advisory opinion caused different reactions. 
The Albanians greeted the decision, while the Serbs remained firm as the ICJ evaluated 
the legality of the declaration but not the legality of Kosovo’s independence.329 
 
More importantly, beyond the legal issues, a more systemic, strategic dilemma was 
imposed on Serbia. Jeremić quickly acted on the ICJ’s opinion, by submitting his version 
of the new resolution to the UN General Assembly. The new version asserted that 
unilateral secession was not a way to solve territorial disputes as “the ICJ did not confirm 
a right of Kosovo Albanians to secede from Serbia”, and called on the interested parties 
to find a solution through peaceful dialogue.330 The EU declared this unacceptable, and 
Serbia quickly found itself pressured by the EU to support a more diluted resolution. 
 
The countries which led the EU’s efforts were Germany and the UK. In August 2010 
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle visited Belgrade. Westerwelle warned that 
Serbia would have to “come to terms” with the loss of Kosovo, and signalled that Serbia’s 
EU integration would be blocked unless Serbia and the EU agree on a new resolution.331 
For one source, this was “a shock” for Tadić, as the message was direct and public.332 A 
couple of days later, British Foreign Secretary William Hague visited Belgrade and, in 
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talks with Tadić and Jeremić, warned that Serbia’s relationship with the EU would be 
damaged if the proposed resolution was not withdrawn.333 
 
Belgrade eventually caved in to EU pressure, withdrew Jeremić’s version of the 
resolution, and came out in favour of the new joint resolution with the EU. Adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in September 2010, the resolution made the EU the 
“facilitator” of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,334 taking the dialogue out from 
under the auspices of the UN Security Council, where Russia had a veto right. Thus, 
Serbian policy met with systemic resistance from more powerful countries whose club, 
the EU, Serbia wanted to join. 
 
This new dialogue format began in Brussels in March 2011 under EU mediation with the 
negotiators Borko Stefanović, a Serbian diplomat from the ranks of the DS, and Edita 
Tahiri, the deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo.335 Talks continued throughout 2011 and 
2012, dealing mostly with technical issues, like civil registers, telecommunications, 
customs stamps, and freedom of movement, without venturing into a political dialogue.336 
The dialogue produced some technical agreements, but nothing suggested that the two 
parties could reach a mutually acceptable solution, which frustrated the EU. During that 
period, Serbia faced difficulties in coordinating its policies with the EU. As one 
interviewee said: “In 2009, 2010 and 2011 Serbia very often voted in the United Nations 
in a different way than the European Union, taking into consideration its particular 
interests related to Kosovo. So, the Kosovo issue had prevented the harmonisation of 
Serbia’s and the EU’s foreign policy.”337 
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The troubles emerged in the majority Serb municipalities of North Kosovo – an area with 
close links to Belgrade and beyond the control of Priština. The unclear status of North 
Kosovo led to talks in Belgrade about Kosovo’s partition, as a potential model for 
resolving the Kosovo conundrum.338 Encouraged by Brussels’ technical talks, in July 
2011 Priština tried to establish full control over Northern Kosovo by dispatching police 
special forces to seize control of two border checkpoints with Serbia. The local Serbs 
organised resistance that resulted in violent conflict and the death of one member of the 
Kosovo police special force unit.339 
 
It turned out to be a decisive moment for Tadić and his future political downfall. While 
the full content of bilateral talks is unknown, Merkel in her Belgrade visit in August 2011 
dismissed Tadić’s insistence on Kosovo’s partition. During a press conference, Merkel 
stated that Serbia would not become a member of the EU without normalising relations 
with Kosovo, demanding that Belgrade dismantle parallel institutions in Northern 
Kosovo, and eliminate the idea of partition.340 Some claimed that for Merkel this was a 
way to please anti-EU enlargement voices within the CDU, the political party she led, by 
issuing a demand that would be impossible for Belgrade to meet.341 Merkel told Tadić 
clearly that on the EU and Kosovo “there are no two parallel tracks” marking the “finale 
and collapse” of his policy.342 
 
Meantime, in May 2011, Serbia arrested former Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko 
Mladić, who was wanted by the ICTY. For years Mladić’s ‘non-arrest’ was the main 
obstacle to Serbia’s EU accession. Despite hopes that the accession would receive a new 
momentum, the Kosovo dispute and problems within the EU itself continued to block the 
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country’s EU path.343 As Srećko Đukić said: “We have to acknowledge the decline in the 
EU’s interest in the Western Balkans and Serbia, as Serbia finished its business with the 
Hague Tribunal, namely the extradition of Ratko Mladić to the ICTY in 2011. From that 
moment starts the declining interest of the EU in Serbia.”344 “A narrow time frame” 
between the arrest and extradition of Mladić to The Hague and Merkel’s visit to Belgrade 
in August 2011 was the point at which the EU and Germany turned their backs on 
Tadić.345 Once again, the smaller unit was punished by the power dynamics of the 
international system. The Serbian weakness became even more evident in December 2011 
when it failed to achieve EU candidate status.346 
 
By now the DS-led government was so deeply bogged down in its balancing act that it 
could not disentangle itself from its various clashing foreign policy priorities. The 
keynote speech that Prime Minister Cvetković provided in 2011 on the occasion of his 
government’s reconstruction shows this confusion: “Full EU membership, as a historic 
goal, and the acquisition of candidate status as a necessary and key condition on this path, 
are of fundamental interest for Serbia and its citizens. … This government formulated 
and implemented a state policy which, apart from its basic goal, namely EU membership, 
also implies the best possible relations with other powerful countries, primarily the United 
States, Russia and China. … The Serbian government is determined and consistent in its 
stance not to recognise the independence of Kosovo-Metohija and is undertaking all 
available diplomatic activities to retain the province within its borders. In this sense, the 
government can be satisfied with the results achieved so far in limiting the number of 
states that have recognised the so-called independence of Kosovo.”347 The following 
month, Jeremić repeated the same set of well-known themes that revolved around 
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Kosovo, European integration and foreign policy based on four pillars in front of the 
Serbian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.348 
 
Nevertheless, Tadić attempted to return the EU to the centre of Serbia’s foreign policy 
agenda, particularly as the country approached parliamentary and presidential elections 
in the summer of 2012. At the 2012 ambassadorial conference, Tadić also focused on 
general themes of Kosovo and European integration.349 The reason why his language was 
scaled back, and why laudatory talks and phrases like the one of “four pillars” were not 
part of the speech, was that the country was expecting to receive EU candidate status, and 
Tadić and the DS needed EU credential for the upcoming elections.350 
 
In 2013 the International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC), a Serbian think tank, 
published a report that provided a critical overview of Serbian foreign policy between 
2008 and 2012, particularly its relations with the EU. This report summarises three 
attributes which marked Serbian foreign policy during that period: a lack of clear strategy; 
a lack of effective decision making; and a lack of coordination with the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU.351 In October 2012, the EU published a strategic 
document entitled “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013.” In this 
document, the EU called upon Serbia to respect “the territorial integrity of Kosovo” and, 
as a precondition for EU integration, called for normalisation and good neighbourly 
relations between Serbia and Kosovo.352 Tadić’s foreign policy was in tatters. 
 
Even to the end, Tadić tried to bring the issue of the EU back into focus. Despite German 
reservations, the EU did grant Serbia the status of an EU membership candidate with a 
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promise that accession negotiations would start as soon as possible.353 After 2008, the 
issue of membership was put on a “backburner”, resulting in “lost continuity.” However, 
by getting candidate status for Serbia, even without opening the negotiations chapter, 
Tadić managed to bring the EU back as the main issue.354 Nevertheless, this did not help 
him to avoid electoral defeat in 2012. 
 
5.2.2 Domestic Factors 
 
In 2008 Serbian domestic politics experienced a significant watershed. With Kosovo’s 
independence, a new form of inter-party rivalry emerged: one where Serbian political 
elites and parties use foreign policy in domestic competition, providing the domestic 
context for Serbia’s international balancing act. 
 
It began with the breakdown of the coalition between the DS and the DSS over Kosovo. 
In 2015, Dušan Spasojević, a Serbian diplomat and then member of the DS, noted that 
after Kosovo’s independence “Everything in Serbian politics becomes … obsessed with 
this issue. We are becoming in internal politics and in foreign policy, a one-issue 
country.”355 The Serbian political and party system became severely destabilised, with 
the issue of Kosovo becoming “the theme of social and political rupture.”356 The fact that 
most EU countries recognised Kosovo’s independence, and that the DSS perceived the 
EU as one of the drivers of Kosovo’s independence, poisoned the DS-DSS coalition. The 
political divisions in Serbia grew worse as pro-EU parties came under pressure from their 
nationalist rivals, who were encouraged by Kosovo’s independence.357 
 
Koštunica and the DSS launched a major political gambit on 21 February 2008. On that 
day the DSS, alongside the SRS, organised a massive rally against Kosovo’s 
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independence in the very heart of Belgrade. Tens of thousands of people attended. Tadić 
did not participate as he was on a one-day visit to Romania, and neither did his coalition 
partner the G17 Plus, nor the pro-Western Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).358 In a speech 
at the rally, Koštunica took a jab at the Western countries who had chosen to recognise 
Kosovo: “For as long as we live – Kosovo is Serbia and our brothers in Kosovo are not 
alone and forgotten! While we reject ultimatums and accept friendship – Serbia is free! 
… It will suffice, they say, that you Serbs accept to be humiliated. To sign your own 
humiliation. No one will ever win a mandate from the Serbian people to accept such an 
ignoble trade-off. Never, and no one!” Nikolić, on behalf of the SRS, was even more 
aggressive in his address: “On behalf of all the citizens of Serbia, I promise I will not rest 
until Kosovo and Metohija is under Serbia’s control. Hitler couldn’t take it away; these 
nowadays won’t be able to either. We owe it to ourselves and our children.”359 
 
For the DSS and SRS, Kosovo’s independence, and the emotional reaction it caused 
among the Serbian public, was an argument to be used in domestic politics. The internal 
divide among Serbian political elites over Kosovo and the EU was becoming stronger and 
deeper, and these dividing topics became tools in domestic competition among the 
Serbian parties. As a result of unbridgeable differences within his government, Koštunica 
disbanded it, calling for new parliamentary elections in May 2008 with the justification 
that his government lacked a unified stance over Kosovo.360 Koštunica hoped that with a 
platform that prioritised Kosovo, stronger ties to Russia, and the abandonment of EU 
integration, he would win the elections. 
 
To keep its electorate together and to avoid a backlash from nationalists, the DS ran on a 
new platform during the elections. This platform was summed up in the slogan “both the 
EU and Kosovo”, meaning that Serbia would not give up on opposing Kosovo’s 
independence, while simultaneously pursuing the path to EU accession. Tadić laid out 
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this position at the DS’s board meeting in March 2008: “No one should think I will give 
up on this policy. Both the European Union and Kosovo, both Kosovo and the European 
Union. … I see no logic in claims that a weakening of our economic and political capacity 
can defend our legitimate interests and so I continue to advocate this political option and 
I will never stop. That is my message to the citizens, the international community and all 
the participants in the country’s political life.”361 In that same speech, Tadić took a jab at 
Koštunica and the DSS, as he claimed that he would “stand opposed to those decisions 
that lead to isolation and diminish the capacity to continue this struggle.” 
 
The DS used relations with the EU to win the elections, showing how foreign policy can 
be used in domestic competition by Serbian political parties. The EU supported the DS 
in its efforts as it wanted the pro-EU party to come out on top. To encourage the pro-EU 
forces, the EU signed the SAA with Serbia despite Belgrade’s lack of cooperation with 
the ICTY, just as it had done when it started visa liberalisation talks with Serbia three 
days before the presidential elections of January/February 2008.362 Indeed, in 
Luxembourg on 28 April 2008, Božidar Đelić, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister from the 
DS, accompanied by Tadić and then Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, signed the SAA.363 
In a statement to the Serbian media Jeremić stated that the SAA implementation “will 
depend on the outcome of the 11 May elections in Serbia.”364 This message was directed 
at the Serbian public, trying to motivate the voters to vote for the DS by indirectly 
implying that the SAA’s fate depended on the electoral outcome. 
 
Another opportunity also came to promote Serbia’s European future and use it as a tool 
in the electoral competition. It came the day after the signing of the SAA. Serbian 
Economy Minister Mlađan Dinkić signed a contract with Italian carmaker Fiat, stipulating 
that Fiat would invest 700 million euros in Serbia to build two plants in the Serbian town 
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Kragujevac.365 The issue of the SAA and Fiat became a major instrument for the DS in 
their campaign. On 2 May 2008, Božidar Đelić declared the SAA to be a “historic 
agreement”, a “superior act of patriotism”, and said that SAA was “not merely a piece of 
paper, but a better future for all of Serbia’s citizens.”366 Đelić made an even stronger case 
for the EU and his own party’s election bid as he asserted that “If the SAA were not 
signed, Fiat would not have signed a contract on strategic partnership worth EUR 700mn 
a day after.”367 
 
Ultimately, the DS’s pro-EU stance bore fruit as the party won the May 2008 
parliamentary elections, proving that foreign policy issues can be the tools of kingmakers 
in the domestic arena. However, the drama did not end there, as the DS won most of the 
votes but it did not have enough parliamentary seats to form the government. Therefore, 
the DS found itself in pursuit of coalition partners. A majority coalition was not possible 
without the SPS, the former party of Slobodan Milošević. As such, the SPS could name 
its price to both the DS and the DSS-SRS coalition. The SPS decided to abandon its 
nationalist image from the 1990s and rebrand themselves as a “new” centre-left political 
party invested in European integration;368 it did this by forming a coalition with the DS. 
 
The EU welcomed the new Serbian government.369 The EU, therefore, condoned the 
SPS’s political transformation. This episode shows us how Serbia’s political reality had 
changed and how a nexus between foreign and domestic policies had formed in Serbia. 
The SPS decided on a major shift in its outlook towards the EU and consequently enabled 
the party to become an acceptable partner for the EU and part of the ruling coalition. The 
SPS from that period is an excellent example of a party that successfully used foreign 
policy to score domestic points. 
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The issue of Kosovo is what focused the foreign policy of the new Serbian government 
the most, and by extension tied Serbia to Russia, causing frictions with the EU. Vuk 
Jeremić, Serbian Foreign Minister, was the perfect example of that policy. He was known 
to be the policy-maker who vehemently opposed Kosovo’s independence, symbolising 
the “terrible discrepancy” between what was “proclaimed during the elections” and “what 
was done in reality.”370 In the words of one interviewee: “After the elections were won 
on the ground of EU integration, Vuk Jeremić had his private foreign policy where for a 
year and a half, he does not mention the EU as a priority. Instead, he talks about Kosovo, 
Kosovo and more Kosovo.”371 
 
During his time as Foreign Minister, Jeremić became famous for saying that if Serbia had 
to choose between the EU and Kosovo, it would always choose Kosovo.372 Domestic 
considerations played a major role in the DS-led government when it came to its Kosovo 
policy, impacting Serbia’s relations with the EU. This impact manifested when Serbia 
asked for the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Kosovo. By asking the ICJ for such an opinion, 
the Serbian government tried “to halt the number of countries recognising Kosovo and 
also to take the issue out of domestic politics because the government could be seen to be 
doing something, albeit not something that threatened violence.”373 
 
This episode demonstrated that the Serbian government was attempting to reconcile its 
systemic imperative of joining the EU and having a partnership with Western countries, 
with its domestic imperative of showing that Serbia could stand its ground on Kosovo. 
However, when Serbia eventually gave in to pressure from the EU to give up on the initial 
draft of the resolution, one can infer two insights. 
 
Firstly, the domestic imperatives tend to clash with systemic imperatives. On that 
occasion, Tadić avoided being humiliated in front of his constituents as he got his mandate 
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to pursue the EU membership only to be blocked in the EU accession publicly by the 
leading European countries. Second, the individual political players use the sensitive 
issue of Kosovo to boost their domestic credentials. In private, Jeremić told several 
European diplomats including several foreign ministers “that he knows that Kosovo is 
gone, but that it is phenomenal for his ratings for him to talk about it.”374 Jeremić was 
seen as “running a private foreign policy” resulting in an “elegant” transfer of foreign 
policy duties away from Serbian Foreign Ministry onto the Presidency, leaving Jeremić 
to lobby in the countries of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) against recognition of 
Kosovo.375 
 
During this period the DS faced criticism from the pro-Western LDP and from the DS’s 
minor coalition partner, the Serb Renewal Movement (SPO), for refusing to accept the 
reality of independent Kosovo, while also facing constant attacks from DSS and SRS that 
insisted on the continuous struggle against an independent Kosovo.376 The DSS and SRS 
used every opportunity to attack the government’s policies. The opposition criticised the 
government for the ICJ’s decision – one which they blamed on Belgrade’s poorly 
formulated question to the ICJ. The DSS and Koštunica attacked the government for not 
filing a lawsuit against countries who disrespected Serbian sovereignty by recognising 
independent Kosovo.377 
 
The dialogue moderated by the EU is another case in point. The DSS attacked the 
dialogue as the humiliation of Serbia, while the SRS criticised the government for taking 
the Kosovo dispute from under the auspices of the UN Security Council, where Serbia 
could count on Russian support, and placing it under the auspices of countries that 
recognised independent Kosovo.378 These attacks were a constant reality for the DS that 
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lasted during its entire mandate, clearly showing a strong domestic impediment that 
shaped the country’s foreign policy. 
 
In the end, the domestic vulnerability was a constant hindrance for Tadić, the DS and the 
country’s foreign policy, which became evident during Angela Merkel’s visit to Belgrade 
in August 2011. The EU’s most powerful country destroyed Tadić’s policy of “both the 
EU and Kosovo” in front of the Serbian public and Tadić’s constituents. For Srđan 
Bogosavljević, Serbian pollster, it was striking that Merkel gave her message to the 
Serbian government in the press conference, not behind closed doors.379 By allowing 
domestic considerations to guide his actions, Tadić suffered a complete defeat on an 
international level, including on his EU policy. 
 
5.3 Serbia and the United States 
 
During the 2008-2012 period, US-Serbia relations were shaped by Kosovo’s 
independence, mainly as that independence was the product of US policies given the US 
military intervention of 1999 and US support for Kosovo’s independence later on. On top 
of that, the fact that US attention was diverted from the Balkans as it was preoccupied 
with other regions, also contributed in forming the systemic environment of a power 
vacuum that created the space for Belgrade’s balancing act. That way, the US only acts 
in the Balkans when it detects strategic inability of the EU to resolve regional issues. 
However, the power disparity also shaped US-Serbia relations - as Serbia tried to manage 
its relations with the US in a way that does not turn the US into a threat. 
 
On a domestic level, party politics also played a significant role. Anti-American 
sentiments caused by US support for Kosovo’s independence meant that Serbian 
politicians needed to tread carefully with the US, particularly over Kosovo; this contrasts 
with the fact that Serbian political parties try to secure US acquiescence to win power. 
However, domestic factors temper the systemic realities which caused the DS government 
to lose US support. 
 





5.3.1 Systemic Factors 
 
Interviewees agreed that the Kosovo dispute and the lack of strategic US interest in Serbia 
and the Balkans were determining factors in the relationship between the two countries. 
As one former member of Tadić’s foreign policy team stated: “I would say that the US 
has never had a policy towards Serbia since 2008. The bilateral relations between Serbia 
and the US, in my opinion, were the consequence of American policy towards Kosovo 
and not of American policy towards Serbia. It never appeared to me that the US has a 
policy towards Serbia.”380 
 
Another interviewee said: “Essentially a power vacuum exists because the Americans are 
not present enough. The EU is irrelevant in that sense. … America again is not particularly 
interested. So essentially yes, there is a power vacuum. It is not caused by the inability of 
the EU. It is caused by the smaller presence of the US.”381 Whether the EU or the US 
created the power vacuum in the Balkans remains unclear. However, there is no doubt 
that the absence of the US contributes to the permissive environment that enabled Russia 
to play a more active role in Serbia and the Balkans. This environment was fundamental 
to the Serbian balancing act. 
 
As Kosovo became a sore point, relations between Serbia and the US became increasingly 
tense. Very soon NATO membership became a non-starter, resulting in Serbia 
proclaiming its military neutrality in 2007. An important factor, as Serbian policy towards 
NATO is frequently identified with its bilateral relations with the US. Former Serbian 
Ambassador to NATO, Branislav Milinković, noted that in Serbia, the relationship with 
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The role of the US is fundamental to the systemic reality of the power vacuum in the 
Balkans, which helped generate the Serbian balancing act. Even during the conflicts of 
the 1990s, Serbia and the Balkans were not a national security priority for Washington, 
while in the post-conflict period the two were even less important, as they had no strategic 
or economic value to the US, except when it comes to their impact on European security 
or on combating Islamic extremism.383 
 
While the US’s help in creating an independent Kosovo might be qualified as an 
ambitious geopolitical project in the Balkans, this project did not indicate a US desire to 
play a more assertive role in the Balkans. On the contrary, from the standpoint of US 
interests, helping create an independent Kosovo was part of the US decreasing its 
presence in the Balkans. 
 
The US hoped to do this by bringing an end to what Washington considered to be the 
unfinished job of its Balkan endeavours of the 1990s and by passing the buck of primary 
regional stabiliser to the EU. The mood for the partial withdrawal of the US in the Balkans 
was already evident in 2009. The US role would decrease as the EU’s role increased, 
leaving the US reduced to NATO, bilateral cooperation and particular assistance in 
solving outstanding disputes like Kosovo and Bosnia.384 
 
After Serbia got a majority in the UN General Assembly to ask for the ICJ’s advisory 
opinion on Kosovo’s independence in October 2008, the Serbian ambassador to the US 
was sent back to Washington after being brought to Belgrade for a long period of 
consultations. This was done later than Serbian ambassadors in EU countries, most likely 
because the EU demanded that Serbia return its ambassadors to EU countries.385 
According to the academic and former Serbian ambassador to the US, Ivan Vujačić, the 
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Serbian diplomatic effort to limit the number of countries that recognised Kosovo’s 
independence brought about a new phase in Serbia’s relationship with the US. Vujačić 
called it “the phase of cooling and silent confrontation”, which lasted from October 2008 
until the ICJ’s decision in summer of 2010.386 
 
During the first term of Obama’s presidency Joe Biden, the US Vice President and Hillary 
Clinton, Secretary of State, were the leading agents of US policy towards Serbia.387 The 
paradox and contradiction of Serbian relations with the US came to the fore on 20 May 
2009, when the US Joe Biden visited Serbia. From the standpoint of US-Serbian ties, this 
was an important moment given that it was the first visit by a high-profile US official in 
years. During this visit, it became evident how Serbia tried to engage the most powerful 
country in the international system. Serbia tried to find a formula that would avoid 
bringing it into conflict-like situations with the US in light of their different stances on 
Kosovo. 
 
The relations between the two were based on the formula of “agreeing to disagree”, to 
avoid confrontation. On that occasion, Biden said: “The region cannot fully succeed 
without Serbia, we both acknowledged we need to find a way forward on issues that 
divide us … We can agree that we disagree [over Kosovo] providing that we have 
reasonable expectations from one another. … We do not expect Serbia any time soon to 
recognise the independence of Kosovo. That is not the precondition for our relationship 
or our support for Serbia to become part of the European Union.”388 Tadić’s response was 
entirely in keeping with this formulation of “agreeing to disagree”: “Vice President Biden 
and I have agreed that we now have an opportunity to establish a completely new level 
of communication between our two countries … Notwithstanding our different positions 
on the Kosovo question, Serbia wishes for the best possible relations with the United 
States, as partners.”389 
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As Ivan Vujačić wrote, “the usual American phrase we agree to disagree was gladly 
accepted to avoid open confrontation.”390 Ivo Visković, a political science professor and 
former Serbian ambassador, said: “Everybody was aware of the importance of the US, 
but unfortunately everybody also knew that we could not expect a friendly relationship 
with them. Instead, the goal was not to make an enemy of the US, while attempts to make 
them a friend, unfortunately, kept failing.”391 Another Serbian ambassador stated: 
“Serbian policy towards the US was an attempt to lower that pressure, to ameliorate it, 
and to achieve the best possible, or at least the most comfortable, relations with the 
US.”392 
 
During this period Serbia and the US focused on specific, very particular, areas of 
cooperation so that disagreements on Kosovo would not become problematic. In an 
interview with the author, Šutanovac cited military affairs as one of those areas: 
 
“In my time Joseph Biden who was visiting Belgrade, had a bilateral meeting with me, 
which is a rarity for the US Vice President to meet with the defence minister of a country 
like Serbia. At the official meeting, Biden stated that the best part of the Serbo-American 
cooperation was military to military cooperation.”393 One interviewee gave a more 
detailed description: “We tried to leave Kosovo aside and say: OK. Fine, we disagree on 
that, but let us try to cooperate on some other issues.”394 These other issues were: 
 
1) Military cooperation: This included stronger cooperation with NATO through 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) as Serbia accessed the PfP Planning and Review 
Process (PARP), and Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP); Sending 
Serbian troops on peace operations under the auspice of the UN and then the EU; 
2) Cooperation against organised crime: This included a partnership with the US 
DEA and the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA); This partnership 
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resulted in successful operations in combating cocaine smuggling from Latin 
America into Europe; 
3) Counter-terrorism: The element least known to the general public, which included 
Serbia assisting the US by using its old contacts from the days of non-
Alignment.395 
 
At the same time, this visit also shows another systemic reality of Serbian foreign policy: 
that the US only takes a more assertive role in the region when the second pillar of the 
West, the EU, fails to provide firm leadership in the Balkans. Biden’s visit demonstrated 
this reality when the US saw EU leadership on hot regional issues like Kosovo and Bosnia 
as inadequate.396 
 
Kosovo always lurked in the background, nevertheless. When the ICJ delivered its 
advisory opinion, the US greeted such a decision and called upon other countries to 
recognise independent Kosovo.397 Among the US representatives who saluted this turn of 
events was Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at 
the State Department.398 Several other senior US officials also made statements 
supportive of the ICJ ruling. Before this ruling, Biden telephoned Tadić to affirm US 
support for Kosovo and discuss US-Serbian relations, while US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton noted that the ICJ “decisively supported the US view that Kosovo’s break with 
Serbia was legal and that it is an independent state whose territory is inviolable.”399 
 
The visit to Belgrade by Hillary Clinton in October 2010 was more optimistic in terms of 
atmosphere compared to Biden’s in 2009. Clinton’s visit also marked the start of a phase 
some refer to as “mild recovery and mild distancing of the US from the region,” which 
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lasted from 2010 to 2012.400 At the time the US again passed the buck to the EU as the 
Balkans were Europe’s “backyard”, as the US strived towards disengagement from 
Europe and the Balkans in light of all the challenges it faced elsewhere, including issues 
like the “reset” with Russia, the Iraq and Afghan Wars, the Arab Spring and the pivot to 
Asia.401 
 
The US diplomatic mission in Belgrade reflected this reality. By 2010, Serbian officials 
had noticed a “significant decline” in the quality of diplomatic officials in the US embassy 
in Belgrade – particularly as opposed to 2008, when the US had “excellent” staff who 
were dealing with “crisis management.”402 The downgrading in US personnel’s quality 
was accompanied in 2011 and 2012 by a decline in the American and the European 
financing of civil society and other pro-Western initiatives. Belgrade took both elements 
as symbolic of a decline in Western attention towards the Balkans.403 
 
In that period, a major milestone was the May 2011 meeting of the heads of states of 
Central and South-East Europe held in Warsaw, where US President Barak Obama was 
an honorary guest. President Tadić did not take part in the summit as Atifete Jahjaga, the 
then President of Kosovo was present, missing that way a significant chance to meet with 
Obama.404 From that moment the US renounced Tadić as a suitable partner in Belgrade. 
Sonja Licht commented that the Serbian hard position of not attending international and 
regional gatherings like the one in Warsaw was “a bad status quo” leading Serbia into 
“self-isolation.”405 Šutanovac in 2012 tried unsuccessfully to put the issue of US-Serbian 
relations back on the agenda, by suggesting that Serbia sends its troops to some high-
profile peace mission, like Afghanistan, in hope that it would lead to a bilateral meeting 
between Serbian and the US president. As Šutanovac concluded: “That idea of mine was 
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not approved. Sadly, it turned out that the Serbian President did not have a chance to sit 
with the US President at the bilateral meeting. It turned out that a prodemocratic, pro-
European party, did not have a full US support.”406 Evidently, the US dismissed the DS 
as a partner. 
 
5.3.2 Domestic Factors 
 
Serbia’s relationship with the US is in part formed by a powerful domestic party dynamic. 
Namely, as the US was the leading champion of Kosovo’s independence, public opinion 
against the US started to shift, impacting how Serbian political parties manage foreign 
policy and relations with the US, affecting the public opinion towards NATO as well. The 
independence of Kosovo alongside the memories of the 1999 NATO intervention, made 
NATO membership unacceptable in Serbian public opinion. Since 2007, the DSS was the 
leading critic of NATO, pointing to the organisation as the main culprit for Kosovo’s 
independence. The pro-Western DS had no choice but to readapt its policy stance towards 
NATO, as from that point on no party that advocated NATO membership could be a 
competitive force. Therefore, the DS had to base its policy towards NATO on the notion 
of Serbia being part of PfP but not a NATO member. 
 
The Minister for Kosovo, Slobodan Samardžić, urged the US and NATO to refrain from 
“the project of creating a satellite, army barrack, state on foreign territory.”407 Koštunica, 
on the ninth anniversary of the NATO bombing on 24 March 2008, attacked NATO and 
the US, calling Kosovo’s independence the direct product of NATO intervention and 
“selfish” Western geopolitical interests. As Koštunica said: “The illegal construction of a 
huge American military base, ‘Bondsteel’ and Annex 11 of the Ahtisaari plan, which 
establishes NATO as the supreme organ of government in Kosovo, reveal the reason why 
Serbia was mindlessly destroyed, and why a NATO state was declared illegally on 17 
February. … The policy of force that is used against Serbia is blind and won’t last, and 
just as with every other force that came to the Balkans, this one will leave too. A huge 
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number of states and the majority of mankind have not recognised the first NATO state, 
and instead recognise Serbia in her true and internationally recognised borders.”408 
 
Even without Koštunica and the DSS campaign, the US and US-led NATO were already 
unpopular in Serbia. As of December 2008, public opinion research suggested, only 28 
per cent of those polled were in favour of NATO membership for Serbia, as opposed to 
55 per cent against membership, and 18 per cent who declined to share their view.409 
Ultimately, this anti-NATO campaign was a success for the DSS, who forced the DS to 
vote for a parliamentary resolution in 2007 entitled “Resolution of the National Assembly 
on the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the 
Republic of Serbia.”410 This resolution became the benchmark of Serbian military 
neutrality and its lack of interest in joining NATO. 
 
The adoption of this resolution was a watershed for Serbia. It cemented a reality in which 
no politician or political party could afford domestically to advocate for Serbian 
membership of NATO. The fact that the US is the key power behind both NATO and 
Kosovo’s independence meant that every Serbian government had to manage its relations 
with the US carefully. The representatives of both DS and DSS gave interviews to the 
author explaining the logic that led to the adoption of this declaration, tracing it in Serbian 
history. 
 
Dragoljub Mićunović established an emotional and historical link that Serbs have towards 
the concept of neutrality, as Serbia first balanced among the great European powers in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and then during the Cold War as Yugoslavia 
between two superpowers. As Mićunović stated: “There has always been the ideal of 
neutrality, and that way we will be safe. … The NATO bombing generated negative 
 
408 ‘Koštunica: NATO bombed to create own state’, B92, 24 March 2008, 
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=03&dd=24&nav_id=48748, accessed 27-
11-2018 
409 Dragan Đukanović and Ivona Lađevac, ‘Prioriteti spoljnopolitičke strategije Republike Srbije (The 
Priorities of Foreign Policy Strategy of Republic of Serbia)’, Međunarodni problemi, Vol.61, No.3, 2009, 
p.350 
410 ‘Resolution of the National Assembly on the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia’, The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 26 




emotional elements regarding NATO and by extension to the West in entirety. After the 
fall of Milošević, the country returned among other nations of the world as it was 
exempted, under sanctions, excluded from all international organisations, including the 
UN. However, the key question was NATO. It was very complicated for the country after 
the bombing, to decide to join NATO through a referendum. To avoid that, Koštunica, 
and Tadić later on, took an already-tested weapon in their hands - neutrality - to avoid 
entry into NATO.”411 
 
Slobodan Samardžić noted a similar logic, despite being on the opposite side of the 
political aisle: “Every government takes care of the state of the spirit within the country. 
It is normal. It listens to the people, public opinion, its citizenry. … Why did this bear 
fruit in Serbia? … It is a reflection of the country’s position, which calculates in the 
following fashion: ’If I lean 100 per cent to one side, I will experience damage from the 
other side.’ That is very accurate, and it is felt intuitively. It is a consequence of two 
simple things. The first is the geographical position between the East and the West; 
second is the need for independent governance of national political life, which in the 
Balkans is most strongly pronounced with the Serbs, and the Greeks to a certain 
extent.”412 Serbian political parties saw the concept of neutrality and a balancing act as a 
way to please the emotional proclivities of Serbian voters, and remain competitive. 
 
The frequent display of anti-Americanism in Serbian public opinion became a powerful 
domestic force in relations between Serbia and the US, affecting Serbian policy towards 
the US to this very day. As the Serbian Ambassador said: “In February 2008 the 
recognition of Kosovo happened, and at that point, some form of dominant and open anti-
Americanism started to develop in Serbia. That type of anti-Americanism did not exist 
even during the days of bombing. If you look at the media, the media stance towards 
Americans from that period is not that type of hostility. There is not that much of a 
passionate hostility. In 2008, this relationship got a new dimension that was much deeper 
than ever before.”413 
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The biggest drama involving the US presence in Serbia clearly showed how US-Serbian 
relations became impaired by the Kosovo situation. Right after the rally of 21 February 
2008, organised by the DSS and SRS against Kosovo’s independence, major riots erupted 
in Belgrade’s centre, resulting in attacks on foreign embassies and looting of local shops. 
Among the attacked embassies, the US embassy was set on fire. While no US personnel 
were injured, one Serbian protestor died in the embassy by accident.414 
 
During this period, for Serbian political parties’ relations with the US also became part 
of the kingmaker game. In that context, while Serbian political parties and their leaders 
take into account displays of anti-American or anti-NATO sentiments, they are also aware 
of power relations. The Serbian political elite and their parties were aware that they must 
have US blessing to win power. The DSS and Koštunica attracted US hostility, 
particularly of the branch of the US government that was spearheading the Serbian policy, 
the State Department. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs said: “The role of 
some of Serbia’s leaders in the mob violence against our Embassy and other Embassies 
in Belgrade is not clear and may never be. But beyond doubt, some Serbian leaders incited 
the population with nationalist rhetoric, creating the environment of hostility that led 
directly to the attack.”415 
 
The way the US got its revenge on Koštunica, speaks again to how there is an interplay 
between domestic party competition and great power politics. US Ambassador Munter 
set his sights on Koštunica as he was “going to ensure the prime minister was gone”, and 
that “the best revenge was making sure this guy lost the next election,”416 Munter arranged 
for Dačić to meet Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the Spanish prime minister at the time, 
and George Papandreou, the future Greek prime minister, who was at the time leading the 
Socialist International. As Munter said: “We didn’t pay him off; we just persuaded him. 
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What he really wanted was international legitimacy. … They [Zapatero and Papandreou] 
told him they would let him in if he joined the pro-European forces, and he did. He put a 
knife in Koštunica’s back.”417 As Dačić’s case shows, for a political party to win power 
in Belgrade, it must make sure to have the acquiescent support of both the EU and the 
US. 
 
During the entire DS era, having a coherent policy towards the US was impossible for 
Serbia due to domestic impediments. They were particularly acute during Biden’s 2009 
visit to Belgrade as MPs from the SRS came up with banners to the parliament shouting: 
“Biden, you Nazi scum, go home.”418 Some would call this a minor episode, but it 
demonstrated the reality in place in 2009 and to this very day. That reality is that the 
negative connotations regarding the US, particularly on Kosovo, affect Serbia’s 
relationship with the US, despite the clear strategic imperative for Serbia to try to improve 
its relations with the US. 
 
Domestic considerations tampering with systemic imperatives turned out to be fatal for 
Tadić and his government’s relationship with the US. This process manifested itself 
during Tadić’s decision not to attend the summit of Eastern European countries in 
Warsaw with Barack Obama due to the presence of Kosovo’s President Jahjaga. Tadić’s 
associate said: “The moment Tadić refused to go to Poland and participate with Jahjaga 
on an equal footing, they [the US] have said: Ahem, so he does not want to resolve the 
Kosovo issue. … In August 2011 right after Mladić’s arrest and with our elections coming 
in spring 2012, absolutely no one in their right mind could expect from Tadić that he will 
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The new US Ambassador in Serbia Mary Warlick appealed to Dragoljub Mićunović to 
change Tadić’s mind, as Obama was meant to meet Tadić and not Jahjaga.420 Mićunović 
had a vivid dialogue with Tadić on the issue: 
 
Mićunović: “Boris, can it be that you refused an arranged meeting with Obama, as the US 
Ambassador just told me?” 
 
Tadić: “You saw what noise they [the opposition] raised after I allegedly at some airport 
greeted Thaçi [Hashim Thaçi, Kosovo’s PM]. Now, I am supposed to go to a celebration 
as an equal guest with Jahjaga, at the celebration of a country [Poland] that recognised 
Kosovo.” 
 
Mićunović: “You do not have to greet her. You will only greet the host at the entrance 
and then sit at the other side of the table if it matters to you. What is important here is that 
you will meet and talk with the US President.” 
 
Tadić: “I am not going alongside Jahjaga. We spoke. Vuk Jeremić and his cabinet. 
Ratković [Tadić’s foreign policy adviser] and some other folks. We decided. There will 
be some other opportunity to meet Obama by myself.” 
 
Mićunović: “After refusing to meet the US President, there will not be another 
opportunity. You will be lucky if they grant you a tourist visa. … I do not envy you for 
your foreign policy team and the results you will soon see.”421 
 
This was a decisive moment as the US, the world’s leading power, no longer perceived 
Tadić and the DS as reliable partners that they could bet on in Serbia. It was clear that 
Tadić was acting on domestic considerations, as he wanted to avoid being labelled as a 
traitor by the opposition. In doing so, Tadić violated the systemic logic of power relations 
and missed an opportunity that his country desperately needed. As a result, Tadić was 
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punished by the international system. Until the end of his time in office in 2012, Tadić 
was no longer deemed a reliable and acceptable interlocutor by the US. 
 
5.4 Serbia and Russia 
 
On a systemic level, Serbo-Russian relations were shaped by Kosovo’s independence and 
the regional power vacuum. In that geopolitical context, a Russia that had better power 
capabilities than in the 1990s and following its ambitions used the opening to assert itself 
in Serbia. Serbia, dependent on Russian support on Kosovo issue, and without a viable 
option of EU membership became engaged in a frequently incoherent policy of balancing 
among various external powers, in this case, the Western powers and Russia. 
 
On a domestic level, party politics again played a major role. The Kosovo dispute 
splintered the Serbian party scenery and altered Serbian public opinion. As a result, every 
Serbian political party, even those who are ideologically pro-European, had to rely on 
Russia to oppose Kosovo’s independence to avoid domestic backlash. On top of that, the 
rise in pro-Russian sentiment in Serbian public opinion has forced Serbian politicians to 
readjust their foreign policy. Balancing was a way for Serbian political leaders and their 
parties to win both pro-Russian and pro-Western Serbian voters. 
 
5.4.1 Systemic Factors 
 
In 2008, Russia seized the opportunity to return to the Balkans by establishing a 
partnership with Serbia. Kosovo’s independence and the lack of Western dedication to 
the Balkans were systemic factors that created a window of opportunity for Moscow. As 
Kosovo started to slide towards independence, Russia seized the opportunity. 
 
By supporting the Serbian case on Kosovo, Russia found a suitable way to assert itself as 
a rival to the West by proclaiming itself as a defender of traditional international law 
based on state sovereignty, as opposed to the West who backed Kosovo’s 
independence.422 Russia applied a substantial degree of pragmatism in doing so. In 
 




January 2008, a month before Kosovo declared independence, Dmitrii Rogozin, Russia’s 
Permanent Representative to NATO said to a Serbian journalist: “The withdrawal of our 
troops from Kosovo was a correct move, and I believe they must not return. We are 
defending not Serbia, but international law. The Serbs must defend themselves.”423  
 
As Russia was a permanent member of the UN Security Council that did not recognise 
Kosovo’s independence, Russia became a more important factor in Serbian foreign policy 
than in the past.424 With Kosovo’s independence, Russia became a more prominent player 
in Serbia and the Balkans. In achieving this end, Russia had “three pillars of influence” 
at its disposal that it continues to utilise to this very day: membership in the Security 
Council; historical ties; and industry ties, most frequently manifested in the energy 
domain.425 
 
More importantly, Russia was more than prepared to use its right to veto in the Security 
Council. Since 2007 Russia has openly threatened to veto any voting in the Security 
Council that implies Kosovo’s independence. Dušan Spasojević said in 2015 that the 
Russian threat to use the veto surprised everybody, including the West and Serbia itself.426 
As such, the Serbian balancing act is dependent on this systemic great power behaviour. 
 
Through the Kosovo dispute, Russia reasserted itself in the Balkans, in Europe and 
globally, after a period of the humiliation in the 1990s. Some seasoned observers from 
the US side were expecting back in 2007 that the Kosovo issue could become another 
divisive issue on the agenda of US-Russia relations.427 As Russia continually insisted that 
it would not agree to any solution that is not the result of Serbo-Albanian agreement, 
Russia found itself in a situation where any option that led to Kosovo’s independence is 
a humiliation for Russia.428 
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Maxim Samorukov provided his account: “Russia in 2008 was ready to recognise 
Kosovo, provided that it will be asked about it and second, given at least some hint that a 
similar precedent will work in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at that time.…But 
Russia was not consulted. The West believed it could carry on with the issue without 
Russian support and now for Russia, it is a matter of honour to prove that your unilateral 
project has failed. It does not matter if it is Kosovo, or if it is in the Balkans, or the Middle 
East or anywhere else. It was a blatant unilateral intervention of the West, and Russia 
disapproves of that and wants to prove that ’No, you failed‘, and it is far more important 
than Serbia or Kosovo for Russia.”429 
 
Russia very soon upped the ante when it invoked Kosovo as a precedent in its dispute 
with Georgia. Russia had been for a very long time in dispute with Georgia over its two 
de facto breakaway provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During 2007 and 2008 the 
disagreement became even more heated over Georgian NATO membership aspirations. 
When Russia intervened against Georgia, it justified its actions on the ground of 
protecting its citizens living abroad similarly to NATO’s justification of intervention 
against Yugoslavia in 1999. When it sponsored the independence of the two provinces, it 
utilised the same rhetoric that the West employed to justify Kosovo’s independence that 
the interested state lost the right to govern the territory.430  
 
Putin’s strategic calculus was strong from the moment Russia got involved with the 
Kosovo dispute. As Dimitar Bechev explained: “In the event that Kosovo remained part 
of Serbia, Russia would score a diplomatic victory. But should the West refuse to back 
down, Moscow was ready to harness the precedent and make the most of it. … It had the 
best of both worlds: donning the mantle of champion of international law without tying 
its own hands or foregoing opportunities.”431 An interviewee told the author: “When the 
Russians firmly decided to stand on the Serbian side on Kosovo, it was the least emotional 
decision … Moscow wanted to tell Washington: You cannot do whatever you want. … 
Wherever you start behaving that way, I will send you a message that I exist.”432 
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One contact believed that the logic of frozen conflict had been the main reason for Russia 
to become involved with Serbia: “I think that what can be the motivation is to trade with 
the West in terms of frozen conflicts: we will make ourselves so relevant that no frozen 
conflict in the Balkans will be resolved without us. So, if you want to resolve them, that 
is fine, but then you will have to recognise some of our other frozen conflicts that are 
outside of the Balkans in a way that will be beneficial for Russia.”433 Dimitar Bechev had 
a similar view: “What Russia really cares about it is not the Balkans, it is Russia itself 
first of all, but also the post-Soviet space and in the mid-2000s there was a moment in 
Putin’s second term when we had coloured revolutions and also the prospect of NATO 
expansion to Ukraine and Georgia. So, that was seen as a priority, and of course, if you 
are Putin you want to balance, you want to push back, to counteract. The prime example 
being the war in Georgia, but you have other ways to assert your interest and to balance 
the West, and clearly the engagement in the Balkans comes in that rubric.”434 
 
A major milestone has been the moment Gazprom Neft acquired 51 per cent of shares in 
Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS), the Serbian oil supply company, below what many 
people thought was the fair market price. The deal was negotiated in 2008 and 
implemented in 2009, and through this deal Russia gained a strong energy foothold in 
Serbia. For Dragan Šutanovac: “From that moment on, Russian influence in Serbia 
spreads.”435 In 2008 Serbia received a Western investment in the form of Fiat and the 
Russian investment, in the acquisition of NIS. These two investments became “the 
symbols of balancing.”436 In return, Russia provided a legally non-binding guarantee that 
the South Stream gas pipeline would go through Serbia. 
 
Many have interpreted this as a pay-off for Russia’s support on Kosovo. Tadić, who took 
part in the arrangement publicly, acknowledged that it was based not solely on energy, 
but on political calculation as well: “One should not forget the political context, as Russia 
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has advocated Serbian interests over Kosovo in the UN Security Council.”437 Dmitry 
Medvedev, who was not yet elected as a Russian President (2008-2012) when the contract 
on NIS acquisition was signed, stated something similar, as he said that the deal is “in 
essence” “an element of moral and economic support for Serbia.”438 
 
Not all of the interviewed observers were pleased with this transaction. A former member 
of G17 Plus that opposed the sale of NIS to Russia was very adamant: “We made a grave 
mistake as we gave our entire energy system, apart from electricity, into Russian hands, 
by selling NIS at a ridiculous price, through a direct bargain without a tender, without an 
auction, without competition and any guarantee for the construction of South Stream. 
Nevertheless, without guarantee, we gave our entire oil industry and oil fields in Serbia 
and Angola to the Russians, and now we are absolutely energy dependent on Russia and 
the Russian gas. … OK, have we retrieved Kosovo? Have we defended Kosovo and did 
we get the South Stream? Neither one of the two.”439 It is worth noting that one of the 
interviewees claimed that the DS expected that a Western buyer would make a bid for 
NIS, which never happened. That occurrence alongside the American disbelief that 
Russia would put a veto on Kosovo in the Security Council was considered a lack of 
“strategic vision by the West”, from which Russia profited.440 
 
The new Serbian government quickly put Russia formally on the list of Serbian foreign 
policy priorities. In his keynote address, Mirko Cvetković stated that the desire to join the 
EU does not go against good relations with countries like Russia while pledging to 
continue cooperating with Russia on the Kosovo issue and to ratify the gas arrangement 
with Russia.441 Tadić’s famous August 2009 statement on Russia being one of the “four 
pillars” of Serbian foreign policy has already been mentioned. This statement was new in 
a sense that it also included China. However, a couple of months earlier, in January 2009 
Tadić talked about “three pillars” of Serbian foreign policy where Russia was involved. 
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During the ambassadorial conference where Tadić met Serbian ambassadors accredited 
abroad in January 2009, Tadić stressed what he thought were Serbian foreign policy 
vectors with much self-confidence. As Tadić said: “In that context, I underscored once 
again that Serbia has three pillars of its foreign policy. These are the EU, Russia and the 
US, and without deepening the relations with the EU, Russia and the US, we cannot 
realise our vital national interests.”442 
 
However, it would be misleading if the Serbian balancing act were to be reduced solely 
to Kosovo. There has been a systemic logic behind Serbian behaviour as explained by 
Tadić in 2009 when he put Russia as one of “four pillars” of Serbian foreign policy.443 
On that same occasion, Tadić identified the dominance of the US, the formation of the 
EU and its common currency, and ultimately the financial crisis of 2008 that revealed 
China’s trajectory to global economic leadership, as the fundamental changes of recent 
times. However, Russia was also mentioned within that same context, as Tadić stressed 
that “in the meantime, Russia renewed its economic and foreign policy potential before 
the world economic crisis, with high oil and natural gas prices. ”444 
 
Filip Ejdus confirmed that Serbian perception of the shift in global balance of power and 
the fact that relations between Russia and the West were becoming more tense played a 
part: “I do think that this factors in, that this is an important element because people make 
their choices also on the basis of the real or perceived international dynamics, and since 
2008 we obviously have the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West. We 
have the Georgian War.”445 Some of the interviewed observers believed that Putin’s 
famous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference was a particularly indicative 
moment, when it became evident that Russia was back on the international scene and that 
its relations with the West were becoming adversarial.446 
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Based on these statements and evidence, the notion of Russia having a stronger position 
within the international system and that the power distribution does not put Russian in a 
disadvantaged position as in the 1990s also propelled the Serbian balancing act. There 
was a systemic option and systemic temptation that emerged in Serbian policy 
considerations with the recovery of Russian power capabilities under Putin. 
 
Dimitar Bechev described this dynamic of the Kosovo issue and power shift that propelled 
the Serbian balancing act. As Bechev wrote: “Russia chose to push back against the West 
and assert the principle of territorial integrity; Serbia, for its part, rediscovered a 
growingly powerful ally to aid its cause. However, this has not grown into a patron-client 
relationship. Successive governments in Belgrade have pursued a policy of balance 
between Russia and the West in order to clinch the best deal either might offer. ”447 Jelica 
Kurjak said something similar: “We [Serbia], I will not say that we acted naively, but it 
does appear that we have tried a well-tested pattern, that it is best to be on good terms 
with everybody. To cooperate with everybody, to work in parallel with everybody, while 
at the same time keeping in mind who is more inclined towards you, and who is less 
inclined.”448 
 
The new partnership became more than evident. In October 2009, Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev visited Belgrade to meet with Tadić and the remaining Serbian 
leadership. The two covered a broad set of issues, but Kosovo and energy dominated the 
agenda, as these became the two essential issues in the relationship. Russia expressed its 
support on the Kosovo issue, while the two sides signed a protocol on the Serbian section 
of the South Stream pipeline, a gas pipeline project that is now defunct.449 
 
The Russians also became more emboldened with their standing in Serbia, realising that 
with the unresolved Kosovo dispute, the lack of interest by the West, and their growing 
popularity in Serbian public opinion gave them significant leverage over Serbia. In April 
2009, Russian Ambassador to Serbia Aleksandr Konuzin was doubtless aware of this 
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reality of asymmetric partnership when he stated that Russia is a strategic partner for 
Serbia, but not the other way around.450 Russia was willing to use this leverage to push 
for its agenda of decoupling Serbia from Western institutions, primarily away from 
NATO, as earlier Konuzin had warned Serbia that it must be aware of its formal military 
neutrality.451 During this period, the Russian side would frequently underline that it is not 
opposed to a Serbian policy of European integration. This stance was driven in part by a 
sense of realism that Serbia is more intertwined with European capitals, and the long-
term Russian calculation that Serbian membership in the EU would provide Russia with 
an ally in the EU ranks. In a lecture that Konuzin gave at the Belgrade-based Institute for 
International Politics and Economics in May 2009, he stated: “Relations between Russia 
and Serbia on one side, and Serbia and the EU on the other side, are not an alternative … 
We [Russia] have nothing against Serbia’s European perspective.”452 In this same speech, 
Konuzin applied something of a win-win logic in describing the triangle Serbia-EU-
Russia, as he emphasised that Serbia is for “maintaining the best relationship with Russia” 
and that “ties with old friends should not be spoiled because of new friends.” 
 
On top of that, as Serbia felt the lack of Western interest, it became more inclined to 
explore if it can use the Russian card as a form of leverage with the Western players. In 
the capacity of Serbian Defence Minister, Dragan Šutanovac said in an interview with the 
French newspaper “Le Figaro”: “If the European Union does not accept us quickly, we 
will have to do business with the Russians. And if Europe does not open its doors to see 
who we really are, we will find other solutions with Russia.”453 Šutanovac reflected on 
his interview: “With that interview I tried, and I somewhat succeeded, in turning on the 
alarms with our Western friends. Why did I do it? Because I was considered a man who 
was absolutely in favour of European and security integration. … I said that at the time 
to the journalist that Serbia was firmly dedicated to European integration. … However, I 
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also said that Europe must have an understanding of this region.”454 Russia was becoming 
more assertive as it sensed the vacuum caused by the lack of adequate Western and 
European devotion to Serbia, and Serbia finding itself on the Western periphery, started 
to use Russia as leverage with the West. As European integration stagnated, Serbian 
partnership with Russia gets stronger and so does the appeal of the Russian political 
model and Russia-friendly political players.455 This has been a political and strategic 
reality which remains in place to this very day. 
 
Russia had continuity in its policy. The ICJ’s ruling on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence changed neither Russia’s stance nor its policy towards Serbia and the 
Balkans. When the ICJ came out with its decision, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a 
statement that it will continue to oppose Kosovo’s quest for recognition internationally. 
Russia justified its position on the grounds that the ICJ discussed the declaration and not 
Kosovo’s right to international recognition.456 When Serbia, in the end, agreed to transfer 
the responsibility for the Kosovo issue from the UN to the EU Russia was sidelined, at 
least when it comes to Kosovo dispute.457 
 
Russia did score other points in Serbia. In October 2011, Ivica Dačić signed with Russian 
Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu in the city of Niš, Serbia, an agreement on 
the establishment of a humanitarian centre for emergency response in Niš, which is 100 
km from the border with Kosovo.458 During Medvedev’s 2009 visit to Serbia, an initial 
agreement on the centre’s establishment was achieved. More importantly, the centre’s 
establishment happened only days after the European Commission blocked Serbia’s EU 
accession.459 However, when a journalist asked if the centre can be turned into a military 
installation, Dačić said that “Nobody has the right to give us lessons about whom we will 
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cooperate with, this is an independent country”, while Shoigu denounced the point of a 
military base as “pure fabrication.”460 This episode shows how Serbia uses Russia to 
hedge and leverage vis-à-vis the EU and the West whenever it feels its EU path is blocked, 
while avoiding full entanglement. 
 
One can see how deeper the Russian footprint became. In the 2011 keynote speech by 
Mirko Cvetković, Russia is being put on an equal footing with US and China in terms of 
priority ranking, which made a significant difference compared to the 2008 keynote that 
listed the US as a priority.461 As an illustration during his March 2012 visit to Moscow, 
Jeremić, in front of his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, called Russia Serbia’s closest 
ally and partner. During that visit, Jeremić issued a statement that demonstrated how up 
to that point the balancing act became an integral part of Serbian foreign policy behaviour: 
“There will be no changes in the Serbia-Russia relations following the achievement of 
the candidacy. The EU integration process was and will remain one of the priorities of 
the Serbian government, and Russia was and is our friend. This friendship requires no 
candidacy.”462 The systemic foundation for Serbian policy towards Russia was set during 
this period, and it remains in force to this day. 
 
5.4.2 Domestic Factors 
 
Between 2008 and 2012-party dynamics were a powerful determinant in Serbo-Russian 
relations, and this reality persists even now. The party dynamics and its spillover on 
Serbian policy emerged from the salience of the Kosovo dispute in the Serbian domestic 
arena and Russia’s growing popularity in Serbian public opinion. 
 
One could see how the Kosovo issue opened up the door for Russia during the February 
2008 rally organised by the DSS and SRS. During the rally, the crowd chanted Russia 
powerfully and cheered at every mention of Putin’s name, particularly when Koštunica 
said that Serbia is not alone, and when he complimented Putin’s friendship and principled 
 
460 Ibid. 
461 ‘Is There a Will for Strategically Orienting Serbian Foreign Policy’, p.16 
462 ‘FM Jeremić: Russia is Serbia’s closest ally’, B92, 16 March 2012, 





policy.463 In March, a Russian state media reporter who covered the riots in Belgrade 
called the late Zoran Đinđić a “Western puppet”, who “deserved the bullet.” This same 
reporter also took Boris Tadić in his crosshairs: “This Serbia voted for Tadić, who, on a 
day of national mourning, had nothing better to do than travel to Romania. And after all, 
it is possible to come up with a thousand excuses as to why nothing is being done, but in 
the end, it’s all really very simple: either you stand up or are submissive and quiet.”464 
The Serbian Embassy in Moscow made a formal protest with Russia. However, it was 
evident that Russia saw that the emergence of a new Kosovo dispute alongside the rising 
nationalist and pro-Russian sentiment in the Serbian public gave Russia new 
opportunities to exercise influence in Serbia and the Balkans. From the Serbian side, it 
became apparent that there is both a need to rely on Russia internationally on Kosovo, 
and that Russia has developed strong popularity among the Serbian population, which 
became part of foreign policy considerations in Belgrade. One can see a strong 
intersection between the systemic and domestic factors at play. The Kosovo dispute is 
systemic, while the need to indulge pro-Russian sentiments is the domestic factor. 
 
Ivo Visković confirmed that Serbian politicians since 2008 “are trying to please both of 
the two parts of public opinion, because one part of the public opinion is more inclined 
towards the West, primarily to the EU, less to the US, and the second one is more inclined 
to Russia. … One could see at that moment that it was difficult to explain to the public 
that we can have an intensive policy with the West while denying that status to Russia 
and China. In that set of unpleasant circumstances, an attempt was made to partially show 
the public that we have not abandoned either Russia nor China as friends and partners.”465 
Another source added: “I think their knowledge of their populus determines them 
[Serbian politicians]. They are not doing it because it is their theoretical combination or 
because they came up with it as a solution or a concept to offer their people. They do it 
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because they have to. That is a feeling in the people, and that feeling various politicians 
handle differently, but it is the fundus. The one you cannot change.”466 
 
As the Serbian political elite and the parties they represented could not afford to have soft 
policies on Kosovo out of fear that the electorate and opposing parties will trump them, 
Serbia was dependent on Russian support. Russia has used the Kosovo issue to embed 
itself further in Serbia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. As Dušan Spasojević 
recalled of that period, at the 2015 LSE event, Russia “did not exist as a factor in Serbian 
politics”, until the Kosovo issue became acute for Belgrade. Spasojević described that “It 
was the West which pushed us to Russia then” as Russia used a breakdown in Serbian 
relations with the West. Spasojević also noted that it was hard to explain to the Serbian 
public how the West imposed independent Kosovo, as the dominant view was that post-
Milošević governments would receive better treatment from the West.467 
 
The party composition of the new Serbian government also played into Russia’s hands. 
The DS needed Russia to oppose Kosovo’s independence. It wanted to avoid being 
attacked domestically by nationalists and conservatives and win votes of both pro-
European and pro-Russian voters. The SPS, as a member of the ruling coalition, also 
helped Russia. In Mirko Cvetković’s Government, two SPS members were given high 
positions related to the energy sector where Russia, due to purchase of NIS, was an 
important factor. The first was Petar Škundrić, Minister of Energy and Mining from 2008 
to 2011, and the second was Dušan Bajatović, who became the general director of 
Srbijagas, the state-owned natural gas provider, a position he still holds. 
 
Dragoljub Mićunović explained an even deeper link between the SPS and Russia: “There 
is the SPS, always a minor coalition partner, but that constantly tries to nourish that link 
with Russia, and there is the fact that Russia granted asylum to the wife of the late 
Slobodan Milošević, and many important entrepreneurs who were on criminal 
prosecution lists and who found sanctuary in Russia, along with some generals, including 
the former defence minister Kadijević, and many others. So, the political representatives 
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of SPS perceived Russia as a form of haven, and they want to present themselves as 
Russia’s main representatives, protégés.”468 Indeed, the SPS and Ivica Dačić during the 
entire term of the DS government maintained “discreet parallel contacts with 
Moscow.”469 
 
The Serbian government always tried to use the emotional appeal of Russia when 
interacting with Russian counterparts. This emotional appeal for the Serbian public was 
present during Medvedev’s 2009 visit as it was on 20 October, a holiday dedicated to 
Belgrade’s liberation from the Nazi occupation in World War II, and honouring of the 
date was on full display.470 When the Kosovo dispute was moved away from UN auspice, 
one would have expected that Russian influence in Serbia would decrease. However, 
Russia still influenced Serbia, as it played on the Serbian elites who were courting Russia 
to boost their domestic credentials. The straightforward demonstration of this came in 
March 2011, when Vladimir Putin, then Russian PM came to Belgrade. The issues of the 
bilateral agenda were the popular topics of Kosovo and the gas pipeline project.471  
However, the content of the talk was not the most striking element of Putin’s visit, but it 
was domestic, as the popularity of Russia and Putin in Serbia was on full display during 
this visit. While in Belgrade, Putin was awarded the highest distinction of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church.472 
 
An even more powerful image came as Putin attended a friendly football game between 
the Serbian club Red Star Belgrade and Zenit St Petersburg, from Putin’s hometown. 
During the game, Red Star’s fans chanted “Putin, you Serb, Serbia is with you.”473 It 
became clear that Russia became important for the domestic public relations image of 
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Serbian politicians and their parties, which affects Belgrade’s relationship with Moscow. 
Nevertheless, this relationship was never transformed into a comprehensive partnership, 
as: “Tadić had a very decent, professional relationship with Putin. They had numerous 
meetings that were never particularly cordial, as they were not great friends, but one could 
see that Serbia completely normally and closely cooperates with Russia in their mutual 
interest.”474 
 
Dragoljub Mićunović, in his memoirs, describes one such episode, which has escaped the 
attention of most of the authors and interviewees consulted within this study. In 2010, a 
delegation from the Russian Duma visiting Belgrade insisted on meeting with Mićunović, 
as a chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee in the Serbian Parliament. During the 
talks, the Russians side insisted on hearing Mićunović’s opinion on the Russian invitation 
to Serbia to become an associated member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO). Mićunović replied: “I admit, it is unclear to me, how is our security 
guaranteed when Serbia does not border any of the mentioned states (CSTO members). 
By the time help would arrive from Uzbekistan, we would be no more since we are 
surrounded by countries that are all in another security organisation, called NATO.”475 
 
The Russia-friendly SPS, the SRS and the DSS wanted Serbia to join the CSTO.476 This 
initiative got blocked in the Foreign Policy Committee, led by the DS majority, despite 
some voices from the government in favour.477 The case involving the CSTO and the 
instance of Dačić with Shoigu signing an agreement on the establishment of a 
humanitarian centre shows how Serbian elites like to court Russia both as a form of 
investing in the relationship with Moscow, and as a way of boosting their domestic 
patriotic credentials. 
 
Serbia became so entrenched in its balancing act because Russia became a significant 
factor of Serbian domestic politics and domestic considerations that guided the Serbian 
political leadership and foreign policy elite. A good illustration came in August 2011 
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when public opinion polls showed that 33 per cent of Serbs believed that Russia is the 
biggest donor of aid to Serbia, even though it was the EU, which provided 48.7 per cent 
of international aid to Serbia as opposed to Russia which provided less than 0.03 per 
cent.478 
 
That speaks of how widely dispersed the pro-Russian emotions became within Serbian 
public opinion and the electorate. As a result, no political leader or party could afford to 
alienate pro-Russian voters out of fear they might give their votes to the opposing political 
parties.479 It also shows that the Russian factor became a tool in internal political 
competitions between Serbian political elites and political parties, resulting in a powerful 
domestic variable contributing to the Serbian balancing act. Although the Kosovo dispute 
was out of the remit of the UN, Russia has already gained a significant foothold in 
Belgrade’s foreign policy considerations. The party politics and domestic concerns 




The period between 2008 and 2012 in Serbian foreign policy was based on two systemic 
realities that continue to shape Serbian foreign policy to this very day: Kosovo’s 
independence and the power vacuum caused by the lack of adequate presence by Western 
players. 
 
There is no doubt that Kosovo’s independence had the most potent effect on Serbian 
foreign policy behaviour, but it is primarily an occurrence imposed on Serbia by the 
international system. That occurrence was also part of the broader pattern of a power 
vacuum that came full circle with the global financial crisis. As the EU could not invest 
adequate efforts into integrating the Balkans, a new permissive environment emerged. In 
that environment an opportunistic Russia that was engaged in its rivalry with Western 
powers seized the opportunity. Serbia was left trying to maximise gains by striking a 
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balance between Russia and the West. In trying to do so, the DS government tried to run 
an overly ambitious and incoherent policy that ultimately failed. 
 
Domestically, the DS-led government tried to avoid internal backlashes while attempting 
to score points in the domestic arena, constituting a big part of the domestic dynamic that 
contributed to the Serbian balancing act. At that time, Serbian leadership tried to avoid 
domestic attacks from the opposition on the Kosovo issue, thus tying itself to Russia. 
Moreover, the domestic public opinion became divided into pro-Russian and pro-Western 
camps. To stay competitive in the domestic political arena, the DS played the Russian 
card to try to keep the votes of both the EU and pro-Russian voters, and prevent the latter 
from giving votes to another party. However, as Vladimir Međak told the author: “The 
DS, actually, only suffered damage in that balancing because their electoral body was not 
the pro-Russian one. In that segment, the balancing was a necessity just like it is today. 
Necessity because of Kosovo and the need for Russia to block Kosovo in the UN, but 
from that balancing the DS only suffered damage.”480 The international system has 
demonstrated that it will still trump any foreign policy solely based on indulging domestic 
impulses. In 2012 a new Serbian government was in office, and it was up to this 
government to try and reformulate Serbian foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER VI: THE QUIET BEFORE THE STORM - THE SERBIAN 




This chapter will cover the period between 2012 and 2014, and will analyse the policies 
conducted by the new Serbian government, formed after Boris Tadić, and the DS lost the 
2012 presidential elections to Tomislav Nikolić, the candidate from the conservative, 
Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). This government was led by Ivica Dačić who became 
the Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, and Aleksandar Vučić from the SNS became 
the Minister of Defence and the First Deputy Prime Minister. Even though former 
nationalists led the new government, they still launched unpopular policies, such as 
normalisation of relations with Kosovo, which the West warmly welcomed. Moreover, 
during this period, the West did not perceive Belgrade’s close ties with Moscow as 
threatening. 
 
The chapter’s title “The Quiet Before the Storm” refers to the brief period of relative 
tranquillity in Serbia’s balancing act between Russia and the West. This chapter shows 
that Serbia mostly maintained its formal policy of balancing, and that it was a period 
where it was easy to implement that policy both internationally and domestically. 
Therefore, this chapter lays out that there were underlying nuances to Serbia’s balancing 
act. Although the Kosovo dispute and the power vacuum remained important factors, 
there was no comprehensive rivalry between Russia and the West. Therefore, the 
balancing act could be pursued without much underlying risk. 
 
On a systemic level, the EU and the US greeted the new government as their new 
champion that started a dialogue on normalisation of relations with Kosovo. Moreover, 
the rivalry between Russia and the West was not as potent, leaving the Balkans and Serbia 
outside of broader geopolitical tensions, thus providing some systemic leeway for Serbia 
to conduct its balancing policy. The critical element of Serbia’s balancing act was simple, 
even though relations between Russia and the West were far from harmonious during this 




Crisis. Thus, the chapter provides the readers with an important contextual element of this 
study. 
 
On the domestic level, the new Serbian government, formed of former nationalists, faced 
fewer domestic hurdles as it could start a Kosovo dialogue and reduce Russia’s role. 
Serbian leadership at that time had no problem with its national political power, as it was 
not faced with major political hurdles domestically. Moreover, it was also a period in 
which the opposition was in turmoil. Serbia’s fragile multiparty democracy did not slide 
in an illiberal direction; this occurred when Vučić and the SNS consolidated their power 
later. This also contributed to the lack of domestic hurdles for the new government in 
Belgrade. In trying to explain the domestic sources of the Serbian balancing act, this 
chapter will also show the genesis of the SNS, as the party was born from the splintering 
of the nationalist SRS. While this process took part during the period described in the 
previous chapter, it makes more sense within this chapter’s narrative since it shows how 
Serbian political parties leverage foreign policy to win power. As it abandoned the 
nationalist ways of its SRS predecessor, the SNS acquired support from the EU and the 
US, which propelled the SNS to power in 2012. The support that the SNS gained from 
the US and the EU is one reason why the balancing act was tranquil during this period 
and why there were not that many turbulent events. 
 
Methodologically, this chapter does not deviate from the rest of the study. It relies on the 
same set of methods described within the other chapters: case study, process tracing and 
analytical narrative. This chapter uses not only secondary source material but also primary 
sources collected through fieldwork interviews. It is worth stressing that this chapter will 
be the briefest compared to the other two empirical chapters. The primary reason for this 
is technical, as this chapter covers the shortest period. Moreover, during the fieldwork, 
the sources interviewed were least elaborate in describing this period as a relative lack of 
contradictions marked the Serbian balancing act during that time. Nevertheless, for a firm 
empirical and contextual understanding of the Serbian balancing act, Serbian policy 






6.2 Serbia and the European Union 
 
The relationship between Serbia and the EU was determined on a systemic level by the 
Kosovo dispute. The EU took over primary responsibility for resolving the dispute, 
emerging as the principal great power. On a domestic level, the party competition played 
an influential role as the SNS leveraged its relationship with the EU to win power. The 
nationalist credentials of the SNS enabled it to run foreign policy without any significant 
domestic hurdles. 
 
6.2.1 Systemic Factors 
 
In systemic terms, the relations between Serbia and the EU during this period were 
dominated and shaped to a large extent by the Kosovo dispute. The EU was happy to 
embrace the new government that came about after Tadić’s electoral defeat, as the new 
government wanted to be more cooperative on the Kosovo dispute. For the EU this 
dispute was important, as the EU’s ambitions dictated that Brussels resolve one of the 
most pressing strategic and diplomatic issues in the region. 
 
The new policy on Kosovo was quickly put into motion by the new government. Tomislav 
Nikolić during his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2012 called for 
“direct negotiations on the highest political level, without the recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence.” As Nikolić stated: “We strongly desire that the talks be continued in good 
faith and with good intentions, taking into account, among other things, that it is important 
to keep the dynamics of the European integration of Serbia and of the Western Balkans 
as a whole in order to ensure progress and stability of the entire region in the long term. 
… At the same time, may I be clear: Serbia is not ready and cannot nor will it ever under 
any circumstances recognise, either explicitly or implicitly, the unilaterally declared 
independence of its southern province of Kosovo and Metohija.”481 
 
 






The EU quickly jumped on this opportunity to assert itself as the primary geopolitical 
player in Serbia and the Balkans by supporting Serbia-Kosovo talks and eventual EU 
membership for Serbia. On 30 October 2012, the High Representative of the EU for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, alongside the US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, visited Belgrade, showing full Western support to the new 
government.482 
 
Catherine Ashton ran the negotiating process that followed, which came to be known as 
the Brussels Dialogue. Throughout this process, Serbia and Kosovo were represented by 
Ivica Dačić, and Hashim Thaçi, Kosovo’s Prime Minister. The height of the honeymoon 
between Serbia and the EU was the signing of the so-called Brussels Agreement between 
Belgrade and Priština on 19 April 2013. Of many provisions of the Agreement, the most 
important one was the merger of the four Serb municipalities in the north (North 
Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić) into the Association of Serb 
Municipalities (ZSO), which would be subjected to Kosovo’s legislation.483 The local 
Serbian community could select local police commanders, and police’s composition 
needed to reflect the ethnic structure, with only Kosovo police being allowed to be 
stationed in the north.484 
 
Catherine Ashton complimented Dačić and Serbia: “The recommendations to open 
negotiations for EU membership with Serbia and to open negotiations for an SAA with 
Kosovo mark a decisive break with the past and a common step towards a European 
future. I would like to pay tribute to the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo for their courage 
and vision. I am honoured to have been able to contribute to this process.”485 On that same 
occasion Štefan Füle, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, 
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said: “Serbia and Kosovo have proved they can both focus on the future rather than 
staying entangled in the past. Our recommendations today are therefore clear: both Serbia 
and Kosovo deserve to move on decisively in their EU perspectives. This is good news 
for the people in Serbia and Kosovo, and in the whole region.”486 Slobodan Samardžić 
said that unlike the previous governments that were divided between Kosovo and 
remaining on the Western periphery, the government that came in 2012: “firmly decided 
in favour of the EU path no matter the cost, even at the cost of renouncing Kosovo”, 
alluding to the Brussels Agreement.487 
 
The relations with the EU were also productive within the domain of security policy, as 
Serbia cooperated with the EU in their Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 
May 2013, the Serbian Foreign Minister Ivan Mrkić told the Serbian parliament that the 
EU’s invitation to Serbia to participate in its Mali mission implied “closer cooperation 
and partnership” and “leads to closer relations” with the EU.488 The ultimate prize for 
Serbia and its government came about on 28 June 2013, when the European Council 
decided to open accession talks with Serbia in January of 2014 at the latest.489 During this 
brief period, it appeared that the EU was a strategic priority of Serbian foreign and 
security policy. 
 
6.2.2 Domestic Factors 
 
To understand the relationship between Serbia and the EU in the period between 2012 
and 2014, one must first understand the domestic circumstances in which the new 
government in Belgrade came about. During the period described in the previous chapter, 
a decisive event of recent Serbian political history took place. It explains a significant 
part of the domestic environment shaping Serbian foreign policy, and is particularly 
important in explaining present-day Serbia and its foreign policy conduct. Moreover, it 
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also shows the correlation between foreign policy and how political parties can leverage 
that same policy to increase their chances of winning within the Serbian political market. 
This decisive event was the split that happened in 2008 within the most dominant party 
of the anti-Western political bloc, the SRS. 
 
The EU became the main point of contestation between the formal party leader, Vojislav 
Šešelj, who from his jail cell at the ICTY still advocated for old nationalist policies, and 
Tomislav Nikolić who was leading the SRS in Šešelj’s absence. Nikolić saw Šešelj’s 
insistence on nationalistic fervour and the renunciation of the EU as an impediment to the 
SRS winning power. The conflict slowly started to simmer as Šešelj became suspicious 
of Nikolić due to his secret meetings with Boris Tadić and US diplomats. This resulted in 
Šešelj issuing in September 2008 an order to some of SRS’s MPs to condemn from the 
parliamentary floor any member of SRS who meets with Tadić in secret, which was a 
clear message to Nikolić.490 The decisive moment came that same month, showing that 
Nikolić was ready to change the game altogether. 
 
As the ruling majority led by the DS was getting prepared to ratify the SAA, Nikolić came 
out with a statement that the MP’s of SRS would vote in favour of ratification if an 
amendment gets adopted affirming Serbian commitment to treat Kosovo as its sovereign 
territory. Božidar Đelić, who was Deputy Prime Minister in charge of European 
integration, consulted with Nikolić in secret and asked the reasons for such a dramatic 
political shift. Nikolić’s response was: “I had enough of losing.”491 
 
Serbia’s case provides an example of how political parties use foreign policy to improve 
domestic political competitiveness by changing their foreign policy program, affecting 
the state’s foreign policy behaviour. Eventually, neither was the SRS amendment adopted 
nor did the SRS MPs vote for SAA ratification, as Šešelj prevailed within the SRS.492  
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The split within the SRS was now complete. Nikolić and Vučić split from the SRS, 
forming a new conservative political party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). 
 
The SNS parted ways with the extreme anti-EU rhetoric and with the radical nationalist 
positions of the 1990s. This split has been neatly described by the seasoned Balkan 
observer, Tim Judah: “As the years passed, though, the gap between formal party leader 
Šešelj’s take on reality - as viewed from the perspective of the 1990s and from his cell on 
the Dutch seaside - and Nikolić’s own became too great for Nikolić to bear. Irritated 
because the party’s vote was increasing, not thanks to Šešelj but in spite of him, and 
because Šešelj treated him like an errand boy, Nikolić decided in 2008 to quit. When he 
did so, he took most of the party leadership with him to found a new party, the Serbian 
Progressive Party.”493 
 
With this transformation, the SNS picked up a significant portion of SRS’s membership, 
cadre and voters. The formal consensus among the mainstream political parties in Serbia 
suddenly became more comprehensive as the SNS proclaimed Serbian membership in the 
EU as one of its policy goals. As one Serbian diplomat told the author: “For Serbia, the 
enlargement policy had only become absolutely acceptable and prevalent from 2008, 
when the breakdown and split in the Serbian Radical Party happened. The Serbian Radical 
Party was an enormous obstacle to adopting that policy within the political arena and the 
public. From that moment on with the creation of the Serbian Progressive Party, which 
accepted the EU and Serbia joining the EU, the policy of enlargement becomes an integral 
part of Serbian politics.”494 
 
Another Serbian diplomat told the author: “One thing has to be clear from the start. As 
far as the domestic circumstances are concerned, in practical terms, Serbia finally 
resolved its EU entry issue once and for all. As they would say in the West, it is no longer 
a divisive issue. As far as the Serbian domestic political scene goes, that happened when 
the SNS was formed. When Radicals lost power, weight and volume on the domestic 
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political scene, when that happened, Serbia in a way had come to terms with itself.”495 
This source also spoke of one occasion when a state official of a country where the source 
served as the Ambassador back in 2008, asked him about the situation in Serbia: “I said 
that the situation was never better, as an internal peace was achieved regardless of the 
chaos surrounding Kosovo. The internal peace has been achieved through the formation 
of a political party that no longer questions Brussels and the EU as our goal.” Ivan 
Vejvoda, a past adviser to several Serbian officials, said that the formation of the SNS 
speaks of what he calls “deep political sociology of Serbia”, in which a party has to 
embrace a pro-European course to win power.496 
 
Moreover, the SNS gained a mighty boost in the domestic arena, as it became more 
competitive domestically by being an acceptable political force for the EU. That way, 
although the DS took part in the formation of the SNS, it inadvertently created an even 
more powerful competitor for itself domestically that the SRS ever was, given that it could 
not scare Serbian voters with SRS’s anti-EU rhetoric anymore. Moreover, the EU was 
less willing to support Tadić and the DS as it was in 2008 because the SNS, as the new 
alternative to the DS, was perceived as less threatening by the EU than its nationalist 
predecessor, the SRS.497 Like the SPS in 2008, the SNS also showed how parties could 
cash in on foreign policy within the domestic arena, which paid off handsomely for the 
SNS when the new elections were held in 2012. 
 
On 6 May 2012, Serbia was in the full electoral cycle as the country was undergoing 
parliamentary and presidential elections, and local and provincial elections in the Serbian 
autonomous province of Vojvodina. In the parliamentary elections, one could see that 
Boris Tadić and the DS were on the defensive as the DS was second in the election behind 
SNS. It is also important to note that the SRS was below the electoral threshold for the 
first time, leaving it outside the parliament, but the most important fact was that the SPS 
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was third in the elections.498 Again neither the SNS nor the DS could form the ruling 
majority in the parliament without Dačić and the SPS’s backing. 
 
The political game had yet to be decided as Tadić and Nikolić were about to face off in 
the second round of presidential elections. Dačić was aware that he and his party were the 
biggest winners of the parliamentary elections as they were now in a position, as 
kingmakers, to name their price. Dačić named his price. After the parliamentary elections, 
Dačić said to the Serbian media in a very boastful and assertive fashion: “Maybe in Serbia 
we still do not know who will be the President, but we know for certain who is going to 
be the Prime-Minister.”499 
 
The second-round loss in the Presidential elections by Tadić and the DS to a controversial 
figure like Tomislav Nikolić was surprising at first. Still, the causes of the electoral loss 
were evident from the start. The reasons were related to economic hardship, which 
manifested itself in “24 per cent unemployment”, alongside the “political culture of 
cronyism and corruption, and accusations of authoritarianism”, the last one being the 
product of the fact that Tadić and DS dominated the political scenery.500 
 
The EU quickly accepted the new power brokers in Belgrade as they were ultimately 
disappointed with Tadić. The crisis between Serbia and the EU that started with Angela 
Merkel’s visit to Belgrade in August 2011, subsequently led to a situation where the EU 
and the US “benevolently greeted” Nikolić’s victory, expecting a “softer stance” on 
Kosovo and that the new government would “deliver.”501 As I was told: “The 
international community has written off Boris Tadić. The best example is the fact that the 
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European Commission congratulated Tomislav Nikolić for his win at 17:00, while the 
polls close at 20:00.”502 
 
However, waiting in the background of this entire process was the new political reality 
that was unfolding. Aleksandar Vučić was emerging as the most powerful political figure 
in the country, even though Serbia’s institutional and constitutional arrangements did not 
mandate that. On the contrary, Vučić would be expected to occupy position number four 
within the formal Serbian political hierarchy.503 By controlling the biggest political party, 
Vučić became “the modern Serbian version of Warwick the Kingmaker”, as the 
government’s survival in the parliament depended on the party under his control.504 
 
How did this come about? Firstly, Vučić outmanoeuvred Tomislav Nikolić, who under 
pressure from Vučić and the West resigned from his position as the president of the SNS. 
Despite being President of Serbia, Nikolić remained a lame-duck figure. What leverage 
Vučić and the West used to constrain Nikolić is unknown. However, Srđan Bogosavljević 
described this process: “At that moment, the West saw Vučić as a man who has to deal 
with an explicitly pro-Russian president whom Vučić managed to sideline very skilfully 
from the party. If Vučić had not done so, the power would be in Nikolić’s hands, not his. 
At no point was Nikolić a pro-European person. He was clearly a pro-Russian figure. 
Very clearly and very determinedly. ... In 2013, there were also party elections within the 
SNS, where all Nikolić’s people were excluded from the party leadership. Not a single 
one remained. … The balance of power within the party shifted. Nikolić was eliminated 
as a serious player.”505 
 
Secondly, Vučić overpowered Dačić. Despite the latter being the PM, Vučić controlled 
the largest party in the parliament, and most ministers were from the SNS. Vučić was thus 
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able to outvote Dačić within the government. In Bogosavljević’s words: “Vučić did not 
need to be the president. Vučić did not need to be the PM. He would still have all the 
power.”506 Thirdly, within the division of spoils, Vučić took control of the Serbian 
intelligence services. This was not just a source of power for Vučić, but also a basis of 
his domestic popularity as he engaged in an anti-corruption clampdown that targeted the 
likes of the retail tycoon Miroslav Mišković and certain members of the DS.507 
 
Fourthly, the DS, which was supposed to be the main opposition to Vučić, started to 
weaken as the party proved unable to reform itself, and instead became burdened with 
internal divisions that resulted in the massive departure of high-ranking members. Within 
those divisions, Vuk Jeremić became the president of the UN General Assembly and was 
expelled from the DS.508 Dragan Đilas, who became the new president of the DS, was 
dismissed as Mayor of Belgrade by Vučić and the SNS through a majority within the City 
Assembly of Belgrade in September 2013.509 Even Boris Tadić, until then the DS’s 
honorary president, left the DS to form his party.510 By emulating the DS’s pro-EU policy, 
the SNS “in a way completely marginalised the DS and the opposition.”511 Finally, even 
the potential nationalist opposition to Vučić was weak during that time as the SRS 
remained outside the parliament. Moreover, the Serbian Orthodox Church experienced, 
at one point, a drop in popularity as the newspapers started publishing a series of articles 
on corruption and paedophilia within the church’s ranks.512 It remains unknown whether 
Vučić’s government instigated these articles, but a significant source of nationalist 
opposition to Vučić was weakened. 
 
The way Vučić subdued Nikolić, Dačić and other rivals again show the nature of the 
Serbian polity, where despite what the formal Constitution implies, the issue of who has 
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the most political power is ultimately determined by who controls the largest party. 
Consequently, the party leader who heads the party will also dominate the entire political 
scenery and public policy, including the foreign policy. As Vučić controlled the most 
powerful party, his domestic foundation for implementing difficult policies was stronger. 
On that account, Vučić earned political support from the EU by being able to pursue 
Kosovo policy in a way that its DS predecessor never could.513 Serbian reality during this 
period was the same as it always has been. Foreign policy behaviour was in part shaped 
by domestic party competition. Simultaneously, foreign policy was utilised to achieve an 
advantage over party competition, as Vučić was able to earn EU support with its Kosovo 
policy. 
 
The fact that the former associates of Slobodan Milošević gave new momentum to the 
Kosovo dispute resolution led some to call it the “Nixon in China phenomenon.”514 Jelko 
Kacin, the European Parliament’s rapporteur for the Balkans, called Dačić for signing the 
Brussels Agreement “The Balkans Nixon.”515 This refers to Richard Nixon making an 
overture towards Maoist China and forming an anti-Soviet alliance with it while avoiding 
the domestic backlash that almost any other US president would face from engaging with 
Mao’s China. Nixon could perform this task as he had the credentials of a hard anti-
communist who even made his career by denouncing the Chinese communist government 
and could not be attacked by political opponents for being soft on communist regimes. 
Lawrence Freedman drew similar conclusions on Menachem Begin’s signing of the 
Camp David Accord: “Peace deals are more likely when hard-liners are in government, 
both because they are forced to appreciate the realities of the situation and because they 
are unlikely to be effectively challenged from the right.”516 
 
In that same spirit, the government led by the SNS and the SPS could not be accused of 
the lack of nationalist credentials as it was led by Milošević’s allies and associates from 
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the 1990s. Moreover, these two political parties were much better positioned than the DS 
to manage any domestic political crisis that could emerge from any accommodation on 
Kosovo as their constituency comprised the most conservative and nationalist members 
of Serbian society. This fitted into Vučić’s policy behaviour from this period. As Zoran 
Lutovac, current President of the DS, told me: “Just a reminder. He [Vučić] came to 
power with one story, a critic of the pro-Western government that preceded his 
government. Then, upon coming to power, he completely changed his tune. From being 
a nationalist, he became an alleged advocate of the European path.”517 A stark contrast to 
the days in opposition when Vučić and the SNS promised to annul all the agreements 
negotiated by Borko Stefanović, only to elevate the talks with Kosovo Albanians to an 
even higher political level with the Brussels Dialogue.518 
 
The SPS-SNS government’s resilience to domestic opposition on Kosovo was tested 
when the Brussels Agreement was reached. Slightly over a month before the Agreement 
was signed, Dačić wrote an article whose words perfectly symbolised a significant shift 
in Serbian Kosovo policy, showing how the new government embarked on a domestically 
riskier policy than its predecessors. As Dačić wrote then: “Lies were told that Kosovo is 
ours, it was even made official in the Constitution. Today, the Constitution is not helping 
at all. The Serbian president cannot go to Kosovo, nor the prime minister, nor ministers, 
nor the police or army.”519 In April 2013 the DSS held protests against the Agreement.520 
In May, protests were organised by the Serbian leaders from northern Kosovo, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and right-wing groups, during which the word “treason” was shouted 
regularly.521 However, the new government did not back down in the face of these 
protests, proving that they were more resilient to domestic backlash than Tadić and the 
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DS. Elizabeth Pond described the government’s resilience to these protests: “Any 
previous centrist government would have had to back down in the face of such resistance 
from north Kosovo Serbs, the Church hierarchy and the ultranationalists who would have 
rallied to their cause. But this time, it was the ex-ultranationalist parties themselves that 
were making peace with the West, and these ex-chauvinists could not be blackmailed.”522 
 
Both the SNS and the SPS used this domestic resilience to get acceptance from the EU 
and the West, which helped them prevail in the domestic turf war. As Dimitar Bechev 
described it: “Ironically, it was self-avowed pro-Western politicians such as Tadić who 
oversaw the resumption of relations with Moscow. And it was Aleksandar Vučić, a one-
time prominent member of Šešelj’s Radicals, who, first as deputy prime minister between 
2012-2014 and then as premier, would advocate rapprochement with the Kosovars as an 
entry ticket to the EU.”523 This shows that political parties’ ideological profile, while far 
from irrelevant, takes second place to political pragmatism. All the political parties in 
Serbia and their leaders are primarily opportunistic actors who choose policies that will 
be most beneficial domestically to their ratings and chances to win power. 
 
A domestic calculus based on political survival logic was always present in how the 
Serbian government interacted with the EU, particularly regarding the Brussels Dialogue. 
This policy still needed to be sold at home. In April 2013, Serbia negotiated an informal 
agreement with the EU’s help, which prevented Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) from 
entering Serbian-dominated municipalities in Northern Kosovo. Dačić asked for domestic 
approval before a final decision could be passed on to Catherine Ashton: “I expect the 
ruling coalition to accept Brussels’ offer which is the best Belgrade can get at the moment. 
... This is the best we can do at the moment. This is the first time that the north and the 
Serb community in Kosovo have been internationally recognised.”524 
 
On that same occasion, Dačić said that Serbia must “save what can be saved in Kosovo”, 
adding that Kosovo PM Thaçi “did not get what he was expecting – that Serbia will hand 
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over the north. ... Albanians thought that we will accept everything they asked for because 
of a date [for the start of the EU accession talks] but it did not happen.” These statements 
were directed towards the wider Serbian public and the domestic constituency, showing 
how the Serbian government was preparing its people for the complicated Serbian 
position in the Kosovo dispute. It also indicates that the Serbian government and the party 
leaders who led it continued to tread carefully in presenting the country’s foreign policy 
to the domestic audience. 
 
The dominance that Vučić and his SNS party was achieving has led some to believe that 
Serbia was “sliding into dictatorship and single-party rule.”525 This process only partially 
came to fruition as Serbia under Vučić did not emerge into an open, single-party 
dictatorship. Still, it did transform into an illiberal regime. In that political setting, 
multipartyism still exists, but not under fair conditions, as Vučić and his party control all 
the levers of power. Beyond any doubt, the political landscape started to change even 
more drastically, affecting Serbian foreign policy, which will become apparent in the next 
empirical chapter. 
 
6.3 Serbia and The United States 
 
Serbian policy towards the US was conducted in an external environment in which the 
US was not interested in Serbia and the Balkans, passing the buck on regional security 
and the Kosovo dispute to the EU. The US observed Serbia and regional developments 
from the sidelines. Still, the US is the most powerful country within the international 
system, making it an important factor in Serbian foreign policy considerations, 
particularly concerning security issues. Domestically, the new government also leveraged 
its ties with the US to win power in Serbia. 
 
6.3.1 Systemic Factors 
 
During the designated period, mainly due to systemic factors, the US-Serbian relations 
were stable. The new government focused most of its efforts and rhetoric on EU 
 




integration and relations with Russia. In contrast, some of the other themes, like 
transatlantic relations or nonalignment, were rarely discussed.526 This was due to systemic 
factors. The Balkans and Europe were not deemed as priorities for the US during this 
time. The Kosovo dispute remained the most important issue for US policy in the region. 
Naturally, the dominant position of the US in the international system still meant that 
Serbia had to have a careful policy on the US, including on security issues like NATO. 
As one source described it: “As they are a superpower, the US embassy has to do 
something, but the attention of the US administration was focused elsewhere.” For this 
source, the fact that Obama did not have a summit with the EU until his second term 
shows the lack of US interest in Europe and the Balkans during that time.527 
 
During this period, the US upheld the policy that has been in place since 9/11, leaving the 
primary stabilising role in EU hands, stepping in only when the need arises. As Slobodan 
Samardžić described it: “The EU took over that task of integrating Serbia into a 
geopolitical sphere. So, the US represented in a way some kind of external supervisor of 
that entire process. They never abandoned that role, but the US was not the central actor 
in those main political issues. The EU became the main actor.”528 For Vladimir Međak: 
“The US appears in the form of a silent, big brother sitting in the next room and listening 
to what Serbia is saying with the EU in the other room.”529 Philip Reeker, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department 
was a perfect example of the fact that the US “sat in the backseat of the car” in the 
Balkans.530 Namely, Reeker was always present in Brussels during the Belgrade-Priština 
talks, monitoring the process. For the US, the only concern related to Serbia and the 
Balkans was that no major problems arise.531 
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Hillary Clinton confirmed this US position in 2012. As Clinton visited Priština, right after 
she and Catherine Ashton visited Belgrade, Clinton stated: “We will stand with you as 
you work with Serbia to resolve practical problems and overcome obstacles, and we will 
be there for you as you take the necessary steps towards the future you so richly 
deserve.”532 This statement shows the US role in the Serbian systemic environment, 
where the US leaves the Kosovo dispute and regional affairs in the hands of the EU but 
is prepared to use its power capabilities if the need arises. The US’s role in Serbian foreign 
policy is “sometimes direct; sometimes, it is indirect.”533 
 
Security policy has been one area where the US indirectly played a significant part by 
being the leading power behind NATO. As the Brussels Agreement was signed, the 
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that NATO would guarantee that 
the Agreement is implemented. The guarantee that Rasmussen gave to Serbian 
negotiators was that the KSF would not be allowed to enter northern Kosovo except in 
the case of natural disasters, and with agreement from both NATO and the local Serbs.534 
This again shows that despite the US’s lack of interest, its power and importance on 
regional security issues via NATO still make it an important factor in Serbian foreign 
policy considerations, including during the designated period. 
 
6.3.2 Domestic Factors 
 
The US factor was a powerful force in domestic party considerations, as the US also 
played a part in forming the SNS and its eventual rise to power. Afterwards, the US was 
less of a factor as the EU was at the centre, but selling cooperation with the US to domestic 
constituents was still in play. This process started during the political turmoil that 
followed Kosovo’s slide towards independence when the US tried to exercise its power 
by affecting Serbia’s internal political trends. 
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Before Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, Dragan Šutanovac, defence minister 
alongside Dragoljub Mićunović, talked in the DS’s headquarters with several Western 
ambassadors and some of the leading figures of civil society in Serbia.535 Cameron 
Munter, the US Ambassador to Serbia, conveyed the American assessment that SRS 
would be triumphant in the next Serbian parliamentary elections. As such, Munter 
wondered if the SRS under Nikolić’s leadership can be reformed and if the grand coalition 
between the DS and the SRS is possible. Mićunović replied that as the pro-European party 
intent on finalising democratic reforms, the DS could not form coalitions with “politically 
retrograde parties”, which was approved by the German Ambassador in the room.536 
 
US interest in the grand coalition was motivated by a desire to form a numerically and 
politically powerful coalition of parties that would conduct a coherent policy. The 
motivation to co-opt the nationalist SRS into switching sides was essential for US designs 
as they were aware that SRS controls the most nationalist parts of the Serbian electorate. 
That way the SRS, as part of any ruling coalition, could guarantee the implementation of 
any international arrangement with the US and the West as the SRS would dampen any 
internal nationalist backlash. This logic mainly applied to the Kosovo issue, where the 
domestic, nationalist resistance was the highest. 
 
Beyond the formal relationship with the DS-led government, the US kept track of the 
newly formed SNS. As Nikolić formed the SNS, he quickly met with the US and UK 
Ambassadors in Serbia, which was a novelty, as before parting ways with Šešelj, Nikolić 
only met with the Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Konuzin.537 Cameron Munter reflected 
on this transformation in 2018: “America welcomed people who would help Serbia move 
on the road to the EU. Eventually, perhaps even going into NATO. So, when they [Nikolić 
and Vučić] began to talk about that theme, we welcomed it.”538 One can see the pattern 
again. One infers that Serbian political parties also recognise the international systemic 
reality that puts the US as the world’s leading power. That way, they avoid being the 
 
535 Dragoljub Mićunović, Life in Bad Times III, p.280 
536 Ibid., p.280 
537 ‘Nikolić met with Western ambassadors’, B92, 26 September 2008, 
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=9&dd=26&nav_id=53761&start=0, 
accessed 03-11-2019 




target of US pressure and animosity. It also helped them on the domestic playing field as 
the US will not obstruct a political party that is an acceptable political partner. 
 
Like the EU, the US quickly embraced the new government in Belgrade. As Lutovac 
stated: “The government that came to power in 2012 got Western support, among other 
things because Vučić and some other leaders that were in play told the West: Everything 
that the previous government did not want to do regarding Kosovo, we will do it.”539 
During the rest of the designated period, the US did not play that much of a role in Serbian 
party politics, or at least that role was not as conspicuous. The US left it to the EU to 
handle Belgrade and, more importantly, the Kosovo dispute, leaving the US to carefully 
observe the situation on the sidelines. 
 
Moreover, the US was initially pleased that the new SNS government could pursue the 
Kosovo policy in a way that its DS predecessors could not, giving little reason for the US 
to be particularly active. However, the fundamental elements of Serbian policy, observed 
through domestic party politics, remained unchanged even regarding the US. These 
elements are securing the US’ acquiescence so that the parties in power could stay there 
and preventing any negative backlash in domestic public opinion from relations with the 
US and NATO. 
 
The US also played a role when the SNS was forming the government in the summer of 
2012. Philip Reeker was leading the charge on behalf of the US and the State Department. 
As the talks and bargaining among opportunistic political parties on who will form the 
government and at what price began, Reeker visited Belgrade. On that occasion, Reeker 
communicated with all the parties that passed the electoral threshold.540 Among these 
parties were those that eventually formed the government, the SNS, the SPS and the G17 
Plus, now transformed under the name the United Regions of Serbia (URS). 
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Some sources noted that in these talks, Reeker promised that the new Serbian government 
would not change its foreign policy course, while Reeker told the SPS and the URS that 
they could pivot away from Tadić and the DS and enter into a coalition with the SNS.541 
This same source also said that both Nikolić and Vučić, as seasoned politicians, knew the 
weight of their promise and that they must not irritate the West in any way. Reeker and 
the US also helped Vučić significantly during the talks on the formation of the new 
government. During these talks, one of the main stumbling blocks for forming the new 
government was the SPS insisting on controlling both the Ministry of the Interior, Dačić’s 
post from the previous government, and Serbia’s leading intelligence service, the Security 
Intelligence Agency (BIA). During the talks on government formation, the US was 
against one party controlling two of the most critical national security institutions, using 
as leverage the possibility of pushing for a grand coalition of the SNS and the DS that 
would leave out the SPS.542 The US was making a bet on Vučić, helping him come on 
top in the Serbian political ranks. Again, foreign policy, including ties with great powers, 
are used by Serbian leaders to get ahead of their competitors. If you have the backing of 
the American superpower, you can really get ahead of the game. 
 
Afterwards, the US was more of a silent factor. The Serbian government as usually trod 
carefully in managing its relations with the US and NATO, to avoid public opinion 
criticism, damaging their domestic standing. A small case in point is undoubtedly the 
April 2013 deal regarding access to the Serbian-dominated municipalities in North 
Kosovo by the KSF. Namely, this deal directly concerned the US and NATO as it 
stipulated that the KSF cannot enter northern Kosovo without approval from NATO and 
its Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission. Dačić said then: “This is the first time that the 
international community is on our side, and this should open up a new era in Serbia’s 
relations with the West.”543 Although the Brussels Dialogue was held under EU auspices, 
Dačić referred to “the West” and not to the EU, a product of the fact that the NATO factor, 
and by inclusion, the US, was also present. Again, the Serbian government had to sell this 
agreement carefully to its domestic constituency. 
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The domestic calculations of the SNS-SPS government, based on the awareness that US 
support played a part in their coming to power, also played a role in the fact that the US-
Serbian relations were not turbulent during this period. As usual with Serbian parties, the 
SNS government also tried to use foreign policy for domestic gains. These parties desired 
the pro-US or pro-NATO voters’ votes, even though this is not as pronounced as in the 
case of the EU and Russia. The SNS-SPS government, similarly to Tadić, tried to avoid 
leaning their domestic stances too much towards the Russian or American side, resulting 
in a situation where one cannot describe that coalition as being “completely pro-Russian, 
and that it renounces America and NATO.”544 
 
6.4 Serbia and Russia 
 
The partnership between Serbia and Russia was not severed during this period, even 
though the EU dominated the Serbian foreign policy agenda in light of the Brussels 
Agreement. Russia was still a partner on whom Serbia counted, mainly on the Kosovo 
dispute. The Serbia-Russia relations were not causing frictions with the West that deemed 
Kosovo as the priority, and the relationship between Russia and the West did not become 
confrontational until after the Ukraine crisis of 2014. In domestic terms, Russia was still 
a factor that could be leveraged, given that pro-Russian sympathies were more potent 
within the SNS than the DS. Still, that factor was not as influential given that Kosovo 
dispute did not dominate the political agenda as before. 
 
6.4.1 Systemic Factors 
 
Although power in Belgrade was won by a political party whose leaders and supporters 
had a strong leaning towards Russia, Russia was not a particularly striking partner at first 
for the new Belgrade government. This is mainly because, during Tadić’s time, the 
Kosovo dispute management was moved from the UN onto the EU. The process became 
more pronounced with the start of the Brussels Dialogue with the EU as the mediator. In 
the words of Dimitar Bechev: “As Serbia agreed to entrust the EU with the Kosovo issue, 
Russia moved to the sidelines. The country’s tilt to the East was followed by a tilt to the 
 




West.”545 Slobodan Samardžić said: “After 2012, the new government returned the 
Russian factor to the fore, but only on the surface.”546 
 
The new authorities in Belgrade did not entirely give up on the Russian factor. Tomislav 
Nikolić is generally perceived as a pro-Russian individual, and he was seen as one of 
Moscow’s best friends in Belgrade. Nikolić’s first foreign visit was to Russia when he 
met Vladimir Putin on the margins of Putin’s party congress, United Russia. Even though 
Nikolić as a newly elected President was not yet sworn in, making the visit an unofficial 
one, Nikolić made a couple of important points that show the reality of relations with 
Russia. As Nikolić told Putin: “I assure you that the cooperation between Serbia and 
Russia will be progressive. I assure you that Serbia is Russia’s partner in the Balkans. … 
Serbia is on the road toward the EU. It’s a long and uncertain journey. We will organise 
the country in accordance with the EU rules.”547 On that occasion, Nikolić also told Putin 
that Serbia will not join NATO and will not recognise Kosovo’s independence. 
 
During this entire period, as shown from Nikolić’s communication with Putin, the 
underlying themes of Serbian foreign policy remained in place: not recognising Kosovo’s 
independence, not joining NATO, joining the EU and pursuing friendly relations with 
Russia. The last one was easy to pursue as the new government enjoyed Western support 
and was willing to tolerate the Russian factor in Serbian foreign policy, as long as the 
government in power followed the policy of EU integrations and was cooperative on 
Kosovo. Moreover, it was easy to pursue the friendly policy towards Russia as Russia’s 
relations with the West did not reach that much of a low point despite the cooling in 
relations with Vladimir Putin’s new presidential mandate.548 
 
The logic of balance still existed in Serbian foreign policy as Nikolić told Russia Today 
in June 2013: “Serbia will never have as close and as strong relations with the West as 
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Russia does. Cooperation with Russia doesn’t mean we have turned away from the EU. 
Cooperation with the EU doesn’t mean we have turned away from Russia. Moscow has 
never told Serbia, directly or indirectly, that it should not cooperate with the EU.”549  
Nikolić still left the Russian card in play. Nikolić said in that same interview: 
“Unfortunately, when the talks started, Serbia decided to talk with Priština within the EU 
framework and never asked for someone to stand up for its interests. … As for Russia, it 
will support any stance that Serbia takes. Russia has made it very clear that it will never 
recognise an independent Kosovo, and that means a lot to us. It’s one thing to be the only 
country that refuses to recognise Kosovo and Metohija. It’s a totally different thing when 
you are supported by other powerful countries that haven’t recognised it either. Those 
involved include, first and foremost, Russia.” This was a clear sign that even though 
Russia did not play a prominent role, Serbia still kept a Russian option open, particularly 
regarding the Kosovo dispute. 
 
Russia was not discounted completely. Indeed, as time moved on, the SNS-SPS 
government tended to reach out to Moscow in a way that the DS government never did. 
Although the draft of the agreement on strategic partnership between Russia and Serbia 
was finished in September 2011,550 this agreement was not signed during Tadić’s time. 
In May 2013, Tomislav Nikolić and Vladimir Putin signed a declaration on strategic 
partnership in Sochi, with Nikolić announcing a “new era” in cooperation.551 The 
mentioned themes were Russian support on Kosovo and the planned South Stream 
project, while two sides praised the cooperation and expressed hope in its further 
development. 
 
The military domain was one area of cooperation that became more striking under the 
new government. In April 2013 the SNS-SPS coalition did what the DS government did 
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not do despite isolated votes in favour. In April 2013 Serbia was granted observer status 
in the Parliamentary Assembly of the CSTO, showing that they were taking steps in their 
Russian policy that Tadić and the DS never did. In May 2013 Serbian Army Chief General 
Ljubiša Diković went on an official visit to the Russian Federation, where he met his 
Russian counterpart Valery Gerasimov Viktorovich.552 Later on, Diković commented on 
that visit: “Military cooperation between Russia and Serbia was not at the level where we 
wanted it to be, but lately it has been improved. The signing of the Declaration on 
Strategic Partnership between the two countries has given new impetus to the cooperation 
with Russia.”553 The statement implied that the new government planned to intensify its 
military partnership with Russia in a way that did not transpire under the DS government. 
In November 2013, the Russian Defence Minister came for a two-day visit to Serbia that 
resulted in the signing of an agreement on military cooperation, while areas like air force, 
air defence, and military training and exercises were covered during the bilateral talks.554 
Unlike in the past, when Russia filled the vacuum carefully, through for instance 
economic instruments, when it acquired NIS after 2012 Russia tried “through military 
cooperation to strengthen its position in the Balkans primarily by influencing Serbia.”555 
 
On the economic front, Serbo-Russian relations were not static, and not only because of 
Serbian energy dependency on Russia and plans for the South Stream pipeline. As Ivo 
Visković said: “It was not until 2012 that we had an improvement in economic 
cooperation with Russia.”556 In 2013, Serbian exports to Russia increased from USD 225 
million in 2005 to USD 1,065.1 million.557 In April 2013, Ivica Dačić met Russian PM 
Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow where Russia granted Serbia a 10-year loan with 3.5 per 
cent interest valued at USD 500 million, for the Serbian budget deficit, while Russia 
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earlier lent USD 800 million to Serbia to overhaul its railways.558 For some of the 
consulted Serbian diplomats, the desire to form alternative capital sources has been a 
manifestation of the Serbian balancing policy.559 
 
Serbia could pursue its cooperation with Russia during that period with ease as there were 
no major risks attached to it in the systemic environment. Serbia had more space to 
manoeuvre as the global environment allowed it, given that the West itself lacked a 
unified position on how to behave towards Russia.560 During this period, the West was 
“lulled in its partnership, primarily an economic one with Russia”, while the Obama 
administration still tried to maintain some stability in its relationship with Russia.561 
 
This was a period of “interregnum” when the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 and the worsening 
of relations between Russia and the West has not yet happened.562 As Dimitar Bechev 
said: “If you backtrack to 2012, with Putin still being assertive, the level of polarisation 
and conflict between Russia and the West was very different. There was a sense of 
competition, but you did not have this burning of bridges as after 2014.”563 The Ukraine 
Crisis systemically helped change the dynamic of the Serbian balancing act, which will 
be addressed in chapter seven. 
 
6.4.2 Domestic Factors 
 
During the DS-led government period, Russia was aware that it has potential allies in the 
opposition and the government. If we leave out the nationalist and conservative SRS and 
the DSS in the opposition ranks, the newly formed SNS also worked very well for Russian 
interest. At the founding congress of the SNS in October 2008 Nikolić said: “We want 
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things to be better for everyone, to regain our friends in the world, for East and West to 
be parts of the world and not fate, to be a bridge between East and West, to be proud, to 
be the Russian Federation’s best partners and proud EU members.”564 For Russia, this 
was a perfect situation. More importantly, it shows the partisan consensus where all the 
major political parties form a unified set of attitudes towards Russia and the EU to ensure 
the balance between two sides internationally, and have a shot at winning power 
domestically. 
 
Once the SNS rose to power, Russia was not overly pronounced in domestic calculations 
of Serbian politicians between 2012 and 2014. This is understandable as the Kosovo 
dispute did not play a prominent role in Serbian domestic politics as it did during Tadić’s 
era. This change came about from the fact that the Brussels Dialogue dominated the 
political agenda., and the emergence of the SNS as the most powerful player in the 
Serbian political market was brought about with Western support, not Russian. Slobodan 
Samardžić observed: “Paradoxically, they [the SNS] through the pro-Russian electorate 
run a pro-Western foreign policy.”565 
 
Naturally, Russia was not totally excluded. Tomislav Nikolić was frequently the one who 
generated pro-Russian sentiments. In instrumental political terms, this was a way of not 
dropping the Russian factor completely given the socio-political origin of the SNS and 
its voters who still had Russia leanings. From Nikolić’s statements to the Russian media, 
one can see a need to maintain the balance between the EU and Russia both for foreign 
and domestic usage. As Nikolić said: “Serbia will never choose between East and West. 
It wants to be part of both. … I think that those who want us to look in only one direction 
don’t have the interests of Serbia at heart.”566 This statement represents the same logic 
prevalent throughout this study—the logic where the Serbian politicians avoid alienating 
neither pro-Russian nor pro-Western voters. 
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The new Serbian leadership could make statements and moves that would be difficult to 
contemplate for the previous government. As Nikolić said to Russia Today: “Serbia will 
never lose Kosovo, but on the other hand, I’m not the President in Priština. This is painful, 
but unfortunately, there’s nothing I can do about it.”567 Tadić did make similar statements. 
Around 2011 as the idea on the partition of Kosovo started to circulate, Tadić adopted the 
rhetoric that while Belgrade will not govern Kosovo, Priština will not establish 
governance over Kosovska Mitrovica and other Serb populated municipalities north of 
the river Ibar.568 
 
However, Tadić and his government circulated the idea of partition but never openly, and 
assertively advocated for that solution model, evidently out of fear of the loss of power. 
Tadić also would not dare make such a statement to the Russian media outlet out of fear 
that pro-Russian and nationalist voters might perceive him of having a softer stance on 
independent Kosovo than Russia. As opposed to Tadić, Nikolić could make such a 
statement. Nikolić could do so as he was a politician with nationalist and pro-Russian 
credentials who had no viable nationalist opposition, while Tadić lacked both those 
credentials and had nationalist opposition in Nikolić, his SNS, and other nationalist 
parties. 
 
Sympathy towards Russia remained a powerful force in Serbian society and with the 
Serbian public, so that every Serbian politician and Serbian political party needed to take 
it into account. An excellent example came in 2013, when Serbian Patriarch Irenaeus 
(Irinej) met with Putin in Moscow. Expressing gratitude for Russian support for Serbia 
on Kosovo issue, Irenaeus said: “We rely on God and on Russia.”569 The Russian factor 
started again to play a more influential role in Serbian party politics after the Ukrainian 
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This chapter proves that the Serbian balancing act, that includes Serbian efforts to join 
the EU, pragmatic if not particularly close relations with the US, and partnership with 
Russia can be pursued with low-risks if there is a suitable combination of systemic and 
domestic factors. On a systemic level, the power vacuum (during this period more salient 
for the US than for the EU) and the Kosovo dispute continued to determine the Serbian 
balancing act. Domestically, the party and elite competition continued to act as a decisive 
conduit between the systemic environment and Serbian foreign policy conduct.  
 
However, this chapter also shows the differences in intensity of the Serbian balancing act 
and the risks and tensions attached to it depending on systemic and domestic dynamics. 
This chapter in both empirical and conceptual terms provides reliable contextual and 
explanatory power to this study. It shows the Serbian balancing act being implemented 
without strategic tensions and risks, and also describes a vital transition phase between 
the DS era that started the balancing act out of necessity, and the one after the Ukraine 
Crisis of 2014 when the balancing act was even more intense as Russia was more present 
in Serbian foreign policy than before. 
 
Systemically, the EU tried to assert itself as the Balkans’ central power by leading the 
charge on the Kosovo dispute, thus embracing the new Serbian government. In that sense, 
it appeared that the EU was trying to end the vacuum it initially helped create back in 
2008. US policy was also a powerful systemic force. The US did not have an intense 
desire to be active in Serbia and the Balkans, which is always a factor in Serbian 
considerations. However, the US is still deemed to be important as its role in the Kosovo 
dispute affects Serbian behaviour. Its international dominance makes Serbian 
policymakers mindful of their relationship with the US. Russia was still a factor in Serbian 
foreign policy, mainly because of its non-recognition of Kosovo. Belgrade was tranquil 




relations between Russia and the West, while damaged, were not as contentious as they 
became after 2014.570 
 
Domestically, political parties as usually leveraged foreign policy to avoid domestic 
backlash and outmanoeuvre the competing parties by gaining the great powers’ support 
and winning both pro-Western and pro-Russian voters. The SPS-SNS government 
followed the pattern that has been present in Serbia since the 1990s, the one where foreign 
policy contributes to the rise and fall of Serbian governments, which in this case refers to 
how the SNS and SPS embraced the EU to win power.571 It was pragmatism which drove 
what used to be a war-mongering political party to transform itself and win power as a 
promoter of European policies.572 As such, the SNS government “did not come to power 
by accident”; instead it promised to conduct a different Kosovo policy to that of its 
predecessors, and won Western support that way.573 During the 2012-2014 period, the 
essential domestic reality affecting Serbian foreign policy remained the same as in the 
past. Serbian political parties will continue promoting a foreign policy that avoids 
alienating domestic constituents. They will continue using foreign policy to win power, 
which allowed the SNS to win the grand prize during this period. 
 
This period was one where Belgrade could easily conduct its balancing act. However, this 
did not last, as in 2014 with the Ukraine Crisis, Serbia’s regional and systemic 
environment changed, and balancing became more contentious and riskier to pursue. The 
domestic dynamic has also changed, as under the leadership of Aleksandar Vučić, Serbian 
polity tilted towards the illiberal political model, creating a completely different domestic 
background for Serbian foreign policy. These changes will be addressed in the next and 
final empirical chapter. 
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This chapter will analyse the Serbian balancing act in the period after the Ukraine crisis 
of 2014, making it crucial to explain the current stage in Serbia’s foreign policy balancing 
act and identify its sources. This part of the study is highly relevant as it demonstrates 
that the intensity of the Serbian balancing act depends on the level of strategic tensions 
between Russia and the West, which in systemic terms builds upon the factors of the 
regional power vacuum and the Kosovo dispute. 
 
The Ukraine Crisis was a turning point that was dangerous for Serbia both because, after 
a very long time, the West and Russian came close to direct conflict and because of the 
danger of having a linkage between the status of Crimea and Kosovo.574 As the relations 
between Russia and the West became more confrontational, Russia became more engaged 
in the Balkans, using an opening left by the EU’s retreat from the region, caused by 
enlargement fatigue, the migrant crisis and Brexit. 
 
The relations with the US were shaped by a different systemic context, where the US 
showed more interest in the Balkans because of increased Russian activity, but not enough 
to impose any meaningful change at first. Later on, the US played a significant role, 
rolling back Russian influence in the Balkans by speeding up NATO membership for 
Montenegro and North Macedonia. This process demonstrated that US power is a major 
part of the systemic environment shaping Serbia’s balancing act, in that it was the US, 
rather than the EU, that checked Russia in the Balkans (showing the limits of Serbian 
balancing). On the Kosovo issue, the US under Trump also started playing a different 
role, leading Serbia to believe that it could get a less painful settlement on Kosovo. 
Consequently, the US became a more attractive partner, demonstrating that the Serbian 
balancing act is an opportunistic policy. The attempt to form a partnership with the US 
 




failed with the electoral win of Joseph Biden in the US, but the US will remain a 
significant factor in shaping Serbian policies. 
 
As Serbia and the Balkans became one of the battlegrounds in the rivalry between Russia 
and the West, Serbia tried avoiding any risks and engaged in an opportunistic partnership 
with Russia to leverage the West and extract concessions from both sides. The Ukraine 
Crisis also made the Serbian balancing act more complicated in light of the Kosovo 
dispute. As the Kosovo dispute gradually intensified around 2015, Russian support in the 
UN Security Council again became imperative for Belgrade. Still, the balancing became 
more assiduous after the Russian seizure of Crimea, which Moscow justified with the 
Kosovo precedent. 
 
Despite the fact of Russia using the analogy with Kosovo in its seizure of Crimea was a 
complicating factor for Serbia, the reliance on Russia in the Security Council left Serbia 
with no alternative. The Kosovo issue forced Belgrade to play the Moscow card once 
again, mainly as Serbia-Kosovo talks under the EU’s auspices started to stagnate from 
2015. However, this chapter will also consider Russia’s declining influence in the Balkans 
due to pushback by the US, leaving Serbo-Russian ties largely reduced to the Kosovo 
dispute. This reality remains even though Belgrade made something of a repivot to 
Moscow to get protection given the rise of Joseph Biden’s Presidency. This change will 
give us a clear temporal benchmark based on which one can conclude this study. 
 
Domestically, party politics remained the prevalent unit level variable: since 2014 the 
dominance of Vučić and his SNS have led Serbia further into an illiberal direction, 
creating a state where one man dominates all public policy. However, even in those 
circumstances, the party’s need to stay in power shaped foreign policy. The sensitivity to 
the Kosovo issue, declining EU enthusiasm, the unpopularity of the US and NATO, as 
opposed to Russia’s popularity, implied that the only concept of foreign policy for which 
the Serbia government could have support from the population is the balancing act. The 
EU, for the ruling SNS, was not a goal enthusiastically promoted in domestic politics, but 
it was still used as a source of domestic legitimacy for the Serbian government. Playing 




declining state of democracy in the country by instilling fear that Serbia could pivot 
towards Russia. Relations with the US also occurred in the domestic context of the US 
being unpopular among the Serbs, making it a frequent target among the nationalists. 
However, with Trump’s emergence, the domestic environment slightly changed as Trump 
was more appealing to the Serbian public. 
 
In the case of Russia, the domestic logic of party politics was most pronounced. Due to 
Russia’s high popularity and domestic vulnerability in the unresolved Kosovo issue, 
Serbia could not join the EU sanctions and other anti-Russian policies. Instead, the 
Serbian leadership sought the balancing act to win over pro-Russian and pro-Western 
voters by avoiding tilting fully towards either the EU or Russia. By building a partnership 
with the highly popular Putin and Russia, the Serbian leadership hoped to gain domestic 
legitimacy while trying to get a better deal on Kosovo by using Russia, hoping to profit 
domestically.575 The pro-Russian atmosphere promoted domestically by the Belgrade 
government was also a way to leverage the West and muster its acquiescence to the 
growing illiberalism at home by instilling the perception that Vučić could easily be 
outpowered by pro-Russian players besieging him. Using Russia to achieve domestic 
mileage remains a temptation for the Serbian leadership. 
 
The methodological scope of this chapter remains unaltered compared to the other 
chapters of the study. The research methods applied in making this chapter remain: the 
case study, process tracing and analytical narrative. This chapter relies on both secondary 
source material and primary sources based on fieldwork interviews. 
 
7.2 Serbia and The European Union 
 
On a systemic level, the regional power vacuum largely shaped Serbian policy towards 
the EU. The EU discounted the possibility of a quick enlargement, which only increased 
later on with the migrant crisis and Brexit. This reality has not changed within the 
timeframe of this study. Belgrade was less enthusiastic in aligning itself with the EU’s 
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policies, including on Russia. The EU’s role as the mediator in the Kosovo dispute also 
collapsed during this period. Domestically, the EU became an occasional target of 
government propaganda, but it was also an instrument of domestic legitimacy. 
 
7.2.1 Systemic Factors  
 
The reality of the power vacuum generated by the EU’s inability to finalise enlargement 
in the Balkans was a systemic environment that started shaping Belgrade’s behaviour 
very early on. The beginning of accession talks between Serbia and the EU in early 
January 2014 would normally imply that the EU has re-asserted itself as the Balkans’ 
primary power and that Serbia would coordinate its foreign policy with the EU. However, 
from the very start of this period, one could see that the enlargement would be a 
complicated process, which implied that the systemic reality of a power vacuum in the 
Balkans and Serbia stranded on the Western periphery continued. In those circumstances, 
the EU had little ability to influence Serbian policy, and Serbia had little incentive to 
follow the EU’s lead on the foreign policy front. The accession was an unremitting 
process for Serbia and the EU. The accession negotiations began in January 2014, and it 
took two years for Serbia to open its first two chapters in the accession talks in December 
2015.576 
 
This was announced openly by Jean Claude Junker in June 2014 in his address to the 
European Parliament before he assumed the post of the President of the European 
Commission in November. Junker stated that there would not be an EU enlargement 
during his term: “The EU needs to take a break from enlargement so that we can 
consolidate what has been achieved among the 28. This is why, under my Presidency of 
the Commission, ongoing negotiations will continue, and notably the Western Balkans 
will need to keep a European perspective, but no further enlargement will take place over 
the next five years.”577 
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Johannes Hahn, the new EU Commissioner, took over the portfolio re-titled “European 
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations” from the old title “Enlargement 
and European Neighbourhood Policy”, which instilled the perception in the Balkans that 
the region is not a priority for the EU.578 Having observed this new trend in the EU, Serbia 
started to swing away from coordinating and aligning its policies with the EU. For a very 
long time, Russia was the biggest challenge Serbia faced in aligning itself with the EU’s 
foreign and security policy.579 
 
Ivica Dačić, in the capacity of new foreign minister, as Serbia was presiding over OSCE, 
cancelled his trip to Kyiv in May 2015 at the last minute to avoid angering Moscow, while 
Tomislav Nikolić was the only non-CIS European leader attending the Victory Day 
Parade in Red Square in Moscow that same month.580 With the Victory Day Parade Serbia 
broke ranks with the EU, as Western and European leaders decided not to attend the 
Parade due to the Russian conflict with Ukraine.581 The most famous example of Serbia’s 
refusal to join the EU’s policy on Russia is its refusal to join the EU’s sanctions against 
Russia. In 2020 Serbia’s percentage of alignment with EU’s foreign policy was 56 per 
cent. Serbia declined to align with eleven EU declarations on Russia and on some 
occasions has even abstained from supporting declarations involving regimes close to 
Moscow, like Syria and Venezuela.582 
 
The migration crisis did not help the Balkans in their European aspirations. During a 
meeting on the Balkan migration route in October 2015, it was observed that after nearly 
a year in office European Council President Donald Tusk did not visit the Balkans. 
Instead, his first trip to the Balkans came in late November 2015, and the trip concerned 
the EU’s cooperation with Serbia and Macedonia on the migration crisis.583 The migration 
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crisis confirmed that the Balkans became a strategic periphery for the EU, thus diluting 
the EU’s leverage and Serbia’s desire to embrace the pro-EU policy. 
 
As the Balkans was not a priority for the EU, external powers like Russia used this 
opening to step into the region. Consequently, Belgrade has an incentive to pursue its 
opportunities with Russia and other non-Western powers to compensate for the lack of 
EU perspective. The EU’s Balkan stance was “on policy autopilot”, where the focus was 
on the process of benchmark decisions rather than on genuine political substance. These 
circumstances lead to the situation where “the costs and benefits of a distant EU prospect 
are reassessed when set against the more tangible benefits offered by other strategic 
actors.”584 Indeed, just like the Eurozone Crisis in 2008, the migrant crisis and Brexit 
have diluted and decreased the attractiveness and magnetic power of the EU, leading to 
the situation where the role of the EU has not changed significantly, but its leverage in 
the Balkans has decreased.585 
 
The UK’s decision in the 2016 referendum to leave the EU (Brexit) has cemented the 
state of a power vacuum in the Balkans and the EU’s inability to deal with challenges in 
its backyard. Brexit caused a political and institutional crisis and has triggered a debate 
on the future of the European project. With the EU preoccupied, both Serbia and the 
Balkans are sidelined from the priority list. Vučić took note of that: “There is no doubt 
that this will have significant consequences, in both the short and long terms. What will 
the EU enlargement policy be I cannot tell you at this moment.”586 
 
Nevertheless, the EU was becoming more aware of the Russian challenge in the Balkans. 
In 2017, Federica Mogherini, in the capacity of High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated explicitly regarding Russian activities in the 
Balkans that “The Balkans can easily become one of the chessboards where the big power 
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game can be played. So the concern is there … and it is profound.”587 The EU took notice 
of various forms of Serbo-Russian cooperation and would always issue warnings if it 
deemed that cooperation to be against Serbia’s EU integration. Despite taking note of the 
Russian activity in the region and despite the EU officials’ statements, there is not enough 
evidence that the EU has done enough to counter this activity by embracing the Balkans 
more confidently. As long as that is the case, there will be a vacuum in the region, giving 
non-Western powers like Russia a degree of leeway to operate in, and providing a 
permissive systemic environment for Serbia to pursue its balancing act. 
 
During this period, the EU did not wholly disappear from Belgrade’s policy radar, thanks 
to the EU’s leading country, Germany, and its chancellor Angela Merkel. A diplomatic 
initiative known as the “Berlin process”, which aimed to strengthen multilateral 
cooperation in the Balkans and keep the momentum of EU integration going, led many 
to talk about the “German moment” in the Balkans.588 However, while the “Berlin 
process” was a sign of partial European re-engagement, it did not present an objective 
strategic change to the status quo, and it was not perceived as such in the Balkans.589  
 
The EU, particularly Germany, tried to establish peace and stability in the region so that 
no crisis can emerge that would force them to invest their resources and energy in the 
region that otherwise would not be considered a priority. Still, this logic and rigid 
membership condition led many in Belgrade to ask whether the EU path is worth it.590 
However, for a long time, Vučić tried to avoid Boris Tadić’s mistake of angering Angela 
Merkel. As it was conveyed to the author, “I think that he may be impressed with the 
Russian role in Ukraine, but I think he is most impressed by Germany in every sense. … 
He is daily in contact with his mentor in Berlin.”591 Vučić bought many sympathies in 
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Berlin and with Angela Merkel by backing her immigration policies during the migrant 
crisis.592 
 
None of the EU initiatives bore any fruit in changing Serbian behaviour, indicating the 
EU enlargement’s declining influence. In February 2018, the EU published an 
enlargement strategy that asserted that Serbia could join the EU in 2025 with an 
agreement on Kosovo and harmonisation with EU’s foreign policy being the central 
conditions.593 Still nothing happened, as, without assertive EU leadership, Serbia and the 
Balkan countries cannot progress to the EU, both because of the EU’s own problems and 
internal political dysfunctions in the Balkans (including declining EU enthusiasm).594 The 
apex of the EU’s lack of strategic commitment to the Balkans was French President 
Emmanuel Macron’s decision to veto the start of accession talks with North Macedonia 
and Albania.595 In an interview with the Financial Times, Vučić made it clear that the 
French move creates the Balkans’ need to focus on themselves and rely on other powers, 
like Russia and China, and not just the EU. “We need to take care of ourselves. That’s the 
only way, that’s the only approach. Everything else would be very irresponsible,” Vučić 
said.596 
 
The EU’s weakened strategic clout came to the fore in regards to the Kosovo issue. The 
talks on Kosovo were led from 2014 to this day by Aleksandar Vučić, first with Isa 
Mustafa, Kosovo’s Prime Minister (2014-2017), then later on with Hashim Thaçi (Thaçi 
became Kosovo’s president in 2016 and Vučić the president of Serbia in 2017). Without 
a realistic scenario of Serbia joining the EU, the EU lacks both the incentive and leverage 
over Belgrade. The same goes for Priština, which does not even have visa liberalisation 
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with the EU. The EU could not guide the two parties to negotiate in good faith, resulting 
in Belgrade and Priština engaging in mutual provocation since 2015. 
 
After a ten-month pause, the dialogue between the two parties began again in February 
2015 as everybody awaited government formation in Priština.597 Little progress has been 
made to this day. Priština is delaying its obligation from the Brussels Agreement on the 
formation of Association of Serb Municipalities (ZSO), making it one of the biggest 
obstacles to a final settlement. The Priština government launched a diplomatic campaign 
of trying to gain membership in several international institutions. In 2015 Kosovo tried 
to get membership in UNESCO; it failed to do so by three votes after the Serbian 
campaign against its UNESCO membership, as Belgrade feared that it would allow 
Priština to endanger and appropriate Serbian cultural and religious monuments in 
Kosovo.598 Even there, one can see the EU’s failure, as the EU did not include protecting 
Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo in its accession talks with Serbia, allowing the subject 
to become contested.599 
 
In January 2017, tensions were also on the rise as the future Kosovo Prime Minister 
Ramush Haradinaj (2017-2020) was released from French custody after an initial arrest 
on a Serbian war crimes warrant. Serbia soon dispatched a train to Kosovo, decorated 
with paintings of Orthodox saints inside and outside with the slogan “Kosovo is Serbia” 
in 21 different languages.600 The Kosovo police were sent to prevent the train from 
entering Kosovo, but the Serbian side stopped the train well before that. In 2018 Kosovo’s 
bid to join INTERPOL failed due to Belgrade’s opposition. This was a third unsuccessful 
bid for Priština in the previous four years as it had failed in 2015 and 2016, and in 2017 
it withdrew its membership application.601 
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In the meantime, Serbia launched a campaign spearheaded by FM Dačić to convince 
countries, mostly in Africa and the Caribbean, to withdraw recognition of Kosovo. 
According to the Serbian government by March 2020, concluding with Sierra Leone, 18 
countries withdrew their recognition of Kosovo.602 The complete breakdown of EU-
mediated talks came when the government in Priština responded to Belgrade’s 
derecognition campaign and its failed INTERPOL bid, hit Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina with a 10 per cent, and then 100 per cent customs tariff, in violation of the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).603 Serbia abandoned the EU-led talks 
until Kosovo lifts the tariffs. 
 
The relations with the EU became incredibly tense from 2018 when Aleksandar Vučić 
and Hashim Thaçi came up with an idea of a land swap to resolve the Kosovo dispute. In 
that swap, the Preševo Valley in southern Serbia with an Albanian population would go 
to Kosovo, while the Serb-populated territories in north Kosovo would go to Serbia. This 
proposal came to be referred to in public discourse as demarcation and border adjustment. 
The EU was interested in this proposal, including Federica Mogherini and the EU 
commissioner for enlargement, Johannes Hahn. Mogherini was enthusiastic about being 
the one under whose tutelage the long-standing dispute could be resolved.604 
 
This initiative was discarded by the EU’s most powerful country, Germany, which feared 
that the land swap might create a bad precedent for other territorial disputes in the 
Balkans.605 The EU lost control over the Kosovo dispute in September 2018 when Vučić 
and Thaçi called off a face-to-face meeting on the land swap brokered by Mogherini in 
Brussels.606 A day after Vučić cancelled the meeting in Brussels with Thaçi, Vučić visited 
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the Gazivoda Lake Dam in Kosovo, whose ownership Belgrade and Priština disputed.607 
Thaçi responded to this visit by dispatching special forces to the Gazivode area at the end 
of September, followed by Thaçi personally touring the area.608 
 
The EU tried desperately to restart the Belgrad-Priština dialogue under EU mediation, 
including efforts by the new EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, 
Josep Borrell, and Miroslav Lajčák, the newly appointed Special Representative for the 
Belgrade-Priština dialogue.609 The EU faltered as Vučić and Thaçi accepted the 
leadership of Donald Trump and the US to resolve the Kosovo issue, including a possible 
land swap. In a domestic political struggle, the Trump administration sided with President 
Thaçi against Kosovo PM Albin Kurti, backed by Germany due to his opposition to the 
eventual land swap, resulting in a no-confidence vote for Kurti in March 2020 and a rebuff 
of EU and Germany.610 
 
However, after Thaçi was faced with a preliminary indictment from the special court on 
Kosovo at the Hague, Vučić was forced to return to the EU-brokered talks. In doing so, 
Vučić, alongside Kosovo’s Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti, Josep Borrell, Emmanuel 
Macron and Angela Merkel, attended a video call on 10 July in Paris, after a bilateral 
meeting with Macron, and later Vučić and Hoti participated in a meeting in Brussels 
chaired by Borrell.611 These meetings produced no tangible outcomes, but Vučić had to 
court the EU more openly. In that context, Vučić told Macron that Serbia accepted the 
new methodology of EU enlargement, a French initiative intended to change the 
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enlargement dynamics.612 For Belgrade, the EU will remain a factor in its foreign policy 
that cannot be ruled entirely out. 
 
For Serbia, the biggest challenge will remain how to reconcile its Kosovo policy and EU 
integration. The EU no longer has the same pull for new members, making the EU process 
for Belgrade burdensome, particularly given the EU’s inability to resolve the Kosovo 
dispute and the fact that Vučić angered Europe by flirting with land swap and the US.613 
Vučić’s partnership with Germany is also over, because of the idea of the land swap and 
his growing authoritarianism at home.614 Instead, Vučić shows a tendency to court 
Macron’s France, which he started doing during Macron’s impressive visit to Belgrade 
in July 2019.615 
 
The future of Serbia’s relations with the EU is uncertain. In 2020 Serbia did not open a 
single chapter in its accession talks with the EU due to the decline in the rule of law.616 
This decision cast a shadow of doubt about the longevity of the EU’s tolerance towards 
Vučić’s Serbia. Still, this partnership might persevere either until Vučić crosses some red 
line or until he resolves the Kosovo dispute, which might lead the EU to renounce him 
and attack him for his illiberal domestic policies.617 
 
7.2.2 Domestic Factors 
 
The 2014 parliamentary elections were a turning point in recent Serbian political history. 
When the results came in, there was no longer any doubt that Vučić is the genuine power 
holder in Serbia, and not Dačić, as the SNS won an absolute majority in numbers of 
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parliamentary seats. The SPS came second, while the DS and the New Democratic Party, 
led by Boris Tadić, passed the electoral threshold but were not competitors in numbers. 
The URS was out of the parliament, and so was the DSS.618 The SPS was allowed to stay 
in government, even though the SNS could form the government by itself, so that the SNS 
could have a partner with whom to share responsibility and blame for any failed 
policies.619 
 
As the DSS and the SRS were outside the parliament, one could easily interpret this as 
European integration victory in Serbian politics, as all the parties who passed the electoral 
threshold favoured EU integration in their formal program. However, it is not just the 
Russia-leaning SRS and the DSS which were out of the picture. The LDP, one of the rare 
Serbian parties that advocated Serbian membership in both the EU and NATO, was also 
out of the game. 
 
This shows a more critical reality within that nexus between Serbian party politics and 
foreign policy. All the parties which advocate leaning towards either Russia or the West 
are marginal players in the Serbian political arena, implying that if you want to be 
appealing to the Serbian voter, your foreign policy program needs to find the balance 
between the EU and Russia.620 One can see that the SNS gathered the minor political 
parties within the pre-electoral coalition and later on in the parliament. This coalition 
gathers a diverse list of parties, including both left and right parties and parties of national 
minorities.621 
 
At the same time, the fragile Serbian democracy was on a severe downward spiral. The 
SNS led by Vučić began to dominate every aspect of society, political institutions, public 
administration, the national security apparatus and the media. As EU membership was no 
longer a realistic prospect, the local elites in Serbia and the Balkans were even less 
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motivated to pass reforms that would impose checks on their power and curb their 
interests.622 In the media domain, Vučić established total dominance. By 2016, the OSCE 
established that independent media are “virtually non-existent.”623 Beyond the national 
broadcaster, Vučić and the SNS have powerful media allies in the private TV stations 
Pink and Happy and the tabloids Kurir and Informer, through which the opposition is 
frequently accused of being traitors and criminals.624 Beyond the growing illiberalism, 
the fact that any Serbian political leader can still suffer domestically if he is seen as 
capitulating on Kosovo also shaped Serbia’s relations with the EU. The SNS was 
stretched between fulfilling a promise to the West of resolving the Kosovo dispute while 
facing the public’s potential internal resistance. 
 
The formal outcome of the 2016 parliamentary elections reflected a landscape of Serbian 
party politics that was much less friendly to the EU than the outcome of the 2014 
elections. The SNS again won an absolute majority, followed by the SPS co-opted into 
the government, with Dačić remaining the Foreign Minister. However, the far-right, 
nationalist anti-EU, pro-Russian parties also gained parliamentary seats. The SRS 
returned to the parliament as the third-largest party in the parliament, and the coalition of 
DSS with Dveri, a minor nationalist party, also passed the electoral threshold.625 The DS 
and coalition around Boris Tadić again were no match for the SNS. With pro-Russian 
forces back in the parliament and pro-Western opposition fragmented, Vučić can promote 
himself domestically and internationally as a pro-European moderniser despite the 
decline of Serbian democracy.626 This strategy was working if one observes that after the 
2016 elections, Vučić received congratulations from Johannes Hahn, the Austrian 
Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz and other EU dignitaries.627 
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The EU path was never something into which Vučić, his voters and his entourage 
ventured fully. The first reason for this was the slowing pace of the EU accession. The 
second reason concerns the political nature of the SNS party and its constituency, both of 
which evolved from the nationalist SRS. Consequently, the SNS elite did not have the 
European foundation at the very start.628 As Dragoljub Mićunović explained in an 
interview with the author: “Their conversion is not so visible in the domain of ideas and 
ideologies as in the domain of practical politics and policies, where they have to respect 
promises and agreements in regards to the EU so that the EU integration of Serbia could 
continue, but in their ideology, practical moves, and the emotional stance, they still share 
those with SRS.”629 
 
That is to say, for parties like the SNS, EU accession is not part of their sincere political 
conviction. Instead, EU accession is “only instrumental: a tool to secure electoral support 
and potentially better living standards.”630 In a sense, advocating the EU path 
domestically, while still relevant, no longer has the game-changer effect it had in the past. 
Moreover, “those who do see merit in following the EU’ line’ are often seen as out-of-
touch elitists promoting a foreign agenda for their own personal gain.”631 The Serbian 
leadership ideally leveraged the fact that the EU is experiencing enlargement fatigue. As 
the EU stalls the process of enlargement, Vučić uses it to strengthen his illiberal rule at 
home without suffering any consequences from the EU, making the EU and Vučić “the 
perfect partners in crime.”632 
 
Frequently, to boost nationalism with parts of the Serbian electorate and divert attention 
from the domestic troubles, Vučić and the SNS would scapegoat the EU, accusing it of 
trying to undermine the Serbian government. In June 2016, Vučić was supposed to travel 
to Brussels for the formal opening of EU membership talks. However, the visit was 
cancelled by Vučić as the pro-government media kept accusing the EU of fomenting and 
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radicalising protests against Vučić.633  Brexit also made the notion of the EU a difficult 
domestic sell. In the words of Dragan Šutanovac: “Some of the citizens are convinced 
that if the British people do not want to be in the EU, why should Serbia be in the EU.”634  
 
The EU was still useful domestically. As democracy and the EU integration have been 
part of social consensus for twenty years, and as countries like Serbia are deeply 
connected with the EU, it is impossible to move to fully-fledged authoritarianism. So, the 
EU can still be used for acquiring legitimacy.635 In that context, Aleksandar Vučić met 
with Angela Merkel in Berlin in April 2017, a couple of days before the Serbian 
presidential elections.636 
 
Aleksandar Vučić easily won the elections by a landslide in the first round. The PM’s 
post was handed over to Ana Brnabić, Serbia’s first female and gay PM, even though 
everyone was aware that central power would remain in Vučić’s hands.637 The 
appointment of Brnabić as a female and gay person was an obvious attempt by Vučić to 
court liberal circles in the EU and the West and to provide cover for his domestic 
illiberalism. Again, the relations with the EU remain a potential asset in the domestic 
political game. The problem remains that whenever the Serbian leadership communicates 
with its public on the EU, it is a technocratic narrative on issues like access to EU funds, 
unlike the emotional narrative on brotherhood with Russia that is more appealing to the 
average voter.638 
 
The SNS government continued to play on the EU’s tendency to turn a blind eye to 
domestic transgression, which also worked well during late 2018 and early 2019, when 
the beating of an opposition politician triggered major protests on the declining rule of 
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law and media freedom.639 Neither the Western diplomats nor “their bosses in Brussels, 
Berlin, Paris and Washington” stepped up to criticize the Belgrade government.640 
 
However, the domestic foundation for sound policy towards the EU was also upset when 
it comes to the Serbian opposition. They did not articulate a clear foreign policy agenda, 
and many pro-EU parties who prioritise the EU are too weak, implying that the Serbian 
opposition cannot formulate its foreign policy program, including on the EU, that would 
run against the government’s blueprint.641 Indeed, the EU component was weakly 
formulated even by the formally pro-European parties within the anti-government bloc 
during the protests.642 
 
The domestic environment, in regards to the EU, transformed profoundly in 2020. As the 
COVID-19 pandemic reached Serbia, the government responded rigorously through a 
state of emergency, lockdowns, surveillance and police enforcement.643 After the 
lockdown, Serbia held parliamentary elections in June 2020. A low turnout marked the 
elections as the opposition boycotted the elections, resulting in Vučić and the SNS 
winning a two-thirds majority in the parliament, without pro-EU opposition, leaving no 
doubt who is calling the shots in Serbia.644 After the elections, a report came out showing 
that the government concealed information on the number of dead and infected to hold 
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the elections and secure the victory.645 The EU response to the controversial elections has 
been vague, raising the risk of augmented Euroscepticism.646 
 
The political crisis escalated on 7 July 2020, when massive protests erupted in Belgrade 
due to the government’s reinstating of lockdown, concealing pandemic data, and Vučić’s 
authoritarianism, in which protesters stormed the parliament. The protests lasted several 
days and have spread from Belgrade to other Serbian cities frequently, with heavy clashes 
between protesters and the police.647 During the protests, Vučić was in Paris with Macron 
for talks on Kosovo, making it harder for Vučić to portray himself to the EU as a liberal 
moderniser.648 
 
Vučić will have to manage his relations with the EU more carefully, both in the context 
of his tightening grip on power in Serbia and the context of the EU being engaged in the 
Kosovo dialogue again. The growing Euroscepticism will also taint Serbian relations with 
the EU. As a result of the Serbian leadership’s dubious European narrative and the 
slowdown in enlargement, in late 2020, 51 per cent of Serbs believed that their country 
should not join the EU, and 58 per cent of people think that Serbia will never enter the 
EU.649 Vučić has and will continue to have a severe problem selling a Kosovo settlement 
to his domestic constituents, the same constituency he helped form by “poisoning it with 
nationalism”, meaning he might have to “pay the price of his previous policies.”650 This 
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7.3 Serbia and The United States 
 
Serbian policy towards the US took place in a new systemic context. After the Ukraine 
Crisis of 2014, the US became more interested in Serbia and the Balkans by expressing 
concern over the Russian presence in the region, but not enough to impose change at first. 
Later on, the US took a more assertive stance, rolling back Russian influence in the 
Balkans and assuming a leading role in the Kosovo dispute. Domestically, Serbian public 
opinion and its hostility towards the US were a factor as always. The US’s perception and 
the government’s narrative on the US changed with Donald Trump’s presidency. 
 
7.3.1 Systemic Factors 
 
As the Ukraine Crisis changed the security landscape of Eastern Europe, and rivalry was 
becoming a predominant trait of US-Russia relations, Serbia continuously tried to avoid 
aligning itself fully with either the US or Russia. Serbia’s attempt to maintain autonomy 
in the post-Ukraine context was perfectly encapsulated in Vučić’s statement: “Serbia is 
neither a ‘little Russia’ nor a ‘little America’. It makes its own decisions.”651 
 
The US slightly raised its interest in the Balkans and Serbia, but only to the extent that 
the region is seen as part of Eastern Europe’s bigger theatre, a new theatre of rivalry with 
Russia. Indeed, US policy towards the region remained “reactive” and “more akin to 
extinguishing fires rather than just a long game of chess.”652 Testifying in front of the US 
Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee in February 2015, US Secretary of State John 
Kerry said: “Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, other places. They’re all in the 
firing line [together with] Georgia, Moldova, Transnistria.”653 What qualified Serbia to 
receive slightly increased attention from the US is its unique position as a country with 
European aspirations and with strong ties with Russia.654 One should not overestimate US 
interest during this period. The US National Security Strategy issued by the Obama 
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administration in 2015 mentions the Balkans just once in the context of European and 
Euro-Atlantic integration.655 
 
Serbia continued communicating with both the US and NATO whenever it could to keep 
as many doors opened for itself as possible. In late 2014, Serbia adopted the Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), the highest level of cooperation that a country not 
seeking membership can have with NATO, while the second cycle of IPAP for the period 
from 2019-2021 was adopted at the end of 2019.656 In November 2015, Serbia hosted 
NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg, after Vučić visited Moscow in October to 
negotiate arms purchases from Russia.657 Before Stoltenberg’s visit, Serbia ratified the 
status of forces agreement (SOFA), which allows NATO freedom of movement in Serbia 
and the use of Serbian military infrastructure.658 
 
Bilaterally, the communications with the US also took place whenever possible, with US 
Vice-President Biden taking the lead. In June 2015, Vučić was to have a meeting with 
Biden in the White House, but the meeting was cancelled due to the death of Biden’s son, 
Beau. Instead, Vučić met with President Obama’s national security advisor Susan Rice, 
where the two discussed: EU integration, the Serbian need to diversify gas supplies away 
from Russia, and last but not least, the Kosovo dispute and the deadlock in dialogue with 
Priština.659 Vučić and Biden did have their meeting in September 2015, with the main 
talking points including issues like the economy, EU integration, Kosovo and Serbia’s 
relations with Russia.660 
 
Biden met Vučić in Belgrade in August 2016, where the two discussed the Kosovo 
normalisation dialogue, regional affairs, Serbia’s EU integration process and US-Serbian 
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bilateral ties.661 There were other bilateral meetings with US representatives, including 
with the US Secretary of State, John Kerry. Kerry met Ivica Dačić and Aleksandar Vučić 
in Washington in February and September 2015, respectively, while Kerry also visited 
Belgrade in December 2015 to attend the OSCE Ministerial Meeting when Serbia was 
chairing the OSCE.662 
 
Over time, the US continued to show interest in Serbia in the context of the Russian 
presence. The Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre was a frequent object of US 
attention. In June 2017, the then U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for European and 
Eurasian affairs, Hoyt Brian Yee, testified in front of the US Senate where he referred to 
“the so-called humanitarian centre.”663 Yee expressed concern that the humanitarian 
centre could be converted into a spy centre from which Russia could collect intelligence, 
as the city of Niš is located close to Kosovo, where NATO’s KFOR troops are located 
and close to a NATO member, Bulgaria. The following month, the US Embassy staff 
even inspected the Centre and its facilities in light of allegations that it could be converted 
into a spy centre.664 
 
Due to Donald Trump’s election, the more isolationist policies he advocated, and the 
Russian presence, the claim of a new war in the Balkans became very popular among 
many observers.665 However, the reality was very different, as the US under Trump acted 
more assertively in the Balkans. In July 2017, Vice President Mike Pence met Vučić in 
Washington, where the two discussed bilateral ties, the Kosovo dispute and Serbia’s EU 
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aspirations.666 Again, Serbia faced the same old systemic impediment of avoiding conflict 
with a more powerful country and the lack of sufficient interest of the US in Serbia for 
Serbian leaders to meet the US President, as the only person able to alter relations with 
Belgrade strategically. Srećko Đukić summarised that problem: “The relations reach the 
level of the US Secretary of State or the Vice-President, but they do not have the decisive 
weight in US policies; we all know who does.”667 
 
The following month, Pence visited Podgorica where he attended the Adriatic Charter 
Summit with the Balkan leaders, where he attacked Russia and its regional policy: “As 
you all know, Russia continues to seek to redraw international borders by force and, here 
in the Western Balkans, Russia has worked to destabilise the region, undermine 
democracies and divide you from each other and from the rest of Europe.”668 The US 
acted on an old recipe of its Balkan policy of jumping in when the EU cannot solve local 
troubles. As the EU could not resolve regional crises, the US became aware that it creates 
a state similar to frozen conflict, making the region more susceptible to Russian 
influence.669 
 
This reality became obvious when Montenegro and North Macedonia joined NATO in 
2017 and 2020, respectively.670 Before North Macedonia joined NATO, US diplomatic 
intervention ended the political crisis in that country that prevented the resolution of the 
country’s name dispute with neighbouring Greece, and a political deadlock between the 
government and the opposition in Albania.671 Again, the US was the primary driver of 
these policies, showing that they are a corrective to the EU’s inability to resolve the crisis 
and that they are frequently a decisive factor for ending the power vacuum in the Balkans. 
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Despite the reservations caused by Trump’s political profile and his remarks on NATO 
being “obsolete” in the Balkans, his administration showed continuity in integrating the 
Balkans in Transatlantic structures, particularly in the context of countering Russia.672 
 
The US tried doing the same with Serbia, as it kept expressing frustration towards Serbia 
due to its ties with Russia. Speaking at the 17th Serbian Economic Summit in Belgrade, 
at the beginning of November 2017, Yee said: “You cannot sit on two chairs, especially 
if they are that far away.”673 Ivica Dačić discounted Yee’s statement: “What we do not 
want is that someone pulls our own chair from under us ... what is important is to see what 
is in our own best interest.”674 Two weeks later, Serbian paratroopers had four-day 
military exercises with their American counterparts despite Russian uneasiness, with 
Vučić attending the last day of drills.675 Serbia was not turning its back on Russia just yet, 
but it was not turning its back entirely on the US either. 
 
In November 2019, the US State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counter-
Proliferation, Sanctions Enforcement and Regional Affairs, Thomas Zarzecki, visited 
Serbia and met Vučić. The following month, Vučić announced that Serbia would finalise 
its remaining transactions concerning arms shipments from Russia, but would stop 
purchasing weaponry from Moscow after that, a move motivated by fear of US financial 
sanctions.676 This episode shows the limits of Serbo-Russian relations and that US might 
is the systemic force that imposes limitations on the Serbian balancing act. 
 
As the EU continuously failed to bring about progress in the Kosovo dialogue, the US 
again came to the fore, and Belgrade started to perceive the US under Trump as a partner 
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to leverage the Kosovo Albanians. The fact that the US role in the Kosovo dispute 
changed became obvious regarding the idea of a land swap between Belgrade and 
Priština. First, in August 2018, the US National Security Adviser John Bolton said in 
public: “Our policy, the U.S. policy, is that if the two parties can work it out between 
themselves and reach an agreement, we don’t exclude territorial adjustments. It’s really 
not for us to say.”677 In December 2018, the initiative moved up to a higher level when 
Donald Trump sent the letter to both Vučić and Thaçi to seize a historical opportunity of 
reaching a peace deal. “I look forward to hosting you and President Aleksandar Vučić at 
the White House to celebrate what would be a historic accord,” wrote Trump to Thaçi.678 
Filip Ejdus commented on this episode: “It is not like that the US is coming back to the 
Balkans or anything like that. It is just that I think their attention has slightly increased 
towards this region. It is a sign of raised interest for the superpower.”679 This raised 
interest was motivated by Trump’s desire to secure a big diplomatic win for the 2020 US 
presidential elections.680 
 
This US role changed in regards to Priština’s taxes on Serbian goods. Indeed, one 
interviewee explained the US role: “Essentially, the United States is the only power that 
can influence both Kosovo Albanians and Serbia. It is the only power at all that can 
influence the Kosovo Albanians. So, essentially there is no other power that can influence 
Priština. Priština does not care about any other power.”681 The sudden interest by the US 
in the Kosovo dispute led some to believe that while “the second league of the US 
politicians dealt with the Balkans since 2000”, now the focus “moves up to a higher level, 
and even at the table of the US President, Serbia figures as a problem”, that needs to be 
resolved.682 This statement turned out to be true in October 2019 when Trump appointed 
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Richard Grenell, a US ambassador to Germany, as a special envoy for peace negotiations 
between Serbia and Kosovo.683 
 
In January 2019, Grenell brokered the establishment of a direct flight between Belgrade 
and Priština, with President Trump personally hailing the deal on Twitter.684 Vučić was 
able to score some points with the US and Grennel. The deadlock in talks with Priština 
caused by constant infighting between Albanian political parties in Kosovo, which also 
impeded Priština in lifting tariffs against Serbia, has led the US to perceive Belgrade as 
the more cooperative in the normalisation talks.685 This was proven in March 2020 when 
US diplomatic intervention led to the fall of Albin Kurti’s government in Priština.686 In 
June 2020, Priština lifted all restrictions on the import of Serbian goods.687 That same 
month, before the planned White House meeting, Grenell got Belgrade to agree to stop 
its derecognition campaign regarding Kosovo and Priština to halt its campaign to gain 
membership in international organisations.688 
 
As the US moved from being a champion of Kosovo Albanians to being somewhere in 
the middle, Belgrade saw a potential opening where the US under Trump could become 
a potential ally.689 Vučić hoped to get a better deal under the Trump administration than 
from a Democratic administration, and Thaçi, on his way to political retirement, was more 
prepared to make a deal than any other Albanian leader in exchange for the guarantee of 
his safety.690 As Vučić said in June: “I do not believe in big changes in American policy, 
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but I do believe in small changes in the US policy, which would be of great importance 
for Serbia.”691 
 
The Kosovo issue was brought back to the EU’s mediation due to the war crimes 
indictment against Thaçi, but without the US, it is hard to imagine that the EU will bring 
about the final resolution of the dispute. As one source prophetically said: “The only way 
to resolve that issue is by foreign pressure, and again we come back to America. Only 
American pressure can potentially resolve that issue. It is completely irrelevant if the 
framework of negotiations will be within the EU or outside of the EU. Of course, it can 
be within the EU. That is logical, but again without the American mediation, nothing is 
going to happen.”692 
 
The US still has not given up on the Kosovo dispute. The day after Trump brokered a 
normalisation agreement between Israel and the UAE, Grenell invited Vučić and PM 
Hotti to a White House meeting at the beginning of September.693 The meeting resulted 
in Vučić and Hotti signing an agreement on economic normalisation in the Oval Office 
in Trump’s presence. The agreement did not involve mutual recognition, but it entailed 
the promise of US investment. Belgrade agreed freezing its campaign of de-recognising 
Priština and Priština freezing its attempt to enter into international institutions for a year. 
However, Trump tied this Serbia-Kosovo dialogue with its Middle East policy, as both 
Priština and Belgrade agreed to Israel and Kosovo recognising each other while opening 
their embassies in Jerusalem.694 Trump got the material for his re-election campaign, but 
his administration still has not closed the Balkans chapter. 
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Vučić and Serbia’s attempt to get closer to the US failed with Trump’s electoral loss and 
the emergence of Joseph Biden’s Presidency. As Biden was an ardent advocate of US 
military interventionism against Serbia in the 1990s, Serbia expects that it will not get a 
partnership with the US or a more beneficial settlement on Kosovo, but increased pressure 
from the US on the Kosovo issue instead.695 Vučić will try to use with Biden’s 
administration some of the momentum built with Trump. In his congratulatory online 
message to Biden, Vučić wrote: “I wish you wisdom and resoluteness to face current 
challenges for the benefit of America and the rest of the world. I hope we will continue 
the good cooperation we had with Trump with you as well, and I am grateful for that.”696 
 
The challenge for Vučić continues to be how to get the US to agree to a solution to the 
Kosovo issue in which Serbia is not the sole loser, and how to build a rational strategic 
rapprochement with the US. In trying to do so, Serbia will continue to use Russia as a 
diplomatic protector to balance and leverage the US.697 However, overplaying the 
Russian card might attract precisely the type of US pressure that Serbia wants to avoid. 
As one Serbian diplomat said: “He [Vučić] started to get close to Moscow again before 
Biden gives him a slap on the wrist. However, in doing so, he risks getting a hammer on 
the head instead.”698 The US will undoubtedly remain the powerful force that Belgrade 
takes into account, profoundly affecting Serbian conduct. 
 
7.3.2 Domestic Factors 
 
As usual, the relations with both the US and NATO were affected by domestic hurdles. 
The various nationalist parties tried to use every opportunity to weaponise anti-NATO 
and anti-US sentiments in the public to score domestic points. In early March 2016, two 
minor nationalist parties, Zavetnici (Oath Keepers) and the Patriotic Movement of Serbia 
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led by the retired police general Bratislav Dikić, organised an anti-NATO rally in Niš.699 
The rally was a response to Serbia’s adoption of a cooperation agreement with NATO 
Support and Procurement Organization (NSPO), and the rally organisers demanded a 
referendum on NATO membership. 
 
Vojislav Šešelj, now back from the ICTY, and the SRS organised another rally in 
Belgrade on 24 March 2016, exactly a month before the Serbian parliamentary elections. 
More importantly, the rally was marking the anniversary of the start of NATO’s bombing 
of Serbia that also corresponded with the day that the ICTY passed its ruling in the trial 
of Radovan Karadžić, the wartime leader of the Bosnian Serbs. At the rally, Šešelj 
stressed Serbia’s need to distance itself from NATO, which he called “a criminal 
alliance.”700 Even though no one in Serbia or the West is thinking of NATO membership, 
NATO remains a hot issue used to score domestically by major and minor Serbian 
nationalist parties. Consequently, the government media avoided providing a visible and 
detailed coverage of the military cooperation Serbia has with NATO and the US, although 
that cooperation is more intensive and substantive than Serbian cooperation with 
Russia.701 
 
Vučić and the SNS occasionally also tended to attack the US for political purposes. In 
June 2016, when Vučić cancelled a trip to Brussels over tabloid assertions that the EU 
was organising protests in Serbia, he also cancelled a trip to the US on an inaugural Air 
Serbia flight to New York.702 This is pure propaganda intended for domestic usage, as 
one can observe Vučić’s tendency to switch narratives. As one source observed: “On one 
hand we organise manifestation of grievance against NATO, and on the other hand 
 
699 Sasa Dragojlo, ‘Anti-NATO Protesters Demand Referendum in Serbia’, Balkan Insight, 4 March 2016, 
https://balkaninsight.com/2016/03/04/serbian-rightists-protest-demanding-referendum-on-nato-
membership-03-04-2016/, accessed 17-06-2020 
700 ‘Seselj's Radicals rally in Belgrade’, B92, 25 March 2016, 
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=03&dd=25&nav_id=97481, accessed 17-
06-2020 
701 Sasa Dragojlo, ‘Serbian Army Trains More With NATO Than Russia’, Balkan Insight, 31 August 2016, 
https://balkaninsight.com/2016/08/31/serbia-s-nato-army-cooperation-beats-russia-significantly-08-30-
2016/, accessed 19-07-2020 




Vučić’s consultants are Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair, while he also goes to the 
Clinton Foundation to get a pat on the shoulder from Bill Clinton.”703 
 
When Biden visited Belgrade in August 2016, domestic hurdles again came to the fore as 
nationalist tried to make a political show for domestic usage by attacking the US. During 
Biden’s visit, hundreds of SRS sympathisers and members led by Vojislav Šešelj marched 
through Belgrade and chanted “Vote for Trump!”, wearing T-shirts with Donald Trump’s 
face on them. Šešelj addressed his followers: “Trump is the alternative to globalisation. 
He will destroy old centers of power in the United States and he is a supporter of Russia” 
while calling Serbs in the US to vote for Trump in the 2016 US Presidential elections.704 
 
However, while the US was still a domestic risk, it was also something that Vučić and his 
government try to use to score domestic points. These domestic points do not solely relate 
to securing US acquiescence to his rule, but also using relations with the US in domestic 
promotion. As one of Vučić’s voters explained: “He is ready to cooperate with everyone, 
Europe, Russia, America.  Anything that is good for our Serbia.”705 Vučić promotes 
himself as an internationally respected leader, trying to assert Serbia as a partner with 
more powerful countries to defend the national interest. 
 
When Donald Trump entered the White House, the situation changed further. “We should 
be aware that Serbia is one of the rare countries in Europe in which the victory of both 
George W. Bush and Donald Trump was celebrated, and in both cases for the same 
reasons. They are seen as Christian fundamentalists or people close to Christian 
fundamentalism, and Christian fundamentalists have a much more relaxed position 
regarding Kosovo. This position is much closer to Belgrade’s views than to the Priština’s 
views. So, whoever comes from that milieu of Christian fundamentalism in America is 
likely to be very popular in Serbia,” an interviewee told the author.706 The rhetoric, formal 
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statements and media reports started revolving around the same themes that the EU-
brokered talks have failed and that only the US can knock some sense into Albanians.707 
 
As Maxim Samorukov told the author: “The United States is still emotionally perceived 
as the enemy by Serbian society, and there is huge mistrust, genuine mistrust, public 
mistrust towards the United States, and the Serbs are far more allergic to the United States 
than to any Europeans. But on the other hand, I have strong doubts that the conflicts that 
Serbia is a party to can be solved without United States help.”708 Belgrade was between 
the systemic imperative of having an accord with the USA and the domestic impediment 
of long-term mistrust towards the US. The fact that a different US president was in the 
White House led the Serbian leadership to bypass this domestic obstacle. 
 
This can be interpreted in several ways. First, the relations with the US became a slightly 
easier domestic sale in Serbia with Trump in the White House. The perception of Trump 
in Serbia is more favourable, as Trump, unlike previous US presidents like Clinton or 
Obama, is not perceived as responsible for Kosovo’s independence.709 Second, by 
projecting these types of news into public discourse, Vučić and the SNS were preparing 
the Serbian public to be more receptive to any settlement on Kosovo that Vučić 
negotiates. Ultimately, it was another way for Vučić and his party to score domestically 
by promoting themselves as respectable statesmen announcing a partnership with the 
American superpower. 
 
Vučić kept sending messages to his public that Serbia has the best chance to extract a less 
painful Kosovo settlement under Trump’s watch. As Vučić said in June: “We have ahead 
of us six months of a tough political struggle for our national interests in Kosovo and 
Metohija and for the rights of our people there … For us, there is no happy solution there, 
whatever it may be. We cannot be particularly satisfied. I cannot lie to the people.”710 
These six months corresponded with the US presidential elections, and Vučić’s decision 
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to hold Serbian elections in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic was in part motivated 
by the need to consolidate power ahead of tough Kosovo talks with the US.711 
 
After the economic normalisation agreement was signed in the White House, Vučić 
praised Trump’s role while presenting the deal as Serbia’s score, and stressing that Serbia 
did not recognise independent Kosovo with the agreement, evidently aiming at the 
Serbian public.712 Vučić will face the challenge to get a settlement on Kosovo with the 
US with all the domestic risks it entails. This challenge will be even more severe with 
Biden in the White House. Biden’s unpopularity in Serbia will make it very difficult for 
Vučić to compromise on Kosovo or relations with Russia, particularly if the Serbian 
public perceives him as doing so under US pressure.713 Domestic politics continues to be 
a thorn in the side of US-Serbian relations. 
 
7.4 Serbia and Russia 
 
The Ukrainian Crisis, in systemic terms, played a crucial role in shaping Serbian policy 
towards Russia. After the Ukrainian Crisis, the systemic environment became more 
hostile, creating the need for Serbia to maintain a balance between Russia and the West. 
Serbia boosted its ties with Russia to balance and play Russia and the West against each 
other. The Kosovo dispute remained a powerful systemic force keeping Belgrade close to 
Moscow. Over time, Russian influence in the Balkans declined, with the Kosovo dispute 
left as the last remaining element of the Serbo-Russian partnership. In domestic terms, 
party politics played a significant role as Belgrade could not afford to have a tough policy 
on Moscow, given Russia’s popularity among the Serbian population. Instead, the 
balancing act was a way for the Serbian leadership to court both pro-Western and pro-
Russian voters. The domestic vulnerability of the Serbian government to Kosovo 
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7.4.1 Systemic Factors 
 
The Russia-West divide caused by the Ukraine Crisis was the systemic process that 
impacted the Serbian balancing act the most. The strategic tensions that followed the 
Ukrainian Crisis made the balancing act a more assiduous task. Ejdus noted that the 
Ukraine Crisis was a shock to which Serbia had no adequate response: “I think that Serbia 
in the Ukraine Crisis is really lost. When the crisis in Ukraine started, in the first few 
weeks you had extremely contradictory statements. I think that the country was totally 
lost in space.”714 
 
For the Serbian leadership, the Ukraine Crisis indicated a multipolar order in which 
numerous powers compete amongst themselves. This multipolar system was supposed to 
be one composed of five to twenty global and regional powers and the one in which 
balance between the West and the East, namely Russia and China, was being 
established.715 As one source briefly stated: “A change came along. There is a change in 
the worldview and the fact that on the international scene, you no longer have one power 
that determines all international trends.”716 In the words of Slobodan Samardžić: “The 
Ukraine Crisis has truly polarised the world, and our leadership was completely without 
a response.”717 The initial Serbian reaction was avoiding getting caught in a crossfire.718 
In this dangerous world, Serbia believed the only feasible way to protect itself was finding 
a balance between Russia and the West. 
 
That Belgrade started playing a new game in regards to Russia became very apparent in 
October 2014. While the West was panicking over Russian actions in Ukraine, Putin was 
the guest of honour at a big military parade in Belgrade, marking the 70th anniversary of 
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the liberation of Belgrade from Nazi occupation with the Red Army’s help.719  Putin also 
used the opportunity to throw down a gauntlet to the West. In an interview with Serbian 
daily “Politika”, Putin took on the US and its exceptionalism by indirectly comparing it 
to Nazi Germany. As Putin said: “Today it is also important that people in different 
countries and on different continents remember what terrible consequences may result 
from the belief in one’s exceptionality, attempts to achieve dubious geopolitical goals, no 
matter by what means, and disregard for basic norms of law and morality. We must do 
everything in our power to prevent such tragedies in the future.”720 As one interviewee 
told the author: “Putin can show that there are countries in Europe like Hungary and 
Serbia that he can visit. That he is not as isolated as it seems.”721 
 
For Russia, Serbia and the Balkans became a theatre where they can oppose the West at 
a low cost, particularly in light of the vacuum left by the deadlock in EU integrations. 
Indeed, the withdrawal of the EU from the Balkans coincides with the Ukrainian 
conflict.722 The logic of the Balkans as Europe’s “soft underbelly” became particularly 
potent after the Ukraine Crisis of 2014, as Russia became more motivated to assert itself 
in the Balkans and disrupt the West. This is both because Russia recognises an opening 
to expand its influence and because the Balkans are perceived as the place where Russia 
can leverage the West, primarily the EU. For Spyros Economides, the Balkans as 
Europe’s “soft underbelly” allows Russia to expand its influence among the countries 
expected to become part of the West.723 For Russia, opposing the EU in the Balkans and 
Serbia was also a way to show to the countries in the post-Soviet space, like Georgia and 
Moldova, that the EU path is difficult and potentially dangerous and should not be 
pursued.724 The desire to have a potentially Russian-friendly EU member motivated 
Russia to be more delicate when commenting on Serbia’s EU aspirations. Speaking with 
the Serbian press in February 2018 and in regards to the EU’s enlargement strategy that 
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requires Serbian harmonising its foreign policy with the EU, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov criticised the EU for forcing Serbia to choose between Russia and the 
West.725 
 
Membership of NATO was something that Russia tried to obstruct in Serbia and the 
Balkans more forcefully. Russia was motivated by the desire to obstruct the EU and 
NATO in their backyard. Russia saw this as a payback for the fact that the West was 
intruding on Russia’s backyard in the post-Soviet space. For Bechev, this was a message 
to the West: “You mess in our backyard, we stir things up in yours. For every Moldova, 
there’s a Montenegro. For every Ukraine, there is a Serbia.”726 Being outside the EU and 
NATO, Serbia was suitable for Russia’s efforts to muster a response to the Ukrainian 
Crisis and NATO expansion in post-Soviet space.727 That way, Russia gets the 
opportunity to obstruct the expansion of NATO and the EU in the Balkans, deterring these 
institutions from expanding into post-Soviet space and a chance to stop blocking that 
process in exchange for the West accepting Russia’s sphere of influence in the post-Soviet 
space.728 
 
For Serbia and other countries in the Balkans, using the notion of the Russian threat to 
gather support from the West became a prevalent tactic.729 In a systemic and regional 
context, in which the Balkans were not receiving enough Western support and the 
relationship between Russia and the West becoming more confrontational, using Russia 
as leverage with the West became a default policy for Belgrade. Belgrade believed that if 
it leaves the impression that it has a more confident Moscow behind it, Serbia has more 
leverage and bargaining power in its relationship with both the US and the EU. 
 
The security partnership has also started to gain momentum. In its public statements, 
Russian diplomats favoured Serbia granting diplomatic immunity to the Russian staff 
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within the Serbian-Russian Humanitarian Centre in Niš, drawing a direct analogy to the 
status that NATO has in Serbia.730 Despite that, the Russian Foreign Ministry would 
frequently discount as “absurd” all the US concerns that the Russian-Serbian centre acts 
as a spy centre.731 The trilateral military exercise called “Slavic Brotherhood”, which 
involves the Russian, Serbian and Belarusian army started to be held annually from 2015, 
with Serbia hosting the drill in 2016 and 2019.732 The Slavic Brotherhood 2015 was a 
Russian provocation to the West in light of the Ukraine Crisis. The exercise involved 
combat against “a coloured revolution”, with a scenario involving anti-government 
protest turning into a riot with armed groups engaging in terrorism and political 
destabilisation.733 
 
A year before, in November 2014, a bilateral counter-terrorism exercise was conducted 
by Serbian and Russian military, near the Serbian city of Ruma and close to the border 
with NATO member state Croatia. Unlike Serbian Defence Minister Bratislav Gašić, who 
downplayed the exercise, stating that “there is nothing special here that could be 
considered a sensation”, the Russian media provided theatrical and lavish coverage.734 
Serbia tried to keep doors open to both NATO and Russia. The Slavic Brotherhood 2015 
exercise was hosted by Serbia, while NATO carried a drill “Montenegro 2016” in Serbia’s 
neighbouring country, a drill in which the Serbian military also participated.735 
 
Serbia also tried to use Russia to modernise its outdated equipment originating from the 
days of former Yugoslavia. The Serbian air force has been the beneficiary of military 
cooperation with Russia, as with its outdated military hardware, it was not able to 
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effectively police Serbian air space. The most important transaction has been the 
agreement from December 2016, when PM Vučić and Russian Defence Minister Sergei 
Shoigu agreed that Russia gives Serbia six MiG-29 warplanes, alongside 30 T-72S tanks, 
and 30 combat reconnaissance vehicles BRDM-2 armed with 14.5mm cannons.736 The 
Serbian Defence Ministry also secured from its Russian counterparts the delivery of four 
Mi-17 transport helicopters and four Mi-35 attack helicopters.737 
 
The Serbo-Russian partnership has been filled with contradictions and limitations, 
showing that the relationship was a simple partnership of convenience. In December 
2014, Russia cancelled the South Stream project due to the EU objection.738 The 
economic ties also showed that the partnership is limited. As stated earlier, in 2019 the 
EU constituted 62 per cent of Serbia’s total trade,.739 The security partnership is no 
different. For Russia, the humanitarian centre in Niš, military drills and transactions 
involving military equipment with Serbia is a way to irritate the West and present itself 
as a rival power to the West. For Serbia, this was the way to maintain the pretence of 
military equidistance between Russia and the West. 
 
However, the humanitarian centre is where the Serbian balancing act would break if 
Russia were to become more assertive in requesting diplomatic status, leading to a more 
vigorous Western pushback and Belgrade caught in the crossfire.740 However, the 
humanitarian centre remains reduced to a single building with a couple of people inside. 
Any plan to upgrade it amounts to “political suicide” for Serbia and is nothing more than 
“a Cold War wet dream.”741 The security partnership with Moscow is also impeded by 
the structural factor of geography, as Serbia is encircled with NATO and EU members. 
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As Srećko Đukić stated: “The only way Russia can deliver military aid to us is if they dig 
up a deep tunnel from the Urals to Avala (the mountain overlooking Belgrade) or from 
outer space.”742 Serbia saw a glimpse of that in July 2019, when Romania blocked a transit 
of Russian secondhand tanks and armoured vehicles that Russia shipped to Serbia via the 
Danube River.743 
 
Moreover, this relationship was not the altruistic partnership Belgrade and Moscow 
pretended to be if one looks at military drills and military equipment supplied by Moscow. 
Indeed, in 2019 Serbia conducted 13 military exercises with NATO members and four 
with Russia.744 According to the document published by the Serbian Ministry of Defence 
containing an overview of all military donations that Serbia received between 2008 and 
2018, the US was the most significant military donor, followed by China, Norway, 
Denmark and the UK, with Russia only being the ninth biggest donor.745 
 
Moscow did provide the MiGs to Belgrade free of charge, but Serbia still had to pay close 
to USD 235 million to Russia for the assembly, repair, and refurbishing of these jets.746 
Serbia gets military equipment from Russia and the West, showing that it tries extracting 
benefits from both without leaning entirely towards either one of them. Indeed, Vučić 
prides himself on Russian helicopters Mi-35 and Mi-17 helicopters, but he does the same 
in the case of H-145M helicopters produced by the European multinational Airbus.747 
 
Russia also has upped the ante on its soft power operations in Serbia, pushing forward 
pro-Russian narratives through public diplomacy, news sites and social media. The list of 
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issues on which Russia shapes the pro-Russian and anti-Western narrative entails, among 
other things: the NATO intervention in Kosovo, US wars in the Middle East, the migrant 
crisis, the rise of jihadism worldwide, coloured revolutions in places like Ukraine, 
economic neoliberalism, as well as the promotion of multiculturalism and political 
correctness by the EU.748 As Bechev wrote: “Moscow is in a position to rally public 
support and exercise leverage from within domestic politics, which in turn adds to its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the government of the country in question.”749 
 
Later on, Serbia saw that Russian influence in the Balkans declined rapidly as 
Monetengro and North Macedonia joined NATO. Russia suffered another setback. In 
August 2018, Greece expelled Russian diplomats for communicating with political 
groups in Greece that opposed the settlement of name dispute with North Macedonia to 
sabotage the agreement and derail North Macedonian membership in NATO.750 In 2018, 
Russian experienced a whole set of defeats, making its position in the Balkans the worst 
since 2008.751 
 
However, the limits of Russian influence in the Balkans still has not forced Serbia to give 
up on the option of using Russia to leverage the West. In January 2019, Vladimir Putin 
visited Belgrade where, according to Serbian media, he was greeted by 120,000 people 
in front of the Orthodox Church of Saint Sava in Belgrade.752 Đukić told the author that 
the logic behind Putin’s visit was the same as in the case of his 2014 attendance at a 
military parade: “These visits are both manifestational and geopolitical. That way, 
Belgrade is sending the message: Look! We have an alternative. We can rely on 
Russia.”753 Belgrade pulled the same trick in October 2019 when Russian PM Dmitry 
Medvedev visited Belgrade. This visit was followed by the Serbo-Russian joint exercise 
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“Slavic Shield 2019”, where Russia used its S-400 air defence system and Pantsir missile 
battery for the first time in an exercise abroad.754 
 
Serbian ties with Russia were still not trusting. In November 2019, a 2018 video emerged 
in which a Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer, stationed in the Russian embassy 
in Belgrade, was bribing a Serbian retired military officer.755 In a sense, Vučić tried to 
use the situation to extract goodwill from the West for being the victim of Russian 
meddling and to distance himself superficially from Moscow while continuing to 
cooperate with Russia on an arms deal and pipeline project, the TurkStream.756 Vučić met 
Putin in Sochi the next month to show that relations were not damaged by the spy scandal, 
but this was also important for Vučić as he still needed Russia on board on the Kosovo 
issue.757 
 
However, this partnership is not what it used to be, as Moscow realises that Vučić’s 
regime is closer to the West than to Russia, and as Serbia saw Moscow’s declining clout 
in the Balkans. Indeed, by the time of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Serbian government 
and media did not greet the Russian medical aid to Serbia with the same enthusiasm as 
China’s, showing that Belgrade was slowly replacing Moscow with Beijing as its primary 
non-Western partner.758 In September 2020, after what Serbian Defence Minister 
Aleksandar Vulin described as “terrible and undeserved pressure from the European 
Union”, Serbia cancelled the traditional military exercise with Russia and Belarus. To 
maintain a mirage of balance, Belgrade suspended for six months military drills with all 
military partners, including NATO, even though NATO and Serbia did not plan any 
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during that period.759 In an attempt to reclaim some of its lost influence and prestige, the 
Russian Defence Ministry proposed opening a military office in Serbia to help resolve 
military and technical issues in Russian-Serbian cooperation.760 Serbia accepted the 
Russian initiative, showing that it does not want to sever all ties with Russia. However, 
the question remains how long will Serbia be able to pursue its balancing act and its 
relations with Russia. 
 
The Kosovo dispute as always acted as a powerful systemic force in relations with Russia. 
As the Kosovo dispute resolution with EU backing was not an easy task, Serbia still 
needed Russia to achieve a better deal. The SNS government tried to use Russia to get 
some breathing space from the West, as it became aware that it will be hard to fulfil a 
promise of normalisation with Kosovo. As one source stated: “When they [SNS] realised 
that it will not be easy to implement everything from the Brussels Agreement and that 
there was a lot of work to be done, they slightly turned towards Russia to show to the EU 
that they have another card up their sleeve.”761 Later on, as Serbia became engaged in a 
derecognition campaign in places like Africa, the Russian diplomatic and political 
backing in that endeavour was also needed.762 To prevent Kosovo from entering into 
UNESCO and INTERPOL, Serbia had to cooperate with Russia as well.763 
 
The Ukraine crisis also made life difficult for Belgrade on the Kosovo issue. Mićunović 
himself stated that “The Ukraine Crisis is extremely harmful to Serbia. The referendum 
in the Crimea was bad news for Serbia, despite the attempts to conceal it.”764 Although 
Ukraine does not recognise independent Kosovo, Belgrade could not support Kyiv as 
Belgrade needed Moscow’s veto in the UN Security Council. Also, Belgrade could not 
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support Western opposition to the annexation of Crimea when most Western countries 
recognised Kosovo’s independence. 
 
What made the Serbian balancing act extremely complicated was that Russia frequently 
made analogies between Crimea and Kosovo. In March 2014, Putin said: “In a situation 
absolutely the same as the one in Crimea they [the West] recognised Kosovo’s secession 
from Serbia as legitimate, arguing that no permission from a country’s central authority 
for a unilateral declaration of independence is necessary.”765 In 2016, in an interview with 
Bloomberg, Putin went even further by invoking the ICIJ’s advisory opinion on Kosovo 
from 2010 to justify a Crimean referendum on joining Russia.766 
 
On the Kosovo front, Serbo-Russian relations became more complicated when the idea 
of a land swap came into circulation. Vučić visited Moscow in October 2018 trying to 
secure Putin’s support for the idea of the land swap and possible recognition of Kosovo, 
but “was given the cold shoulder”, and Putin’s visit to Belgrade initially scheduled for 
November 2018 was postponed.767 The cold shoulder was because Putin did not want the 
Kosovo dispute to be resolved in a way that excludes Russia and denies Russia the 
opportunity to ask something in return in the great power bargaining with the West, 
primarily the US.768 
 
When Putin visited Belgrade in January 2019, Serbia’s challenge was to have Putin agree 
to a Kosovo settlement. Russia knew that a Kosovo dispute resolution leaves Russia 
without influence and leads Serbia to tilt towards the West.769 Međak said that Russia 
would not give up on the Kosovo asset for free: “In the Western Balkans, Russia has no 
military forces, but it has political influence via the UN Security Council. It is a clear 
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shot. Why would Russia miss a clear shot? You never know when you might cash that 
clear shot for something else.”770 The question remains unanswered. As Vučić kept 
engaging the US on Kosovo, he still tried to have Russian support. On 18 June 2020, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Serbia, and six days later, Vučić visited 
Moscow to attend the postponed Victory Parade marking the Soviet victory in World War 
II, corresponding with Vučić trying to resolve the Kosovo issue with Grenell.771 However, 
Serbia was still distancing itself from Russia. 
 
Starting with July 2020 protests in Serbia, and alongside Vučić meeting Macron and 
Merkel in Paris, the pro-government tabloids and media began accusing pro-Russian, 
anti-EU right-wingers of fomenting protests to derail Vučić and his attempt to resolve the 
Kosovo issue under Western guidance. This was done to court the West by creating a 
false perception of the Russian threat. The Russian Ambassador in Serbia kept denying 
the allegations, but it is evident that Serbia is willing to scapegoat Russia to muster 
Western support.772 When Vučić met Trump in the White House, Maria Zakharova, the 
spokesperson of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, caused ire amongst Serbian officials 
when she compared photos from the meeting with the scenes from the erotic thriller 
“Basic Instinct.”773 While the Russian side apologised, it remains clear that Serbo-
Russian ties are past their prime and that Russia was not happy that Serbia was following 
the US lead on Kosovo and degrading Russian influence in the process. 
 
The Kosovo issue will continue to affect Serbian balancing until it is resolved. Indeed, in 
September 2020, after the White House meeting with Trump, Vučić had a telephone 
conversation with Putin in which Vučić still talked of Serbia as a partner of Russia. 
Regarding Kosovo, Putin stated that “Russia had not changed its position in searching for 
a balanced and compromise solution acceptable to Belgrade which should be verified by 
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the UN Security Council.”774 Putin flashed his veto in the Security Council, sending a 
message that Kosovo is an asset that Russia will not renounce unless the US gives 
something in return. However, suppose the US decides to indulge Russia and engage in a 
great power bargain on Kosovo with Putin. In that case, the Kosovo issue is “out in the 
orbit where Serbia has no saying.”775 In that case, Serbia will again become the casualty 
of the cruel realities of the international system. 
 
In the meantime, Serbia will still be forced to keep Russia around. The emergence of the 
Biden Presidency and the pressure that Serbia expects from Washington regarding 
Kosovo has forced Belgrade to perform a partial repivot towards Moscow. In December 
2020, Serbia voted against the UN General Assembly resolution calling on Russia to end 
the “temporary occupation” of Crimea as soon as possible.776 Through this vote, Serbia 
and Vučić were getting closer to Russia to get protection from Biden and the US.777 Soon 
after, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Belgrade, where he met with Vučić to 
discuss Kosovo, the TurkStream project and bilateral ties.778 
 
Lavrov’s visit showed that Serbia still tried to extract benefits from cooperating with 
Russia while using Russia to extract concessions from third parties, primarily the West. 
After meeting with Lavrov, Vučić commented on the Turkstream project by saying Serbia 
is ready to import gas from all sources but that no one offered a better price than 
Moscow.779 A cunning statement where Vučić praised cooperation with Russia while also 
sending a message to outsiders that he is willing to hear them if they have a better offer.  
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Even the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines fits into the rubric of Serbia repivoting 
towards Russia. At the end of December, Serbia took delivery of the first batch of Russian 
made Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine.780 Beyond the health necessity, purchasing vaccines 
from Moscow was a way for Belgrade to court Moscow and leverage the West.781 The 
Serbo-Russian partnership has been significantly downgraded, and it can be said that it is 
a “partnership past its prime”, but it is not a terminated partnership.782 As long as Serbia 
needs Russia on Kosovo and lacks strategic accommodation with the West, Russia will 
remain a factor in Belgrade’s policy thinking. 
 
7.4.2 Domestic Factors 
 
The logic of political survival has been a major force impacting Belgrade’s desire to 
engage Moscow more assertively. Apart from the more pragmatic Vučić and pro-Russian 
figurehead Nikolić, Ivica Dačić was one of the more effective voices in the pro-Russian 
camp of the Serbian political hierarchy, even advocating for granting diplomatic status to 
Russian staff at the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre in Niš.783 The ruling coalition 
gathered around the SNS to this very day brings together a large grouping of minor 
political parties, some of which never participated in the elections independently. Even 
though these minor political parties do not contribute to the electoral rating and success 
of the SNS, they are co-opted into the ruling coalition to extend the political front to 
include both pro-Russian and pro-Western figures and groups by his side.784 
 
The main reason why Serbian leaders decided to play the Russian card in domestic 
politics post-2014, even more powerfully than before, was the high popularity of Russia 
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and Putin in Serbia. For example, in January 2018, Putin was the most popular foreign 
leader in Serbia, with 80 per cent of Serbians showing sympathy.785 The Serbian public 
started to perceive Russia as Serbia’s main protector, irrespective of the lack of deep 
substance in the Serbo-Russian relationship, so Serbian leaders could not join the anti-
Russian policies of the West.786 
 
The Serbian leadership is also faced with a strong political symbolism of the 1990s that 
distinguishes people as patriots and traitors. In that context, “whoever opposes Russia 
openly is very likely to seen as a traitor by major parts of the population. So, if you want 
to win elections, you are not going to do that.”787 Naturally, Serbia’s democratic 
backsliding also helped the Serbian balancing act as the Russian factor became a way of 
deterring the EU from openly attacking the declining state of democracy in Serbia.788 As 
one source said: “The benefit that Serbian leadership expects is to avoid being destabilised 
by foreign factors, either from the West or from the East. Tadić followed the European 
path only to be betrayed by Germany, which revoked its support.”789 
 
The domestic vulnerability of the Serbian leadership to the issue of Kosovo also re-
energised the Russian factor. Ivo Visković explained to the author that the SNS and Vučić 
are engaged in “foreign policy for domestic usage” or “foreign policy in the function of 
domestic politics” as there is the “Sword of Damocles” hanging over the ruling elites in 
the form of the Kosovo dispute. As Visković said: “Everyone knows that it cannot be 
resolved in a way that is good for Serbia, and no one wants to assume full responsibility 
because they are aware that they can lose a lot as a result. That is the game. In that type 
of situation, Russia appears as a sort of deus ex machina, as some form of a saviour.”790 
As it was said to the author: “The position of political elites in Serbia regarding Kosovo 
is very insincere. Actually, political elites do not care about Kosovo. It is absolutely all 
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the same to them if Kosovo were a part of Serbia or Mongolia. The only reason they 
mention it is that they are afraid of public opinion.”791 
 
Vučić, being aware of this reality, started playing the Russian card to gain an advantage 
for himself and his party by showing his electorate that he has Moscow’s support and that 
he is willing to promote cooperation with Russia. In March 2014, Vučić visited Moscow 
between the parliamentary elections and him becoming the new PM, establishing a 
practice of interstate visits with Russia that correspond with Serbian electoral cycles.792 
The invocation of Orthodox Christianity and brotherhood with Russia is Vučić pleasing 
pro-Russian voters as “what you do with others worldwide, you have to present it to your 
market, to your constituents,” in the words of former Serbian PM Zoran Živković.793 
 
In November 2014, two Serbian MPs from the ranks of the SNS acted as observers during 
elections organised by the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. While the 
two MPs claimed to have visited Donetsk and Lugansk in a private capacity, the 
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry summoned the Serbian Ambassador in Kyiv due to this 
issue.794 Serbian politicians proved they could be even more provocative in invoking 
nationalism and Russophilia to promote themselves domestically. The delegation led by 
the new president of the DSS, Sanda Rašković-Ivić and the president of Dveri, Boško 
Obradović, in October 2015 visited Crimea and met the Crimean Prime Minister and 
members of the Crimean regional legislature.795 Obradović took the scandal to a whole 
new level when he responded to Ukraine’s protest over his visit to Crimea. “In my 
response, I said for us Crimea is part of Russia just like Kosovo is a part of Serbia. In this 
case, we do not agree with the position of our government. We think that it is like this. 
The position of our government is disrespectful toward Russia’s territorial integrity.”796 
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Public opinion and the media landscape have also helped the Serbian balancing act. While 
Russian soft power operations have been mentioned earlier, these should not be 
exaggerated. Despite the talks in 2015 that RT (formerly Russia Today) would start to 
broadcast its program in Serbian,797 it has not happened to this very day. This implies the 
strong influence of local agency rather than purely Russian induced media content.798 As 
Šutanovac said: “There are Serbian media that for some time now are engaged in the 
campaign against the EU, convincing the citizens that the EU is collapsing or that it is on 
the verge of collapsing, while the Eurasian Union or the  Russian-led Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) are thriving, making the future that Serbia should be a part 
of.”799 This media landscape was also pronounced in the coverage of the Serbo-Russian 
military partnership that received greater and more favourable coverage than the more 
developed collaboration with the West, calibrated to Russia’s popularity in Serbia and 
intended as a PR boost for Vučić.800 
 
As the 2016 parliamentary elections were approaching, the situation looked very good for 
Russia when it comes to its place in the Serbian party arena. During the SRS rally on 24 
March 2016, Šešelj told his supporters that Serbia must decide between Russia and the 
EU, whose members are “traditional enemies” of Serbia.801 The election results were also 
good for Moscow as the Russia-friendly parties entered the parliament in both the ruling 
coalition and the opposition.  
 
After winning the Serbian parliamentary elections in May 2016, Vučić visited Moscow, 
where he met with Putin.802 In June 2016, at the time when Vučić was cancelling his trips 
to Brussels and New York, Russia insisted that the SPS and Dačić remain in the ruling 
coalition with Vučić due to their openly pro-Russian stance.803 The DSS and Dveri, who 
were now in Parliament, and the SNP led by Nenad Popović, now a coalition partner of 
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the SNS, attended the congress of United Russia in Moscow in June 2016, Putin’s party 
and the ruling party in Russia. On that occasion, these parties signed with United Russia 
a declaration directed against NATO expansion in the region as the signatories agreed to 
work on “establishing militarily neutral, sovereign states in Southeast Europe.”804 
 
The pro-Russian elements in Serbian domestic politics are also being used by the Serbian 
leadership in its balancing act, as it tries to leverage the West. Namely, Vučić and his 
entourage could always present themselves to the US and the EU as moderate, pro-
European reformers surrounded domestically by the pro-Russian opponents who would 
turn Serbia towards Russia unless the West gives support to Vučić’s rule.805 As Bechev 
wrote: “when there is a geopolitical challenger, the West’s focus shifts from 
transformation to stability. That is why the EU, as well as the U.S., seems prepared to cut 
some slack for Balkan leaders to ensure they don’t fall into Russia’s lap. The scarier Putin 
is, the more leeway Balkan wannabe-Putins have.”806 
 
In 2017 another domestic reshuffling took place. As Serbia was preparing for the 
presidential elections, Vučić and the SNS were going for the option of Vučić running for 
the post as he was deemed to be the most powerful and popular politician whose victory 
was inevitable. Eventually, Nikolić had to step aside and let Vučić run. Nikolić was left 
to lead the National Council for Coordination of Cooperation with the Russian Federation 
and the People’s Republic of China, a body formed especially for Nikolić as a sinecure 
and pay-off for not running.807 Again, a more pragmatic Vučić prevailed over the pro-
Russian Nikolić.808 A couple of days before his presidential win, Vučić met Putin in 
Moscow once again.809 Vučić saw Putin the same way he met Angela Merkel to promote 
himself as leader respected internationally and win both pro-European and pro-Russian 
voters. 
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Vučić continued using the Russian factor in the domestic political struggle during Putin’s 
January 2019 visit. However, by this point, it was evident that he was not sincerely close 
with Putin and Russia the way Nikolić and Dačić were.810 Vučić scored with this visit as 
he showed his ability to counter mass protests by organising a big rally for Putin.811 The 
visit did show that Moscow did not perceive Vučić as a pro-Russian leader, as Putin 
addressed the crowd with a simple “Thank you for your friendship” in Serbian and 
Russian, after foot-dragging and persistent pleas from Serbian hosts.812 However, the 
central challenge for Vučić remained the risky prospect of Putin sabotaging any Kosovo 
settlement that Vučić negotiates, as this would lead to Vučić’s political downfall, as most 
Serbs would perceive this situation as Putin being firmer on Kosovo than Vučić.813 
 
Many opposition leaders tried to weaponise the Kosovo issue and relations with Russia 
to counter Vučić’s dominance. However, for some of the sources, the pro-EU parties care 
even less about Kosovo than Vučić. Still, they are engaged in the policy to stay 
competitive, creating discrepancies between what they say in public and what they 
believe.814 During the 2019 protests, the idea of using pro-Russian sympathies in Serbian 
public opinion to unite anti-Vučić forces and try to steal the SNS votes, particularly as 
the EU narrative no longer had the same pull, was very much present.815 
 
This tactic never worked for the opposition, but Vučić still used the Russia card. In 
October 2019, Vučić used Medvedev’s visit for domestic promotion as Medvedev 
attended a military parade marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of Belgrade’s liberation 
from Nazi occupation, and as Russia used the powerful S-400s in a military exercise.816 
In June 2020, when Lavrov visited Belgrade and when Vučić went for a parade in 
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Moscow, these visits were timed for the period before and after the parliamentary 
elections to show the SNS voters that Vučić still enjoys Russian support, especially on 
Kosovo.817 
 
However, Vučić is aware that Russian popularity can be a domestic trap as well. Vučić 
and his media avoided naming Putin as complicit in alleged subversive actions against 
the Belgrade regime during the July 2020 protests. However, the anti-Russian rhetoric 
was a way for Vučić to suppress any future pro-Russian backlash in Serbia against the 
agreement with Priština.818 Vučić will still play the Russian card carefully given the 
unresolved Kosovo dispute and Russian popularity among the Serbs, where forty per cent 
of Serbs in late 2020 perceived Russia as Serbia’s best friend.819 That became evident in 
October 2020 when Vučić announced that SPS would be part of the new government led 
by Ana Brnabić and Ivica Dačić, taking over as parliament speaker.820 
 
The SPS was proof that Russian influence in Serbia was downgraded but not eliminated. 
Dušan Bajatović, a pro-Russian cadre of the SPS, who remained the general director of 
Srbijagas, the state-owned natural gas provider, was the target of public contempt by 
Zorana Mihalović, the Western-leaning Energy Minister and Deputy PM.821 Despite these 
frictions, the SPS, Dačić and Bajatović were still around, and so are the Russians. The 
declining status of SPS in the Serbian government coalition reflects the scaling down in 
Russian influence. However, as long as the SPS is still in the government, even in a 
diminished capacity, Russia is not out of the picture. 
 
Serbian leadership continues to use Russia as a tool of domestic legitimacy. During 
Lavrov’s December 2020 visit to Belgrade, he and Vučić visited the fully renovated Saint 
Sava Cathedral, partly financed by Russia, and the two laid flowers on the grave of 
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Serbian Patriarch Irinej, who had died of COVID-19 the previous month.822 The 
acquisition of the Russian COVID-19 vaccine Sputnik V by Serbia is also a way to court 
pro-Russian parts of the Serbian electorate.823 The conclusion is self-evident: Russia 
continues to be a factor in Serbian domestic politics that will undoubtedly affect 
Belgrade’s foreign policy in the future. The domestic sensitivity to the unresolved Kosovo 




This chapter showed the final and most essential stage in the Serbian balancing act, a 
period when the balancing act between Russia and the West was at the highest intensity 
and highly unpredictable as Serbia constantly readjusted its behaviour depending on the 
circumstances. This was the product of a particular combination of systemic and domestic 
forces prevalent during the designated period. 
 
Regarding the systemic factors, the old casual forces of the power vacuum and the 
unresolved Kosovo dispute remained in play. The Ukraine Crisis and the rivalry between 
Russia and the West that followed exacerbated these systemic trends. The power vacuum 
came as the EU’s attention became even less focused on the Balkans, decreasing the 
incentive for Belgrade to follow the EU’s lead in its foreign policy. In those 
circumstances, the other powers were able to play a more active role. As the Ukraine 
Crisis transformed Russia’s relations with the West, the Balkans became a fertile terrain 
where Russia could oppose the West at a low cost, and the power vacuum in the Balkans 
enabled it to do so.  
 
In that context, Serbia embraced its balancing act more openly to avoid being sucked into 
the great power rivalry, turning this rivalry into an asset where it could balance and pit 
West and Russia against each other to extract concessions from both. Naturally, the issue 
of Kosovo was also a powerful systemic determinant. While the EU’s ability to handle 
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the Kosovo dispute diminished, Belgrade wanted to use Moscow to extract a better 
settlement on Kosovo. 
 
The US changed its posture towards Serbia after Ukraine in 2014, as the Russian factor 
caused the US to pay more attention to Serbia and the Balkans. The systemic environment 
changed as the US suppressed Russian influence in the Balkans. Serbia also engaged 
differently with the US as it became more active in resolving the Kosovo dispute. 
Ultimately, the limits of Russian power and the mistrust and dysfunctionality in Serbo-
Russian relations came to the surface. However, Russia will remain a factor as long as 
the Kosovo issue is unresolved. This notion is vindicated with Joseph Biden’s ascendance 
as the new US President, prompting Serbia to get close to Russia once again. 
 
Domestically, the party politics in Serbia played its role. The sensitivity to the Kosovo 
issue and the Russian popularity in Serbia forced the Serbian leadership, balanced 
internationally, to win votes of both pro-Western and pro-Russian Serbs. Given the 
Serbian government’s increasingly illiberal character, Serbian leadership used the 
balancing act to gain acquiescence from the external powers. While the EU and the US 
were occasionally the targets of government propaganda, they were also tools of domestic 
regime legitimisation, while the government frequently courted pro-Russian sentiments. 
The rhetoric on the US changed as the US under Trump became a more acceptable partner 
for the Serbian government and as Russian popularity became an obstacle in resolving 
the Kosovo issue. However, Russia remains extremely popular with the Serbian public, 
and the unresolved Kosovo dispute is highly salient for Serbian citizens, forcing Serbian 
politicians to employ the Russian factor in their domestic competition. Serbian party 









This chapter is the conclusion that will summarise and revisit the argument in regards to 
the puzzle and the research question. The conclusion will revisit the research 
methodology undertaken and why NCR was chosen as the analytical framework. The 
main arguments and findings will be briefly restated. Afterwards, the contribution that 
this thesis makes to NCR literature, Balkan scholarship, and general IR will also be 
presented. Ultimately, avenues for future research will also be provided as other 
theoretical traditions can profit from studying cases like Serbia. 
 
8.2 Research Methodology and Analytical Framework Revisited 
 
As with any scientific research, the starting point was defining a puzzle and coming up 
with a research question from that puzzle. The research began with an inductive approach 
of selecting a case and defining the timespan of that case study. The case of the Serbian 
balancing act between Russia and the West represented a puzzle in itself. Why did Serbia 
decide to do geopolitical balancing instead of aligning itself fully with the West? Serbia 
is a small country with insufficient capabilities to operate with that much leeway vis-à-
vis more powerful players like the EU, the US and Russia. For a country that is still 
burdened with the legacy of the 1990s when it was deemed a pariah by the West, is it not 
risky to encourage perception in the West of Serbia being Russia’s proxy? Would it not 
be easier for Serbia to follow the footsteps of its neighbours who pursue pro-Western 
policies? 
 
The research question is why is Serbia conducting this balancing act, which involves 
maintaining close ties with Russia, the pursuit of EU membership, and a working 
relationship with the US, and what factors explain variations in that balancing during 
different periods? The period between 2008 and 2020 is selected, as 2008 marks the 
beginning of the Serbian balancing act. The 12 years that ensued provide a long enough 




Upon selecting the case, the research embarked on an empirical process tracing, whose 
purpose was to put the cause (independent variable) and outcome (dependent variable) in 
sequential order. The process tracing was done by analysing primary and secondary 
reading material and then through empirical fieldwork research in Serbia. During the 
fieldwork, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 31 local sources in Serbia. 
The research established systemic pressures that generated the Serbian balancing act and 
its variations during the designated period. However, the research also established a 
strong domestic force of Serbian party politics that determined how Serbia responded to 
these pressures. 
 
Based on this finding, it was possible to formalise the theoretical framework and use NCR 
as the analytical framework that provides the best causal mechanism to organise the 
empirical data collected in the research logically and systematically. That is to say, an 
analytical framework that considers both domestic and systemic factors was needed. 
More importantly, the research needed an analytical framework that deals with the foreign 
policy outcomes of individual states. 
 
NCR is the most novel form of realist theory, and it was first coined by Gideon Rose back 
in 1998. By including domestic forces in its paradigm, NCR reconciles Innenpolitik 
tradition with the realist systemic approach that gives causal primacy to international 
systemic pressures. Equally important is that NCR reconciles two previous versions of 
realism, classical realism and neorealism. NCR keeps the theoretical and scientific rigour 
of neorealism and integrates it with the more context-salient approach of classical realism 
that emphasises the study of statesmanship.  
 
In its causal mechanism, NCR has three variables: the independent variable, the 
intervening variable and the dependent variable. The intervening variable represents the 
international systemic pressures that act as a causal force. Like all versions of realism, 
NCR emphasises the international system’s primacy in determining the states’ behaviour. 
Occasions where the states behave solely according to the domestic rationale without any 
international systemic effects are infrequent.824 All states are susceptible to international 
 




systemic pressures, and the research established that the Serbian balancing act is no 
exception. The systemic pressures that act as the independent variable are the Kosovo 
dispute, the power vacuum in the Balkans, and the state of relations between Russia and 
the West. The last one does not cause the Serbian balancing act, but it determines its form 
and intensity at various stages. The dependent variable is the foreign policy behaviour of 
an individual state that responds to the pressures generated by the international system. 
 
As Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro noted, there are three versions of NCR: NCR as the 
explanation of anomalies of neorealism; as a theory of foreign policy; and most recently 
as a theory of IR.825 The last version does not apply to this study, but NCR is used to 
address a foreign policy puzzle and analyse the foreign policy outcome. Based on that 
premise, this study relied on two general themes of NCR; the first is that not all states 
respond to the systemic pressures in the same way, and the second is that domestic politics 
are a factor in the causal mechanism. States do not respond identically to systemic 
pressures because of the influence of domestic factors. 
 
It is these domestic factors that act as the intervening variable, where it is a filter through 
which systemic pressure gets translated into a foreign policy outcome. The use of an 
intervening variable in the causal analysis gives NCR an edge in analysing individual 
policies, like the Serbian balancing act. The research identified Serbian party politics as 
the intervening variable affecting the Serbian balancing act. Most of NCR’s critics point 
out that it lacks theoretical parsimony because researchers employing the theory 
selectively choose intervening variables in an ad hoc manner depending on the individual 
case study. To make NCR more generalisable, theoretically, Ripsman, Taliaferro and 
Lobell introduced leader’s images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic 
institutions as elements that fall into the category of intervening variables within the NCR 
lexicon.826 
 
Serbian party politics was determined to be an all-inclusive factor that unites these four 
elements. Namely, Serbian leadership dominates over political institutions based on the 
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political position of the political parties they represent, and that political environment 
significantly shapes their worldview. Moreover, the Serbian political parties remain the 
most influential power centre within a Serbian polity known for weak and dysfunctional 
domestic institutions. The political parties remain the only effective transmission belt 
between the state and society. This study has established that party politics act as an 
intervening variable. Still, it diverges from the NCR scholarship that takes into account 
party politics but fails to consider the process of competition between them. This study 
considers this competition process between Serbian elites and political parties, which 
impacts how systemic pressures are being translated into foreign policy, thus qualifying 
Serbian party politics as the intervening variable. 
 
Based on the fact that there are systemic and domestic forces at play, it was also possible 
to apply an analytical narrative method within this study: as the independent and 
intervening variables are the analytical benchmarks, an empirical account was possible 
but with thematic and analytical subplots. Serbian relations with three relevant great 
powers, the EU, the US and Russia, could be described through the lenses of systemic 
and domestic factors. 
 
8.3 The Main Findings and Arguments - Summary 
 
The research uncovered the systemic forces shaping the Serbian balancing act and 
Belgrade’s interaction with three relevant global powers, the EU, the US, and Russia. 
These forces are the independence of Kosovo and the power vacuum in the Balkans. First, 
the independence of Kosovo is a turning point for Serbian foreign policy, forcing 
Belgrade to recalibrate this policy and its relations with both the West and Russia. 
 
The second systemic factor impacting the Serbian balancing act is the power vacuum in 
the Balkans, which has been in play since the global financial crisis of 2008 and deepened 
with the migrant crisis and Brexit. These crises impeded the EU’s ability to enlarge to the 
Balkans, creating an open space that enabled Russia to play a more assertive role. These 
processes also cemented Serbia’s status of being stranded on the Western periphery. In 




the end game of gaining leverage and increasing its bargaining power with the EU and 
the US. 
 
However, while these two factors remain consistent during the designated period between 
2008 and 2020, they still do not provide a full systemic context. They do not explain the 
variations in Serbian balancing at various stages covered with the empirical chapters. The 
study established that the systemic force that helps explain the variations in the form and 
intensity of Serbian balancing is the state of relations between Russia and the West. 
Namely, if these relations are cooperative, the Serbian balancing act can be conducted 
relatively calmly without any strategic tensions. However, if these relations become 
adversarial, Serbian balancing becomes more visible and turbulent due to a more 
dangerous systemic environment. 
 
These systemic factors shaped the Serbian balancing act during the selected historical 
stages. The first stage was between 2008 and 2012 when the Serbian balancing act began. 
The Serbian balancing act is also a policy with nuances and differences in intensity. This 
assertion was empirically proven between 2012 and 2014 when the Serbian balancing act 
operated smoothly and without significant crises. The period between 2014 and 2020 is 
the final and most significant empirical stage when Belgrade’s balancing was most 
pronounced in its openness and intensity. The main reason why this period was the 
pinnacle of the Serbian balancing act in its visibility and intensity was the rivalry between 
Russia and the West. The increased rivalry between the two sides from the Ukraine Crisis 
of 2014 made the Serbian systemic and regional environment more dangerous.  
 
The process tracing methodology and interviews with human sources established that 
Serbian party politics intersect with the country’s foreign policy in three ways, thus acting 
as an intervening variable, a conduit for systemic influences. Firstly, Serbian leaders 
avoid any unpopular policies, like being soft on Kosovo or tough on Russia—thus 
avoiding damaging themselves and their political parties. Secondly, Serbian leaders want 
to win over pro-Western and pro-Russian voters by promoting themselves as facilitators 
of friendship with those powers. Thirdly, Serbia’s political elites believe that by gaining 




competitors needed to win power. The party politics as the intervening variable operating 
at the domestic level of analysis also provided a sub-plot within the analytical narrative 
through which Serbian relations with three relevant powers, the EU, the US and Russia, 
can be viewed.  Consequently, domestic hurdles impede the ability of Serbian leaders to 
get support for any other foreign policy platform, except one based on balancing. 
 
The Serbian party scene was recomposed in the wake of a political crisis generated by 
Kosovo’s independence that became the dominant issue and point of the partisan divide. 
During the period 2008 to 2012, the balancing act became a domestic necessity as foreign 
policy issues like the Kosovo dispute, relations with the EU, US, NATO and Russia 
became part of the inter-party competition. Party politics also played a significant role in 
the period between 2012 and 2014 and between 2014 and 2020, when Serbia marked an 
illiberal turn. This combination of systemic and domestic forces has conditioned the 
Serbian balancing act, and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. 
 
8.4 Contribution to the Field 
 
The thesis contributes to the domain of NCR, Balkan studies, and IR in general. This 
research contributes to the field of NCR not by adding another case study to the list but 
by the nature of the selected case. Serbia is an interesting case study in terms of both 
systemic and domestic forces that are in play. Regarding systemic factors, if one of the 
purposes of NCR is to analyse anomalies to neorealism, Serbia is the perfect example. 
After all, neorealism would expect a small state with insufficient power capabilities to 
bandwagon with the West. However, Serbian behaviour is different, arising the need for 
NCR analysis, whose scope is expanded because NCR scholarship has been 
overwhelmingly focused on policies of great powers.  
 
At the same time, by examining the domestic background of Serbian foreign policy, NCR 
profits as one can develop insights into how domestic politics filter systemic pressures in 
a country with a hybrid political system, not fitting into the democracy-autocracy 
dichotomy. More importantly, a polity based on partisanship and interest groups plays a 




by Peter Trubowitz, that NCR discounts foreign policy’s distributional and electoral role 
in domestic politics.    
 
In terms of Balkan studies, the greatest contribution of the thesis is empirical. The 
research identified key changes in the Serbian systemic environment (both global and 
regional) that have shaped the country’s place in the world and its region since 2008. 
Empirically, these changes are key turning points in Serbia’s recent diplomatic history, 
including the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008, the global financial crisis 
that same year and the crisis in Ukraine of 2014. Based on this finding,  it was possible 
to identify the dominant trend of Serbian foreign policy at this moment in history.  That 
trend is Belgrade’s tendency to hedge and avoid full tilt towards either the West or Russia.   
 
Through this study, the Balkan scholarship can familiarise itself with domestic dynamics 
influencing Serbian foreign policy. On that front, the study contributes to the field by 
providing input on the character and development of the Serbian polity, including in its 
current illiberal form. More importantly, it shows the competition between political 
parties to be the missing piece of the puzzle, explaining why Serbia responds the way it 
does to its external challenges. 
 
This approach resulted in a thesis that places research on Serbia and the Balkans in the 
wider context of IR. The use of NCR, including systemic and domestic factors in its causal 
mechanism, sheds light on the forces shaping not just the Serbian balancing act, one of 
the dominant traits of Serbian policy, but its foreign policy as a whole. The thesis also 
places Serbia and the Balkans, a country and region that have been outside the geopolitical 
mainstream except for regional specialists, into the global context. The study shows how 
the global dynamics involving great powers like the EU, the US, and Russia affect the 
neglected region and how local nations like Serbia operate when they face those global 
effects reaching their regional neighbourhood. With that in mind, this study also provides 






8.5 Possible Avenues of Future Research  
 
The use of NCR and its ability to integrate the intervening variable into the realist, 
systemic logic provided a very elaborate manner to analyse Serbian policy of balancing 
between Russia and the West during the designated period. This does not mean that all 
the avenues for future research on this topic have been exhausted with this study. On the 
contrary, Serbian foreign policy can provide a strong incentive for future research, 
offering options for both empirical and theoretical research. 
 
The researchers dealing with Serbia, the Balkans and European geopolitics who approach 
these issues from the empirical policy standpoint can profit from this study. However, 
they can also build upon it for the future. The Serbian balancing act is not fully complete 
with the period covered in this study. Serbia is still burdened with the Kosovo dispute, 
leaving Russia in the game in the Western Balkans. Those interested in US and Russian 
foreign policy can also draw knowledge from this study and try to develop further insights 
about considerations guiding the US and Russia in those regions which are not at the 
forefront of world media. Those who chose to explore other aspects of Serbian foreign 
policy can draw insights from this study on patterns and factors behind Belgrade’s foreign 
policy. In doing so, future research must consider that even though they lack the power 
capabilities of the global powers they engage with, countries like Serbia are not merely 
pawns of great power politics. Instead, such countries try to manoeuvre within those 
systemic circumstances.  
 
Future research on this topic needs to take into account local agency. The project took 
into account the state agency by using NCR as a theoretical framework and by integrating 
the intervening variable. Some other NCR authors might find an interest in other aspects 
of Serbian foreign policy. In analysing this behaviour, they can expand on the foundation 
left by this study by integrating other potential unit-level intervening variables. The 
identity or the ideology of Serbian nationalism are just some of the potential candidates 
for the intervening variable that can be attractive for NCR scholars tempted to research 





There are naturally other theoretical approaches that can also profit from this project and 
analyse the unit-level factors only from a different perspective. NCR stands in between 
Innenpolitik theories that stress domestic politics and unit-level factors, and realist 
theories that emphasise the international system. The Innenpolitik theorists that engage 
with the political regime’s nature, domestic interest groups and state-society relations 
should pay more attention to countries like Serbia.  
 
Countries like Serbia have a complex and turbulent socio-political history that prevented 
the full emergence of mature civil society and liberal democracy with the rule of law and 
functioning independent institutions. The historical evolution of the Serbian polity and its 
endgame is even more challenging for researchers given the complicated nature of 
Yugoslav communism, the legacy of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, and the incomplete 
political and economic transition in Serbia. With this chaotic and unpredictable domestic 
politics, Innenpolitik theories can gain new knowledge and devise new ideas on how the 
domestic political environment shapes its external policies. Serbia’s current status as a 
hybrid regime makes the country an even more significant challenge for Innenpolitik 
scholarship. By examining the domestic political environment, particularly party politics, 
this thesis lays the groundwork for further research into other aspects of the Serbian 
political system that may impact Serbian foreign policy. The lack of a civic, political 
culture - that is a must for the functioning of genuine liberal, constitutional democracy - 
the nature of Serbian political economy and public administration and its impact on the 
country’s foreign policy can also be developed further based on the findings of this study. 
 
NCR also stands in between the materialist tradition associated with realism and 
ideational approaches that emphasise perceptions, ideas and identities. In their focus on 
identities, the constructivists can also be among those who might profit from studying the 
Serbian balancing act and Belgrade’s policies towards great powers. While NCR does not 
entirely discount the role that ideas and identities play in domestic politics and foreign 
policy, NCR is focused on their use as instruments in the power struggle among various 
groups and not on the process of identity formation and social construction. This leaves 
an opening for the constructivists to explore the role of identities and strengthen their 




foreign policy among the Serbian elite is another avenue that should be of interest to the 
social constructivists. The role of strategic culture is also another avenue of potential 
research that might be of equal interest to realists and constructivists. If parochial interests 
and opportunistic parties dominate the Serbian polity, what type of strategic culture is 
formed in that environment?   
 
FPA scholarship can also find salience in the case of Serbia, particularly the scholarship 
that deals with the role of cognition, perceptions of the leadership, and historical 
analogies. These analytical approaches can provide an even more complex picture and 
enrich the existing scholarship by analysing Serbian policies and Serbia’s relations with 
great powers through the individual level of analysis. Due to its small size and the fact 
that the Balkans is not in the focus of the global public, Serbia is not frequently a subject 
of scholarly IR inquiry, except for Balkan specialists. However, the country’s complex 
history, unpredictable domestic and external environment creates an equally surprising 
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